Convergence of biological and psychological perspectives on cognitive coordination in schizophrenia by Phillips, William & Silverstein, Steven M
1. Introduction
Cognitive neuroscience provides a new conceptual frame-
work for psychiatry by showing how psychological pro-
cesses arise from neuronal activity (Kandel 1998). Con-
versely, it is possible that psychiatry will influence the
future development of cognitive neuroscience by encour-
aging a better balance between localist and holistic con-
ceptions of brain function. An apparent conflict between
these conceptions has been central to the development of
neuroscience, with the emphasis upon locally specialized
functions emerging as clearly dominant. Neuroanatomy,
neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and neuroimaging all
show that different regions of the brain process information
about different things, and that different cells within re-
gions deal with different aspects of those things. Recent de-
velopments in experimental and theoretical neurobiology,
however, are leading to an increased emphasis upon inter-
actions that coordinate the activity of locally specialized
processors. Here we argue that impairment of these coor-
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dinating interactions may be central to some psychiatric
disorders. Studies of such disorders may therefore shed fur-
ther light on their nature and importance.
Many studies indicate that the strength and salience of
neuronal responses depends on context, and that subsets of
neuronal responses are grouped by synchronizing the spik-
ing activity of which they are composed (Gray 1999; Phillips
& Singer 1997a). This implies that context can change the
salience and timing of neuronal signals but without chang-
ing what they mean. These effects are a special kind of mod-
ulation, which we will refer to as cognitive coordination.
Such effects were predicted by theoretical considerations
(e.g., Edelman 1989; Sporns et al. 1989; von der Malsburg
& Schneider 1986), and Phillips and Singer (1997a) com-
bine the experimental evidence with neurocomputational
theory to argue that it is fundamental to normal cortical
function. Many others agree with this view (Phillips &
Singer 1997b), and the possibility that contextual coordina-
tion may be impaired in schizophrenia was briefly noted by
Silverstein and Schenkel (1997). This paper examines that
possibility in detail. The viewpoint presented is consistent
with the theory relating schizophrenia to re-entrant mech-
anisms (Edelman 1989; Tononi & Edelman 2000), and with
the disconnection hypothesis (Dolan et al. 1999; Friston
1999), with which it will be compared in section 7.1.
Changes in the effects of context are central to several in-
fluential theories of cognition in schizophrenia (e.g., Cohen
et al. 1999a; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber 1992; Gray et al.
1991; Hemsley et al. 1993; Shakow 1962). They are not cen-
tral to a currently influential conception of the underlying
pathophysiology (e.g., Olney et al. 1999), however. This hy-
pothesizes that under-activity of NMDA (N-methyl-D-
aspartate) glutamate receptor channels plays a central role,
and it is supported by a rapidly growing body of neu-
ropharmacological studies cited below. Here we argue that
these two streams of research are mutually supportive.
Many patients diagnosed with schizophrenia have im-
pairments in perception, pre-attentive sensory gating, se-
lective attention, working memory, and long-term memory,
as well as other cognitive impairments more obviously in-
terpreted in terms of context. We will argue that all these
impairments involve cognitive coordination. As our theory
predicts, they are most prominent in patients with thought
disorder and other disorganized symptoms, so those are the
symptoms on which we focus. Liddle (1987) reported evi-
dence for three distinct groups of symptoms in schizophre-
nia: reality distortion (hallucinations and delusions), negative
symptoms, and cognitive disorganization. Though subse-
quent factor analytic studies sometimes also suggest one or
two additional factors, they reliably find evidence for these
three (Andreasen et al. 1995). To a crude first approxima-
tion they can be seen as relating to Kraepelin’s classic dis-
tinctions between paranoia, catatonia or negativism, and
hebrephrenia, with the crucial proviso that they provide a
3-dimensional space that can be used to characterize some
of the variation in schizophrenic symptomatology, without
at all implying that patients are clustered within one of
three separate regions of that space.
After 100 years of research on schizophrenia, it is still un-
clear whether schizophrenia is one disorder or several. The
presenting symptoms are clearly heterogeneous, and at the
neurobiological level multiple neurotransmitters and brain
regions have been implicated (e.g., Benes 2000b; Jentsch &
Roth 1999). Recognizing this heterogeneity, we must make
clear at the outset that we are here primarily concerned
with the disorganization syndrome, and with the disorders
of coordinating neuronal interactions, such as under-activ-
ity of NMDA-receptor channels, from which disorganiza-
tion may arise.
It is sometimes suggested that much of the observed het-
erogeneity arises in various ways from a common under-
lying pathology. We will argue that the disorganization
syndrome, which has a particularly large genetic loading
(Cardno et al. 2001), may reflect such a pathology.
Nevertheless, we do not claim that this can explain all
symptoms that have been associated with schizophrenia,
and assume that some can arise independently of either
cognitive disorganization or NMDA-hypofunction. Similarly,
we do not attempt to explain all of the many neuropatho-
logical findings relating to schizophrenia, but focus on those
that seem particularly relevant to our hypothesis.
We will discuss four crucial issues concerning cognitive
impairments. First, what is “context”? Second, do changes
in context-sensitivity underlie various apparently diverse
cognitive impairments? Third, how are cognitive impair-
ments related to clinical symptoms? Fourth, are these cog-
nitive changes similar to those produced by substances such
as PCP (phencyclidine) and ketamine, and, if so, what does
that suggest about the pathophysiology of the underlying
cognitive changes?
Dopamine dysregulation has been implicated in schizo-
phrenia by a vast amount of research, but we will outline ev-
idence suggesting that there is also a central role for under-
activity of NMDA glutamate receptor channels. For brevity
we will refer to this as NMDA-hypoactivity.
We will discuss three issues raised by this evidence. First,
why does NMDA-hypoactivity have such widespread but dis-
tinctive effects upon cognition? Second, what is the role of
NMDA-mediated interactions between pyramidal cells in
producing these effects? Third, the most distinctive property
of NMDA-channels is that, in addition to being ionotropic,
they are voltage-dependent. Theories of cortical computa-
tion claiming that NMDA-channels play a major role in co-
ordinating activity (e.g. Phillips & Singer 1997a; Sporns et al.
1989) emphasize this property, and thus predict that NMDA-
hypoactivity will impair cognitive coordination.
We will cite previous work clarifying the key notions of
“context” and “coordination” from psychological, neurobi-
ological, and computational perspectives, but we see these
concepts as open to further improvement. We will focus on
coordination within the cortex but assume that it is also rel-
evant to limbic, striatal, and thalamic functions. Although
context has long been thought relevant to schizophrenia
(e.g. Shakow 1962), different investigators think of it in dif-
ferent ways (Pickering 1993). Cohen and Servan-Schreiber
(1992) identify context with task-relevant information sup-
plied by preceding events and stored in a working memory
(WM) involving the prefrontal cortex (PFC). For others
(e.g., Gray et al. 1991; Hemsley et al. 1993; Jones et al.
1991) it includes effects of concurrent context on percep-
tion, and depends more upon long-term memory than upon
working memory (WM). Our concept of context includes
both of these views. It is based upon an underlying distinc-
tion between processes that determine what neural signals
mean, that is, what they transmit information about, and
processes that affect transmission of those signals without
becoming part of their meaning. Effects upon salience or
timing provide good examples because it is assumed that
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they do not change the meaning of the signals affected. We
will call the input about which a processor transmits infor-
mation to subsequent processors the “primary input.” It
arises from the receptive field (RF) input determining the
stimuli to which cells are selectively sensitive. Context aris-
ing from other streams of processing plays a secondary role
by modifying signal detection decisions, by influencing the
choice between possible interpretations, by making rele-
vant signals more salient, and by grouping those that go to-
gether. The input producing these effects has therefore
been called the contextual field input (Phillips & Singer
1997a). We do not identify context with particular kinds of
knowledge, but with a particular class of effects, assuming
that the outputs of most processors serve both as a basis for
computing higher-order things and as a context for the pro-
cessing of other things. Although we discuss the distinction
between contextual interactions and the primary interac-
tions that determine RF selectivity as though it were cate-
gorical, the biological reality may well be less simple, com-
bining these two functions in various ways.1 Even if this is
so, however, it remains necessary to make the concept of
contextual interaction clear. Formal computational studies
of our conception of context will be cited below. Here we try
to convey the essentials through informal demonstrations.
Information can be ambiguous in several ways as the
presence, interpretation, and relevance of signals can all be
uncertain given just those signals alone. Figure 1 shows ex-
amples of disambiguation by concurrent stimulus context,
making explicit the properties that distinguish the effects of
context from the effects of primary input. Figure 1 empha-
sizes the effects of concurrent stimulus context, and deficits
in such effects will be emphasized below. Task contexts are
also important, however. Many paradigms have been used
to study the effects of task-context in schizophrenia, and
these effects are also usually much reduced (e.g., Perlstein
et al. 1998).
Local stimulus elements are related to the context in
which they occur by being grouped into coherent wholes or
Gestalts. Evidence reviewed in section 4.1 shows that these
basic organizational processes are often impaired in schizo-
phrenia. The Gestalt theory-influenced psychiatrists Matus-
sek (1952/1987) and Conrad (1958) saw core components
of schizophrenia as arising from a disorder of perceptual
organization, and Cutting (1989) concluded that Gestalt
theory offers an understanding of otherwise inexplicable
phenomena of schizophrenia. Here, we further develop
these hypotheses by reviewing evidence that, as the Gestalt
psychologists emphasized, such dynamic organizational pro-
cesses may apply to cognition in general.
In summary, our working conceptions of coordination
and context are as follows. Coordinating interactions are
those that affect the salience or dynamic grouping of neu-
ronal signals without changing what they mean. Such inter-
actions do affect the interpretation of stimulus inputs, how-
ever. This is shown in Figure 1 where the interpretation of
stimulus items is strongly influenced by surrounding items.
We assume that this involves increasing the salience of the
neuronal signals that convey the interpretation selected,
which implies that those signals can be made more salient,
without changing what they mean. Dynamic grouping cre-
ates new combinations of items while maintaining their dis-
tinct meanings. It is essentially the same as “compositional-
ity” (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988), which refers to the ability to
compose new structures, such as sentences, from elements,
such as words, which retain their individual meanings while
being used in many different combinations. Fodor and
Pylyshyn (1988) argued that standard connectionist models
fail to provide this capability and are therefore of limited
value in modelling higher aspects of cognition. The coordi-
nating interactions emphasized here could overcome this
limitation because forming new combinations of elements
while retaining their individual meanings is one of their
central functions.
It may seem that localist conceptions of brain function
have long since won the debate with holistic conceptions
by explaining coordination in terms of a central executive
located in specialized regions of the pre-frontal cortex
(PFC). This cannot be the whole story, however. Organiz-
ing activity by imposing top-down strategic commands
upon what would otherwise be anarchy could not by itself
be adequate, because any strategic control system must be
ignorant of nearly all of the details upon which effective lo-
cal cooperation depends. In relation to perception it is now
clear that the dynamic organizational processes empha-
sized by Gestalt psychology are largely pre-attentive (Watt
& Phillips 2000). In relation to motor control, the long-
established principle of “central executive ignorance” im-
plies that dynamic coordination is largely local (Kelso 1995;
Turvey 1977). Our working hypothesis is therefore that cor-
tical activity is coordinated by widely distributed local in-
teractions within and between regions, as well as by top-
down strategic commands, and we will outline evidence
that this is so.
These arguments imply that there are higher-level pro-
cesses of strategic coordination.2 Our working hypothesis is
that local and strategic coordination both depend on basic
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Figure 1. Simple examples showing the distinct roles of primary
and contextual input, in the case of disambiguation by concurrent
stimulus context. (a) Left column: nearby items affect the salience
of the various possible interpretations of the central item. Though
T and P influence the processing of O, a response identifying it as
a letter rather than a digit does not imply that it is flanked by T
and P, or indeed by any context at all. Thus the response transmits
information about the primary input, and not about the context,
even though it is affected by the context. Center column: context
is not necessary as the central item is perceived in the absence of
any context, though interpretation may then either select a dom-
inant default option or fluctuate between alternatives. Right col-
umn: Primary input is necessary, however, as contextual items
alone do not produce perception of items for which there is no pri-
mary evidence. (b) Mutual contextual disambiguation can occur
when all items are ambiguous. 
physiological mechanisms of dynamic grouping and con-
textual-modulation. In the following section we discuss the
relevance of these mechanisms to pre-attentive perception.
Here we briefly note their possible relevance to executive
functions. The control of lower-level routines clearly re-
quires modulatory interactions, as does attention. Working
memory requires forming and maintaining a novel sub-set
of items, which implies some form of dynamic grouping
(Lisman et al. 1998; Luck & Vogel 1997; Raffone & Wol-
ters 2001). Source memory and the assignment of affective
significance both imply that contextual associations are
formed from semantically distinct items, thus requiring
compositionality. Lastly, although it is not known what neu-
ronal processes are involved in creative problem-solving,
they seem likely to include both dynamic organization and
context-sensitivity.
What we call local coordination has much in common
with “contention scheduling” (Shallice 1988; Shallice &
Burgess 1996), that is, with the automated resolution of
conflicts between schemata. Our emphasis upon local co-
ordination does not imply that we think executive functions
have little to do. On the contrary, there is evidence that, in
addition to their other roles, executive functions can mod-
ulate local processes of dynamic coordination (Fries et al.
2001; Gilbert et al. 2000; Ito & Gilbert 1999).3
Our perspective on context and coordination has been
presented here informally, but it has been given rigorous
mathematical specification using Shannon’s information
theory (Phillips et al. 1995; Tononi et al. 1994; 1996), and it
has been implemented in simulations of simplifying (Kay et
al. 1998) and physiologically realistic (Sporns et al. 1989)
neural networks. Introductory nonmathematical reviews of
this work that discuss its relevance to cognition are available
(Phillips & Singer 1997a; Tononi et al. 1998b). Compu-
tational theories provide ways of bridging the gap be-
tween psychiatry and neurobiology (e.g., Cohen & Servan-
Schreiber 1992; Hoffman & McGlashan 1993). An explicit
bridge is necessary, because we will never know whether an
identified neural pathology is directly responsible for the
cognitive impairments with which it is found to be associ-
ated unless we know how the mechanism that is impaired
gives rise to the cognitive capacities concerned.
The central concern of this target article is therefore with
the neural bases of cognitive disorganization in schizo-
phrenia. Section 3 reviews evidence implicating NMDA-
hypofunction in this disorder. Section 4 reviews evidence
that it involves deficits in basic processes of cognitive co-
ordination, such as contextual disambiguation and dynamic
Gestalt organization. We claim that the neurocomputational
theories of Kay et al. (1998), Phillips et al. (1995), and
Tononi et al. (1994) can explain why NMDA-hypofunction
should lead to these particular cognitive deficits. Section 2,
therefore, first reviews psychophysical, anatomical, and
physiological evidence for the central ideas expressed in
those theories. The computational work simply shows that
the operations involved are formally coherent and able to
perform the functions involved. Empirical studies are nec-
essary to determine whether they are relevant to neurobi-
ology. Section 5 reviews studies of high-frequency cortical
rhythms that provide further support for the view that cog-
nitive coordination, NMDA-activity, and psychosis are all
related. Section 6 shows how our perspective is compatible
with the heterogeneity of symptoms in schizophrenia, and
also briefly discusses the possibility that impaired cognitive
coordination may be involved in some other disorders of
mental function, such as autism. Section 7 compares our
perspective with related theories. Section 8 lists several of
the issues that arise, and which in our opinion deserve
closer examination.
2. A special class of neuronal interactions
coordinate cortical activity
2.1. There is physiological and psychophysical
evidence for coordinating interactions
There is good evidence that both stimulus and task contexts
affect activity by enhancing relevant and suppressing irrel-
evant activity. For example, parallel studies comparing re-
sults obtained from human psychophysics and single-unit
recording in the visual cortex of alert monkeys show that
they are quantitatively very similar (Kapadia et al. 1995).
Here we outline this evidence, which has been thoroughly
reviewed by others (Desimone & Duncan 1995; Gilbert
1992; Kovács 1996; Lamme & Spekreijse 2000; Maunsell
1995; Salin & Bullier 1995; Singer & Gray 1995; Wörgötter
& Eysel 2000; Zipser et al. 1996). Context influences the
salience of neuronal responses. Pyramidal cells in the pri-
mary visual cortex, for example, are specialized to respond
preferentially to stimuli with particular positions, orienta-
tion and size. This selectivity is determined by the primary
input to each cell, which arises from a limited region of the
visual field which is called the receptive field (RF) of that
cell. Responses to preferred stimuli within the RF can be
amplified or suppressed by stimuli presented well beyond
the classical RF, however. This interaction is highly specific
to the geometric relations between elements, with facilita-
tion being strong when the local elements taken together
form some coherent entity such as a smooth contour (Ka-
padia et al. 1995; Kovács 1996). Facilitation is strongest
when the RF input is weak, and decreases as the spacing
between elements increases (Polat et al. 1993; Polat & Sagi
1998). Locally specific contextual amplification in primary
visual cortex has also been shown to be produced by feed-
back signals from extrastriate cortex that increases the
salience of stimulus elements that are part of the figure
rather than the ground (Zipser et al. 1996). Though in a
sense “top-down,” these particular effects are nevertheless
still driven by stimulus context, which is used automatically
to organize input into figure and ground (Zipser et al. 1996).
Similar effects on salience can also be produced by pro-
cesses of selective attention that depend upon the task
(Desimone & Duncan 1995; Maunsell 1995). These effects
of task context are produced by the same kind of physio-
logical mechanisms as those that mediate the effects of
stimulus context (Treue & Tujillo 1999). Furthermore, task
context modulates the effects of local stimulus context
(Gilbert et al. 2000; Ito & Gilbert 1999).
Contextual interactions are also involved in the grouping
of neuronal responses. The conditions in which simple vi-
sual elements, such as Gabor patches, are grouped, are so
similar to those under which disambiguating interactions
occur between them, that both effects could depend upon
a common set of underlying neuronal connections (Kovács
1996). Dynamic Gestalt grouping has a fundamental role in
vision, and is predominantly computed by pre-attentive
mechanisms. One particularly clear example of a task in
which dynamic grouping is necessary is the computation of
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coherent object motion from many local motion signals
(Watt & Phillips 2000), and relevant studies of motion per-
ception in schizophrenia will be discussed in section 4.1.
Dynamic grouping could be signalled by synchronizing
the activity to be grouped, and this hypothesis is supported
by a wide variety of evidence (Gray 1999; Singer 1994;
1995; 1999; Singer & Gray 1995). Synchrony was first ob-
served in primary visual cortex of anaesthetised cats, and it
has since been shown in awake monkeys (Kreiter & Singer
1996), and within and between parietal and motor cortex
(Roelfsema et al. 1997). Psychophysical evidence on the
role of dynamic grouping in vision and its relation to syn-
chrony is reviewed by Watt and Phillips (2000). Evidence
from evoked potentials indicates that synchrony is en-
hanced by selective attention in auditory cortex (Tiitinen et
al. 1993), and it has been argued that synchrony may be the
neural correlate of sensory awareness (Engel & Singer
2001). Though the role of synchrony remains controversial,
Treisman (1999) concludes that there is so much evidence
for grouping through convergence in pre-specified hierar-
chies and for grouping as signalled by synchronization that
it is highly likely that both occur. Watt and Phillips (2000)
argue that they are mutually supportive.
2.2. Lateral and descending intracortical connections
provide an anatomical basis for coordination
Long-range communication within and between cortical
regions is mediated predominantly by pyramidal cell axons
(Braitenberg & Schüz 1991). Though complex, this long-
range communication includes some simple patterns of
connectivity that are common to cortex as a whole (Felle-
man & Van Essen 1991). Ascending feedforward connec-
tions provide the primary driving inputs that are processed
by local cortical circuits. Long-range lateral connections
within and between regions together with descending feed-
back connections provide additional input (Felleman & Van
Essen 1991), and this could in part be used to coordinate
the primary feedforward processing. This general pattern
of connectivity is shown as simply as possible in Figure 2a.
Figure 2b uses the canonical circuit hypothesized by Doug-
las and Martin (1990) to show how local circuits within cor-
tical columns could receive both primary ascending inputs
and long-range coordinating inputs. Figure 2 focuses on
long-range connections omitting many details of intrinsic
connectivity within the local circuits, such as the NMDA-
receptor component of the local excitatory input to the in-
hibitory cells (Grunze et al. 1996). The long-range lateral
connections within primary visual cortex have been studied
in great detail. They are highly specific, and probably im-
plement the coordinating interactions producing Gestalt
organization (Gilbert 1992; Kovács 1996; Schmidt et al.
1997; Singer & Gray 1995).
2.3. NMDA glutamate receptor channels provide a
synaptic mechanism for coordination
The cholinergic, adrenergic, dopaminergic, and serotoner-
gic systems are most prominent amongst neurotransmitters
known to have modulatory effects. It is unlikely that these
classical neuromodulators can implement the detailed co-
ordinating interactions emphasized here, however. This is
because those interactions must be between the processing
streams that convey detailed information about what is be-
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Figure 2. Common patterns of connectivity within and between
cortical regions. (a) This shows the hypothesized distinction be-
tween RF connections that transmit primary feedforward infor-
mation through cortical columns, shown with solid grey arrow-
heads and contextual field connections that coordinate that
transmission, shown with open arrowheads. Only a few columns
are shown in each region, and many complexities of connectivity
are omitted. Each column of necessity receives input from only a
small subset of the cells in the preceding region, and though these
subsets may overlap for nearby columns (not shown) there is little
overlap between the inputs of most columns within a region. Mas-
sively parallel but interactive processing is thus implied by this ar-
chitecture. (b) Connectivity within and between columns is shown
using the canonical cortical circuit hypothesized by Douglas and
Martin (1990). Three columns processing separate parts of the in-
put from the preceding region are shown. This pattern of con-
nectivity is thought to occur throughout the cortex. Glutamater-
gic (GLU) pyramidal cells are divided into two populations with
the upper group being those in Layers II, III, and IV and the lower
being those in Layers V and VI. Excitatory synapses are shown by
arrowheads. Inhibitory synapses formed by inhibitory cells are
shown by filled circles. Synapses mediating long-range coordina-
tion within and between regions are shown by open arrowheads
labelled N. They selectively link columns sensitive to distinct but
correlated inputs, bypassing intervening columns that respond 
to inputs that are less correlated. The circuitry shown is highly
simplified and omits much detail, including the pyramidal cell out-
puts to more distant sites, and the sources of the descending co-
ordinating inputs from higher regions. For detailed reviews of ev-
idence on which this figure is based, see Douglas and Martin
(1990), Felleman and Van Essen (1991), and Salin and Bullier
(1995).
ing seen, heard, thought, or remembered, and so on. Con-
sider the perception of the ambiguous stimuli in Figure 1,
for example. Coherent interpretations at each level of pro-
cessing are formed by coordinating the interpretation of
each element with that of other elements. The information
concerning these elements and their interpretation is trans-
mitted by the axons of pyramidal cells, which are all gluta-
matergic (Braitenberg & Schüz 1991). We therefore sug-
gest that two major components of the glutamatergic
system need to be distinguished: The first provides the pri-
mary input that produces post-synaptic output and deter-
mines what cells transmit information about. The second is
neither necessary nor sufficient to produce post-synaptic
output, but modifies the effects of the primary inputs.
These modulatory interactions between pyramidal cells can
be direct, but will often be mediated by local circuit neu-
rons, as in the case of suppressive interactions for example,
which depend on inhibitory interneurons. This distinction
between primary and coordinating interactions is closely
analogous to that between obligatory and modulatory in-
teractions between cortical regions as inferred from fMRI
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) data (Friston et
al. 1995).
This argument is supported by a well-established dis-
tinction between two classes of glutamate receptor, one that
produces primary excitatory drive and one that modulates
the activity thereby produced. For a thorough introduction
to these receptors see Feldman et al. (1997). AMPA and
kainate glutamate receptors provide primary excitatory
drive because they open whenever glutamate (GLU) binds
to them. Metabotropic and NMDA-receptors both have a
coordinating role, because both modulate the effects of di-
rect excitatory inputs (Daw et al. 1993; Salt & Eaton 1996).
Though there may be a role for metabotropic receptors
(Whittington et al. 1995), coordination on a fast time-scale
is likely to be more dependent on NMDA-receptors be-
cause they operate more rapidly (Daw et al. 1993). This ar-
gument is made precise by computational studies showing
how the voltage-dependent properties of NMDA-receptors
can be used for the dynamic organization of both process-
ing and learning (e.g., Kay et al. 1998; Phillips et al. 1995;
Sporns et al. 1989). The argument is further strengthened
by the evidence cited below, implicating NMDA-receptors
in cognitive coordination.
As NMDA-receptors may play a crucial role in coordina-
tion we now note their most relevant characteristics: (1)
They are voltage-dependent because at or below resting
levels of post-synaptic membrane potential, they are
blocked by magnesium ions (Fig. 3). Current flow through
NMDA-channels thus requires both that glutamate binds
to the receptor and that the post-synaptic membrane is al-
ready partially depolarized. The key point to note is that be-
cause of this voltage-dependency they could contribute to
coordination by amplifying activity that is appropriate, and
by suppressing, via inhibitory interneurons (Grunze et al.
1996), that which is inappropriate. They therefore have a
gain-control effect on ongoing processing, as shown in Fig-
ure 3c (based on data in Fox et al. 1990). (2) They let cal-
cium into the cell, and thus play a major role in the cascade
of processes that underlie learning. (3) They open less
rapidly than non-NMDA-channels, and open for longer.
Note, however, that direct application of NMDA to neural
circuits can activate rhythmic bursting (Daw et al. 1993),
and that NMDA currents may have a rapidly decaying com-
ponent with a time constant short enough to support fast
bursting and synchronization (Jensen et al. 1996). (4) They
have a rich set of sites that regulate channel function. Fig-
ure 3 shows only a few of them. (5) They are widely distrib-
uted across all cortical regions, and are especially dense in
the hippocampus, basal ganglia, and pre-frontal cortex
(Monaghan et al. 1989). (6) At the cellular level they form
synapses on both pyramidal cells and on inhibitory in-
terneurons (Grunze et al. 1996), and in the case of pyrami-
dal cells they are predominantly located on distal dendrites
(Siegel et al. 1994), which supports the hypothesis that it is
predominantly the distal dendrites of pyramidal cells that
receive long-range contextual input (Körding & König
2000). (7) They have several subtypes, with subtly different
physiological properties (McBain & Mayer 1994). NMDA-
receptors on pyramidal projection cells and on local circuit
interneurons could therefore be of different subtypes
(Grunze et al. 1996; Monyer et al. 1994).
Clearly, our hypothesis concerning the role of NMDA-
receptors in cognitive coordination requires further devel-
opment and test. Additional support discussed in section
5.2 concerns their relevance to the high-frequency syn-
chronous rhythms that have been related to both cognitive
coordination and schizophrenia.
2.4. Coordinating interactions have general relevance
for cognition
Studies of vision are prominent in the evidence cited above
because they relate neurophysiology and psychophysics in
great detail. Higher cognitive functions are likely to be even
more dependent on context-sensitivity and dynamic group-
ing, however. An empirical argument for supposing that
such coordinating interactions have general relevance for
cognition is that the mechanisms by which they could be im-
plemented (such as those shown in Figs. 2 and 3) are widely
distributed throughout the cortex. Furthermore, as will be
outlined in section 5, EEG (electroencephalogram) record-
ings provide evidence that high-frequency synchronization
plays an important role in various cognitive functions.
3. NMDA-antagonists impair cognitive
coordination and are schizomimetic
If cognitive coordination depends upon ion flow through
NMDA-channels then it should be disrupted when they are
blocked. The effects of subanaesthetic doses of a class of
drugs that include PCP and ketamine support this predic-
tion as they produce their psychotomimetic effects via
competitive or non-competitive antagonism with NMDA-
channels (Javitt & Zukin 1991). For brevity we refer to this
disorder as PCP-psychosis. Many reviews of PCP-psychosis
and the associated glutamatergic hypothesis of schizophre-
nia are available (Coyle 1996; Ellison 1995; Goff & Coyle
2001; Javitt & Zukin 1991; Jentsch & Roth 1999; Olney &
Farber 1995; Olney et al. 1999; Tamminga 1998). Only par-
ticularly relevant findings are summarized here. The
schizomimetic effects of NMDA-antagonists suggests that
schizophrenia may involve under-activity of NMDA-recep-
tors, so evidence on this will also be discussed. Though
PCP-psychosis seems more similar to schizophrenia than
any other drug-induced psychosis, they are not claimed to
be identical. Abi-Saab et al. (1998) give reasons for expect-
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ing differences, and conclude that the psychosis induced by
NMDA-antagonists best models symptoms of cognitive dis-
organization including thought disorder. As we will show, it
may also have relevance to other symptoms, however. Our
focus here is therefore on the cognitive disorganization pro-
duced by reducing the activity of NMDA-receptor chan-
nels. NMDA-receptor antagonists, such as PCP, can influ-
ence other neurotransmitter systems also, however, so the
complex psychopathology produced may also include ef-
fects due to those other influences.
Effects of NMDA-antagonists in humans are summa-
rized in Table 1. Acute effects of a single subanaesthetic dose
occur within minutes and last a few hours; chronic effects
of repeated doses can be long lasting. Their similarity to ef-
fects seen in schizophrenia is both striking and surprising,
given the very different developmental courses of the two
conditions. The effects of acute exposure to NMDA-antag-
onists show that most of the symptoms and deficits seen in
schizophrenia can be produced without long-term struc-
tural damage. The relevance of NMDA-antagonists to
schizophrenia is further strengthened by evidence that they
provoke relapse in schizophrenic patients, who are highly
sensitive to them (Allen & Young 1978; Bakker & Amini
1961; Lahti et al. 1995b; Malhotra et al. 1997; Tamminga
1998). PCP-psychosis also resembles schizophrenia in that
it is age dependent, with its effects being much less appar-
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Figure 3. Outline of the voltage-dependency of NMDA receptor synaptic channels, emphasizing their amplifying function. NMDA re-
ceptor channels are shown in black outlines, non-NMDA (AMPA and KA) in grey outlines. Outward ion flow not shown. NMDA-chan-
nel function is regulated by several other sites in addition to those shown. (a) When the post-synaptic membrane is at or below resting
potential, NMDA-channels are blocked by magnesium ions, which reduces ion flow through these channels when glutamate or NMDA
binds to the receptor. (b) When the post-synaptic membrane is raised above resting potential, for example, by flow through non-NMDA-
channels, the magnesium block is released, so ions then flow through these channels when glutamate binds to the receptor. (c) The am-
plifying effect of NMDA function, as shown by iontophoretic application of NMDA or of APV which blocks binding to the receptor.
Graph based on the responses of cells in cat visual cortex to visual stimuli at their preferred orientation and of varying contrasts (Fox et
al. 1990). (d) Binding to the PCP receptor site in NMDA-channels by phencyclidine, or its analogues ketamine, MK-801, and so on, re-
duces ion flow through those channels, but does not prevent flow through non-NMDA-channels.
ent in immature subjects (Karp et al. 1980). PET-scans
(positron emission tomography) show that in healthy vol-
unteers these drugs produce an acute increase in metabolic
activity in PFC, anterior cingulate, and in parietal and sen-
sorimotor cortex, together with decreases in hippocampus
and lingual gyrus, with effects 20–40 minutes later in the
thalamus and cerebellum (Breier et al. 1997; Lahti et al.
1995a; Tamminga et al. 1995; Vollenweider et al. 1997a,
1997b). Repeated administration produces a chronic de-
crease in PFC activity, however, so chronic PCP-psychosis
may provide the best model of schizophrenia (Jentsch &
Roth 1999). In vivo brain imaging, post-mortem neuro-
chemistry, and clinical pharmacology all provide evidence
of glutamatergic abnormalities in schizophrenia (Hirsch et
al. 1997; Tamminga 1998). Furthermore, a recent study of
post-mortem hippocampal tissue suggests that it may not be
the number of NMDA-channels that is pathological, but
their subunit composition (Gao et al. 2000). Further evi-
dence for NMDA-hypofunction in schizophrenia are given
in the reviews cited above. The NMDA-antagonist keta-
mine produces deficits very similar to those seen in schizo-
phrenia in both the mismatch negativity paradigm, a re-
flection of pre-attentive contextual interactions, and in 
the AX version of the Continuous Performance Task, a mea-
sure of post-attentive contextual interactions (Javitt et al.
2000; Umbricht et al. 2000). The schizomimetic effects of
NMDA-antagonists, including reductions in context-sensi-
tivity, are therefore well established. We therefore need to
determine how these effects occur.
Some cognitive deficits in both PCP-psychosis and schizo-
phrenia may be due to generalized overexcitation and any
consequent neuropathophysiology, rather than being direct
consequences of NMDA-hypofunction. The neurotoxic ef-
fects of chronic NMDA-hypofunction are well established
(Ellison 1995; Olney & Farber 1995; Olney et al. 1999).
This may contribute to long-term psychopathology but is
unlikely to explain the acute psychological effects of PCP,
which occur within minutes and are transient. Further-
more, neuronal degeneration in schizophrenia often seems
too minimal to produce the deficits observed (Tamminga
1998). The neuronal degeneration that does occur can be
explained as resulting from overactivity due to the failure of
NMDA-receptors to facilitate excitatory input to inhibitory
interneurons (Coyle 1996; Ellison 1995; Olney & Farber
1995). Interactions with the dopamine system could also
lead to overactivity. Some cognitive deficits may thus be
consequences of generalized overactivity (Coyle 1996; Ol-
ney et al. 1999). It is hard to see how this can explain all of
the observed deficits, however. First, it is hard to see how
generalized overactivity can be used to predict the specific
changes in context-sensitivity and perceptual grouping em-
phasized throughout this article. Increases in activity, for
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Table 1. Effects of NMDA-antagonist exposure in humans
Effect studied Acute Exposure Chronic Exposure
1. Positive Symptoms
Delusions Paranoia, Referenceb Reference, Influence, Grandiosity, Religiousd
Hallucinations Visualb Auditorye Auditoryd
2. Negative Symptoms
Negativism/Withdrawal Emotional withdrawal, 
Psychomotor retardationa,b,e
Affective Flattening Yesa,e
3. Disorganized Symptoms
Conceptual Disorg. and/or 
Thought disorder Yesb,c,p Yesd
4. Cognitive Deficits
Working Memory Yesi,m Yesn
Long-Term Memory Verbalq Semanticc Declarativem
Free Recall and Recog. Memoryh
Executive Functioning WCSTb,j Verbal Fluencyb,c Concrete 
Thinkinga,e Raven Progressive 
Matricesa
Attention Selective Attentiona Digit Spana Reduced Attention Spanl Trail marking
Stroop Testa Increased Reaction Test (B)n
Timeo
Eye Movements Smooth Pursuitg
Context Processing Auditory and Visualf
Perception Visualq Perceptual Awarenessa
Perceptual Constancya
5. Affect Anxietyb Euphoria & Disorganizatione Anxiety, Euphoria, Labilea
6. Brain Blood Flow Increase in PFCe Decrease in PFCk
aBakker & Amini (1961) bKrystal et al. (1994) cAdler et al. (1998a) dAllen & Young (1978) eVollenweider et al. (1997b) fUmbricht et
al. (2000) gWeiler et al. (2000) hMalhotra et al. (1996) iGhonheim et al. (1985) jKrystal et al. (2000) kHertzman et al. (1991) lAmerican
Psychiatric Association (1989) mNewcomer et al. (1998) nCosgrove & Newell (1991) oRosenbaum et al. (1959) pAdler et al. (1999)
qHarborne et al. (1996).
example, as reflected by neuroimaging, are often assumed
to be functional, not malfunctional. Second, impaired sen-
sory gating does not reflect general overactivity because re-
sponse latencies and amplitudes to individual stimuli are
unaffected (Catts et al. 1995; Javitt et al. 1996). Third, neu-
roimaging does not show general overactivity in psychosis.
Fourth, if the effects of NMDA-hypofunction were largely
due to a consequent under-activity of inhibitory cells, then
agonists for inhibitory cells might be prominent in phar-
macotherapy, but they are not (Olney et al. 1999). Finally,
many NMDA-channels are localized on pyramidal cells
(Daw et al. 1993; Grunze et al. 1996; Siegel et al. 1994), and
thus have facilitatory rather than inhibitory effects on pyra-
midal cell activity. Direct evidence that they facilitate sen-
sory gating will be outlined below.
The role of NMDA-channels in learning is widely ac-
cepted, and learning is impaired in both PCP-psychosis and
schizophrenia, so some of the other cognitive deficits may
be a secondary consequence of impaired learning. This can-
not account for many of the symptoms observed, however,
as effects on immediate experience are prominent, which is
to be expected, given the direct effect of NMDA-channels
on glutamatergic activity. Furthermore, although there are
some similarities between amnesia and schizophrenia,
there are also clear differences (Heinrichs 1993). Impaired
learning is thus more likely to be a consequence than a
cause of impaired coordination.
Some of the cognitive effects of NMDA-dysfunction will
arise as consequences of interactions between the NMDA-
system and other neurotransmitters, such as dopamine 
and serotonin, and so on (Olney et al. 1999). Glutamate-
dopamine interactions are complex (Coyle 1996; Jentsch &
Roth 1999). Various studies suggest that reduced NMDA-
receptor function can facilitate sensitization of dopamine
systems (Duncan et al. 1999). NMDA-antagonists produce
dopamine dysregulation (Jentsch & Roth 1999; Jentsch et al.
1997a; Moghaddam et al. 1997), for example, and these ef-
fects include an acute increase in the use of dopamine in
dorsolateral PFC, followed by a chronic decrease (Jentsch
et al. 1997a; 1997b; Moghaddam et al. 1997). This is com-
patible with theories proposing a chronic reduction in pre-
frontal dopamine leading to excessive mesolimbic dopa-
mine in schizophrenia (Davis et al. 1991; Jentsch & Roth
1999). Conversely, dopamine may be involved in regulating
NMDA-activity (Greengard et al. 1998; Olney et al. 1999),
and there is evidence that antipsychotic drugs acting
through the D2 dopamine receptor can enhance NMDA
function (Goff & Coyle 2001).
Some cognitive deficits resulting from NMDA-hypo-
function are therefore likely to be due to interactions with
other neurotransmitter systems. Some are likely to be di-
rectly due to NMDA-hypofunction, however, as that di-
rectly alters glutamatergic transmission. The challenge be-
fore us is to sort out which is which. One way to do this is
via computational theories that relate specific properties of
NMDA-channels, such as their voltage-dependence, to
specific cognitive functions (e.g., Kay et al. 1998; Phillips et
al. 1995; Tononi et al. 1994; 1996). PCP-psychosis has from
the start been interpreted in terms of processes that some-
how “integrate” incoming information (Bakker & Amini
1961; Luby et al. 1962). If cognitive coordination depends
on NMDA-channel activity as proposed here, then this can
explain why incoherent, irrelevant, and fragmented per-
ceptions and thoughts arise from NMDA-hypofunction.
Another way to test hypotheses concerning direct effects
of NMDA-dysfunction is to test specific predictions that
they make concerning cognitive changes, and substantial
progress has already been made in this direction (e.g., Javitt
et al. 1996; 2000; Umbricht et al. 2000). Evidence on the
direct effects of NMDA-hypofunction comes from studies
of the effects of NMDA-antagonists on sensory gating in au-
ditory cortex. Impaired sensory gating occurs in both schiz-
ophrenia and PCP-psychosis (Jentsch & Roth 1999), and
has been studied using mismatch negativity (Javitt et al.
1996). The response to an auditory stimulus that occurs as
a deviant within a sequence of repetitive stimuli is greater
than if it occurs as a repeated stimulus. This, and related ef-
fects of stimulus context, are much reduced in schizophre-
nia (Catts et al. 1995; Javitt et al. 1996; Judd et al. 1992),
and it has been shown that NMDA-hypofunction can pro-
duce this effect (Javitt et al. 1996). NMDA-antagonists
were infused into a microregion of primary auditory cortex
in awake monkeys, and multichannel electrodes recorded
neural activity in response to repetitive and deviant audi-
tory stimuli. NMDA-antagonists removed the effect of
stimulus context without affecting the primary obligatory
response to the individual stimuli (Javitt et al. 1996). Neu-
ronal degeneration, dopamine dysregulation, and impaired
learning are all unlikely to be involved in this case, so this is
evidence that reduced context-sensitivity in sensory cortex
can be directly due to NMDA-hypofunction. Together with
the studies of Umbricht et al. (2000), showing that keta-
mine impairs contextual interactions in healthy volunteers,
these results therefore provide strong support for the per-
spective we advocate.
4. Cognitive coordination is impaired in
schizophrenia
4.1. Deficits in perceptual grouping
In a study of the subjective experiences reported by pa-
tients, Cutting and Dunne (1989) found that perceptual
dysfunctions were the most invariant feature of the early
stage of schizophrenia. Goodarzi et al. (2000) found that, in
people scoring highly on schizotypy, local processing dom-
inates global processing, thus producing a deficit in per-
ceptual Gestalt organization. Gestalt organization is a par-
adigmatic example of cognitive coordination. Many studies
show that it is impaired in schizophrenia (Cox & Leventhal
1978; Knight 1984; 1992; Knight & Silverstein 1998; Place
& Gilmore 1980; Rabinowicz et al. 1996; Silverstein et al.
1996a; 1996b; 1998a; 2000). These impairments are a spe-
cific feature of the illness itself. They are not due to a gen-
eralized cognitive deficit because patients perform rela-
tively better than normal in conditions where grouping
would interfere with performance (Place & Gilmore 1980;
Silverstein et al. 1996a, as shown in Fig. 4). They are not an
epiphenomenon of treatment, because: (1) there is no rela-
tion between either oral dose or blood level of depot med-
ication and performance on perceptual organization tasks
(Knight 1992); (2) patients medicated using traditional neu-
roleptics, and unmedicated patients, do not perform differ-
ently on these tasks (Rabinowicz et al. 1995); and (3) im-
pairments have been demonstrated in unmedicated
patients (Frith et al. 1983).
Perceptual grouping is far from being completely absent
in schizophrenia, however. Patients perform adequately
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when the task involves stimuli with continuous contour or
strong configural properties (Chey & Holzman 1997;
Knight & Silverstein 1998; Silverstein et al. 1998d). In the
absence of strong cues to grouping, however, schizophrenia
patients show clear impairments in combining noncontigu-
ous elements (e.g., dot or line patterns) into perceptual
wholes (Cox & Leventhal 1978; Place & Gilmore 1980; Sil-
verstein et al. 1996a; 1998a; 2000). Patients are also im-
paired in their ability to alter perceptual organization of am-
biguous stimuli based on current context (Silverstein et al.
1996b), or to develop perceptual organization for unstruc-
tured patterns after repeated exposure (Place & Gilmore
1980; Silverstein et al. 1998a). Furthermore, the perfor-
mance deficit shown by patients was removed by strength-
ening the contextual input, suggesting that they required
stronger context than normal (Silverstein et al. 1996a). In
addition, symmetrical stimuli comprised of noncontiguous
components are not processed as groups by schizophrenia
patients without strong top-down influences that use con-
text (Knight 1992; Silverstein et al. 1998a). Schizophrenia
thus involves a reduced ability to organize activity into co-
herent groups, but this only impairs performance when
cues to grouping are weak in some way.
Perceptual grouping depends on the combined opera-
tion of two different but mutually supportive processes:
grouping through convergence in pre-specified feature hi-
erarchies; and grouping through dynamic Gestalt organiza-
tion (Watt & Phillips 2000), which involves processes that
create novel groupings that can be specified only after the
input is known. The computation of local motion signals can
be pre-specified, but the perception of the global coherent
motion of a whole surface requires dynamic grouping be-
cause it depends upon working out which local motion sig-
nals arise from a single surface in each particular instance
(Watt & Phillips 2000). Our perspective therefore predicts
that global, but not local, motion perception will be im-
paired in schizophrenia. A recent psychophysical study sup-
ports this prediction (Chen et al. 2001), and fMRI data
show that activity in higher motion perception areas of vi-
sual cortex is much reduced in neuroleptic-naive patients
(Tost et al. 2001). These findings provide strong support for
our perspective.
4.2. Deficits in contextual disambiguation
Many paradigms have been developed to study different
forms of contextual disambiguation and, though diverse, all
require detailed contextual information to modify the pro-
cessing of information about other things. We first discuss
effects that can plausibly be explained as depending on ex-
ecutive functions, then those that are more plausibly ex-
plained in terms of other functions. Reduced context-sen-
sitivity in schizophrenia has been found in many paradigms
designed to assess executive function and selective atten-
tion, including: the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST)
(Gold et al. 1997); the Stroop task (Cohen et al. 1999a; Perl-
stein et al. 1998); various versions of the Continuous Per-
formance Task (CPT) (Cohen et al. 1999a; Pigache 1999);
the anti-saccade task (Curtis et al. 2001); and N-back tasks
(Perlstein et al. 2001). Such findings have often been repli-
cated (e.g., Servan-Schreiber et al. 1996), and include
deficits in first-episode as well as in chronic patients (Riley
et al. 2000). Abnormalities in the Stroop paradigm are com-
plex, but can be interpreted as arising from an impaired
ability to focus attention on those aspects of the stimulus
that are relevant to the task (Barch et al. 1999). This re-
duced sensitivity to task-context is most closely associated
with disorganized symptoms (Barch et al 1999), that is, with
the same sub-group of patients who show reduced sensitiv-
ity to stimulus-context. Contextual disambiguation is also
impaired in language comprehension (Cohen et al. 1999a;
Hoffman & McGlashan 1993; Kuperberg et al. 1998), and
production (Barch & Berenbaum 1997; Patterson et al.
1986; Spitzer et al. 1994). These deficits have also been ex-
plained in terms of a component of WM that stores task rel-
evant contextual information in the PFC (Cohen & Servan-
Schreiber 1992).
Reduced context-sensitivity has also been found in many
paradigms testing non-executive functions, including: re-
duced effects of irrelevant letters flanking a target letter in
a choice reaction-time task (Jones et al. 1991); reduced pre-
pulse inhibition (Adler et al. 1998b); reduced use of context
for phonemic disambiguation (Rochester 1978); reduced
effects of context in weight perception and related para-
digms (reviewed in Magaro 1980); and reduced mismatch
negativity amplitudes, which is an event-related potential
that reflects preattentive perceptual processing (Catts et al.
1995; Javitt et al. 1996; 2000). Delayed-tone matching is
also impaired, and is due to impaired sensory comparison
of a current tone with the immediately preceding context,
rather than to increased distractibility (Rabinowicz et al.
2000). The decreased amplitude of mismatch negativity
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Figure 4. The effect of five different grouping conditions on
mean reaction time to decide whether the letter in an array is a T
or an F for four different groups of subjects. All, except for the in-
patient poor premorbid schizophrenic group, show the same ef-
fects of grouping condition as that obtained with normal subjects.
PPM 5 poor premorbid; SCZ 5 schizophrenia; GPM 5 good pre-
morbid; PSY 5 psychosis; OP 5 outpatient (data from Silverstein
et al. 1996a).
scalp potentials to unattended stimuli are found in the same
patients that show deficits in the CPT (continuous perfor-
mance task) (Javitt et al. 2000). The contextual interactions
involved in the mismatch negativity deficit are pre-atten-
tive, whereas those involved in the CPT deficit are post-at-
tentive. Both deficits of contextual processing could arise
from the same kind of underlying pathology, however, and
this view is supported by the finding, noted in section 3, that
similar deficits in both mismatch negativity and the CPT are
produced in normal volunteers by ketamine (Umbricht et
al. 2000).
Paradigms in which context is misleading (e.g., Jones et
al. 1991; Kuperberg et al. 1998) provide strong evidence for
a specific reduction in context-sensitivity, because in those
paradigms context interferes with the performance of pa-
tients less than it does with that of control subjects. Re-
duced interference cannot be due to a general performance
deficit.
Contextual disambiguation is therefore impaired in tasks
that assess executive functions and in tasks that assess non-
executive functions. Furthermore, as will be discussed fur-
ther in section 4.4, deficits of context-sensitivity correlate
most strongly with disorganized symptoms (e.g., Barch et
al. 1999; Cohen et al. 1999a).
4.3. Memory deficits
Memory deficits are relevant here because, as the Gestalt
psychologists emphasized, dynamic organizational pro-
cesses are also important in memory functions. Both epi-
sodic and semantic memory deficits occur in schizophrenia,
with the latter being relatively more impaired than in 
the amnesic syndrome (Chen & McKenna 1996; Duffy &
O’Carroll 1994). In addition, the influence of contextual
constraints between items in the recall of verbal material is
reduced in thought-disordered patients (Maher et al.
1980). Long-term memory deficits are to be expected from
our perspective for at least four reasons. First, NMDA-
channels, synchronization, and coherence have all been im-
plicated in long-term memory formation (Singer 1995).
Second, context is important for retrieval from long-term
memory. Third, it has been hypothesized that contextual in-
teractions are important for both the learning of associa-
tions between features and the discovery of those features
that are associated (Kay et al. 1998). Fourth, source mem-
ory and memory for affective significance both require the
formation of assemblies that relate items to the relevant
context.
Though less clear than long-term memory deficits, WM
deficits have also been associated with schizophrenia (e.g.,
Park & Holzman 1992). Digit span is reduced from about
seven to about six digits (Gruzelier et al. 1988), and short-
term visual memory capacity is also reduced (Knight et al.
1985). Though such small impairments could easily be dis-
counted, they may have important consequences for cogni-
tion under demanding or stressful conditions. WM depends
upon dynamic grouping because it requires memory for
novel combinations of familiar elements. Experiments with
normal subjects show that only about three or four dynamic
groupings can be held simultaneously in visual WM (Luck
& Vogel 1997), and these groupings could be signalled
through synchronization (Lisman & Idiart 1995; Luck &
Vogel 1997; Raffone & Wolters 2001). Simulations of re-
current networks composed of physiologically realistic ele-
ments show rigorously how NMDA-currents can select and
maintain any novel subset from a set of familiar elements
(Lisman et al. 1998). Furthermore, an independent analy-
sis of the dynamics of synaptic transmission, for example, 
in PFC circuits, also suggests a critical role for NMDA-
receptors in WM (Wang 1999). Working memory, NMDA-
currents, and dynamic grouping may therefore be closely
related, and, if so, this could help explain subtle WM
deficits in schizophrenia (Lisman et al. 1998). Dopamine
dysregulation in PFC has also been related to WM deficits
in schizophrenia (e.g., Arnsten 1998; Braver et al. 1999), so
it is possible that NMDA-hypofunction could produce WM
deficits both directly and by contributing to dopamine dys-
regulation.
4.4. Relationships between cognitive coordination and
clinical symptoms
At the level of signs and symptoms, fragmentation of men-
tal functions is prima facie evidence of impaired cognitive
coordination. At a phenomenological level, this could give
rise to experiences in which the individual components of
mental or motor activity take precedence over any coher-
ent or integrated pattern of activity. Reviews of phenome-
nological reports by patients with schizophrenia support
this view (Carr & Wale 1986). Reports of fragmented expe-
rience can be found throughout the clinical literature, and
they suggest that cognitive impairments often involve the
reduced coordination of distributed activities.
Cognitive disorganization and thought disorder are more
related than are other symptoms to each of the major as-
pects of cognitive coordination, for example, to sensorimo-
tor gating (Perry et al. 1999), context-sensitivity in language
perception (Kuperberg et al. 1998), context-sensitivity in
language production (Spitzer et al. 1994), WM for task-rel-
evant information (Cohen et al. 1999a), and knowing what
goes with what within the semantic system (Goldberg et al.
1998). The relation of clinical status to perceptual grouping
impairments has been studied in detail. They are more pro-
nounced in patients who have been recently hospitalized
for acute psychotic episodes compared to patients who have
been living in the community for at least six months (Sil-
verstein et al. 1996a). Furthermore, several studies show
that patients with poor premorbid social function have
more impaired perceptual grouping (Knight 1992; Knight
& Silverstein 1998; Silverstein et al. 1996a; 1998c). The
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay et al. 1987) has
been used to relate impairments in cognitive coordination
to specific symptom clusters. In one study, the best predic-
tors of performance in a perceptual organization task were
determined using a five factor solution (Lindenmayer et al.
1994). Only the cognitive or disorganization factor (con-
sisting of conceptual disorganization, mannerisms and pos-
turing, disorientation, difficulty in abstract thinking, and
poor attention) was a significant predictor (Knight & Sil-
verstein 1998). Further evidence comes from a study in
which symptoms of the Positive and Negative Syndrome
Scale were related to the development of memory repre-
sentations for configural and nonconfigural stimuli (Silver-
stein et al. 1998a). Once again, only the cognitive factor sig-
nificantly predicted task performance. A reduced ability to
develop a memory-assisted perceptual organization is
therefore related to the disorganization component of
symptomatology. A precise psychophysical study (Silver-
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stein et al. 2000) also found that a reduced ability to per-
ceive closed contours comprised of noncontiguous Gabor
patches was related to higher levels of disorganized symp-
toms in chronic schizophrenia patients.
Evidence relating abnormal perceptual grouping to dis-
organized symptoms has also been obtained using the
Thought Disorder Index (Solovay et al. 1986). Scores from
21 acutely psychotic schizophrenic patients showed that
perceptual organization ability was correlated only with
scores of disorganized and associative thought disturbance
(Knight & Silverstein 1998). These correlations were not
due to a general performance deficit because degrees of
disorganized and associative thought disturbance were not
associated with baseline levels of perceptual task perfor-
mance, and because the degree of perceptual organization
impairment was not related to overall levels of thought dis-
order (summed across all four a priori factors). Further ev-
idence of a relationship between abnormal perception and
thought disorder or disorganized symptoms is that: (1)
there is a significant correlation between an index of per-
ceptual fragmentation on the Hooper Visual Organization
Test (Lezak 1995) and degree of disorganized thinking (Os-
born et al. 1994); and (2) thought disorder correlates with
performance on the degraded stimulus version of the con-
tinuous performance test, which is a task that involves per-
ceptual grouping (Knight & Silverstein 1998; Nuechterlein
et al. 1992; Silverstein et al. 1998b).
5. Cortical rhythms, cognition, NMDA, and
psychosis
We argue above that cognitive coordination, NMDA-activ-
ity, and psychosis are related. Here we note that evidence
relating each of these to high-frequency cortical rhythms
strengthens the argument.
5.1. High-frequency rhythms and cognition
Gamma rhythms (30–80 Hz) are currently prominent in
electrophysiological studies of cognition (Nunez 2000; Tal-
lon-Baudry & Bertrand 1999). They are relevant to theories
of dynamic organization as they reflect synchronized activ-
ity that changes on a fast time-scale. They have been related
to several aspects of dynamic organization, including
Gestalt perception (e.g., Keil et al. 1999), attention (e.g., Ti-
itinen et al. 1993), and visual search and working memory
(Tallon-Baudry & Bertrand 1999). Gamma rhythms are
first seen in infant scalp potentials at around eight months
of age, which is when other evidence indicates that Gestalt
perception shows major developments (Csibra et al. 2000).
Though much of this research emphasizes gamma-band ac-
tivity that is not phase-locked to stimulus events, activity
that is phase-locked to stimulation is also relevant (Fries et
al. 2001; Haenschel et al. 2000). Finally, coherent dynam-
ics involves more than gamma-band activity (Habeck &
Srinivasan 2000). For example, beta rhythms (12–30 Hz)
can tolerate longer conduction delays and still synchronize
robustly, so they may be involved in coordinating activity
between cortical regions (Bressler & Kelso 2001; Bressler
et al. 1993; Haenschel et al. 2000). Beta rhythms in the PFC
could thus help coordinate activity in posterior cortex that
is locally synchronized within the gamma-band (Kopell
2000).
5.2. High-frequency rhythms and NMDA-receptor
activity
Mechanisms for the generation and control of high-fre-
quency synchronized rhythms are complex, and not fully
understood. As far as we can tell, inhibitory local circuit
neurons play a major role in the primary generation of high-
frequency rhythms, but NMDA-receptor activity has a role
in controlling their strength, duration, and synchronization.
Computational modelling clarifies these issues and suggests
a role for NMDA-receptors (Jensen et al. 1996; Wright et
al. 2001). Direct evidence relating NMDA-receptor activ-
ity to high frequency rhythms in auditory cortex (Javitt et
al. 1996) was outlined in section 3, but further evidence is
also available. Whittington et al. (1997) showed that the
transient high-frequency response of hippocampal pyrami-
dal cells to brief input has a component mediated by
NMDA and metabotropic glutamate receptors. Funahashi
and Stewart (1998) report evidence that the duration of the
gamma response of retrohippocampal cells to low-fre-
quency repetitive input depends on NMDA-receptor acti-
vation. Faulkner et al. (1998; 1999) show that ketamine and
other dissociative anaesthetics can disrupt the synchroniza-
tion of gamma activity across separate sites and reduce the
amount of beta-activity that is induced by gamma activity.
Finally, Doheny et al. (2000) found that the NMDA-antag-
onist ketamine greatly reduced the difference between the
gamma responses induced by novel and repeated stimuli in
hippocampal slices. This is therefore analogous to the re-
duced effects of habituation and perceptual learning in
schizophrenia.
Thus, although synchronized activity has often been
thought to be due primarily to obligatory or driving con-
nections, the above evidence suggests that non-linear con-
textual connections mediated by NMDA-receptors play an
important role in controlling synchronization and thereby
helping to coordinate cognitive activity as hypothesized by
Phillips and Singer (1997a).
5.3. High-frequency rhythms and schizophrenia
As high-frequency synchronized rhythms are related to
both dynamic organization and NMDA-receptor activity,
our perspective predicts that they will be changed in schiz-
ophrenia. As a first approximation, we can hypothesize that
gamma activity will be reduced, particularly in tasks re-
quiring dynamic organization. Low-frequency rhythms
may reflect more rigidly specified activity and may there-
fore be increased. A rapidly growing body of evidence sup-
ports these predictions. Using the degraded-stimulus CPT,
Hoffman et al. (1996) found reduced gamma activity and
increased low-frequency activity in neuroleptic-free schiz-
ophrenia patients. Clementz et al. (1997) found evidence
relating sensory gating deficits to suppression of gamma ac-
tivity. Kwon et al. (1999) studied the entrainment of the au-
ditory EEG to clicks presented at 20, 30, or 40 Hz, and
found that at 40 Hz this was much less in schizophrenia pa-
tients than in controls. Green et al. (1999) interpret the in-
creased effects of visual masking that are associated with
schizophrenia as being due to abnormalities in establishing
high-frequency rhythms. Kissler et al. (2000) found that,
when performing mental arithmetic, schizophrenia patients
showed abnormalities in gamma activity, including general
decreases of activity in the high gamma-range 60–71 Hz.
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The report of exceptionally large 40 Hz rhythms during
somatic hallucinations in a schizophrenia patient (Balde-
weg et al. 1998) suggests that the hypothesis of reduced
high-frequency activity is too simple. Abnormal patterns of
high-frequency synchronization across cortical regions may
also occur. Furthermore, different schizophrenic syn-
dromes may show different EEG abnormalities. Gordon et
al. (2001) related activity in narrow gamma-band (37–41
HZ) responses to target and non-target stimuli in a standard
auditory oddball paradigm. Overall, schizophrenic patients
showed reduced gamma, but different syndromes were as-
sociated with different patterns of abnormality. Reality dis-
tortion was associated with increased gamma to targets
(which may be an “over-attention” similar to that found by
Baldeweg et al.). Psychomotor poverty was associated with
reduced gamma to targets. Disorganization was associated
with reduced gamma to non-targets, which Gordon et al. in-
terpreted as reflecting a diffuse deficit involving context-
sensitivity, with the other two syndromes reflecting distinct
patterns of compensatory adaptation to this core deficit.
For a more extensive review of evidence relating schizo-
phrenia to changes in high-frequency rhythms see Lee et
al. (2003b).
6. Impairments of cognitive coordination are
heterogeneous
The depth of the heterogeneity in schizophrenia is unclear.
It may be a family of disorders involving impairments of
common underlying processes (Andreasen 1999). We will
not know whether this is so until we identify any such
process. Cognitive coordination is a candidate, and its dis-
orders may be heterogeneous in several senses. They may
be heterogeneous in that different aspects of coordination
may be impaired to different extents and in different com-
binations. They may also be heterogeneous in the sense that
disorders of coordination may be combined with disorders
of various other aspects of mental function to produce dif-
ferences both within and between classically defined psy-
chiatric conditions.
Our hypothesis does not imply that schizophrenia is a
homogeneous condition, but leaves much room for hetero-
geneity, both of neuropathology and of symptomatology.4 It
suggests that some of the symptoms associated with schiz-
ophrenia are a direct consequence of NMDA-hypofunc-
tion, and that others are a consequence of associated patho-
physiology, such as dopamine dysregulation or neuronal
degeneration (Jentsch & Roth 1999). We have focused on
the attempt to characterize those that are directly due to
disorders of coordination. Some non-psychotic visual disor-
ders show that such disorders can be very specific. One ex-
ample is strabismic amblyopia, which involves both im-
paired perceptual grouping (Polat et al. 1997) and impaired
neuronal spike synchronization (Roelfsema et al. 1994). Im-
pairments of particular aspects of cognitive coordination
may also occur in some psychiatric disorders. For example,
impairments to sensory gating can occur in mania (Franks
et al. 1983). Impairments of many different aspects of cog-
nitive coordination can also occur together, however, as in
PCP-psychosis. The covariance of many aspects of cogni-
tive coordination with thought disorder in schizophrenia
also suggests that they are often jointly impaired.
The covariance of impairments in coordination with
thought disorder does not imply that they are unrelated to
other symptoms. First, NMDA-antagonists can rapidly in-
duce hallucinations, delusions, and negative symptoms in
normal volunteers, and profoundly exacerbate all of these
symptoms in schizophrenic patients (Jentsch & Roth 1999).
Second, in patients whose glycine levels are initially sub-op-
timal, glycine agonists (which then facilitate NMDA-chan-
nel opening) can improve negative symptoms (Goff et al.
1999; Heresco-Levy et al. 1999). Third, poor motor learn-
ing discriminates children at risk of developing schizophre-
nia from normal children (Mednick & Silverton 1988), so
disorders of motor coordination may be related to disorders
of cognitive coordination. This is consistent with neuro-
physiological studies of motor cortex showing that spike
synchronization occurs during normal sensorimotor coor-
dination (Murthy & Fetz 1996; Roelfsema et al. 1997), and
with cognitive studies indicating that feature binding mech-
anisms are operative in action planning (Stoet & Hommel
1999). Fourth, Carr and Wale (1986) present detailed ar-
guments for viewing many hallucinations and delusions as
compensatory adaptations to impairments of the processes
that organize information into coherent wholes prior to the
allocation of attention. Finally, internally generated mental
activities also need to be linked to their source (Frith 1992),
and if this linking fails, then various hallucinations and delu-
sions may occur.5
Impairments of any particular aspect of cognitive coor-
dination can also vary in severity. Consider perceptual or-
ganization. Patients with histories of poor premorbid social
functioning show abnormalities that patients with good pre-
morbid histories do not (Knight 1984; 1992; Knight & Sil-
verstein 1998; Silverstein et al. 1996a). This suggests that
some perceptual abnormalities reflect more severe disabil-
ity. This is supported by evidence that perceptual organiza-
tion abilities on admission to a long-term psychiatric reha-
bilitation unit significantly discriminated between patients
who could be discharged within three years from those
needing longer hospitalizations (Silverstein et al. 1998e).
Impairments of perceptual organization may therefore oc-
cur at different levels of severity (Silverstein & Schenkel
1997). Subtle sensory gating abnormalities may also occur
in the absence of psychosis because failure to attenuate the
P50 psychophysiological response to the second of two au-
ditory stimuli is distributed across affected and unaffected
relatives of schizophrenic patients in a pattern consistent
with autosomal dominant transmission (Adler et al. 1998b).
More severe dysfunction of more aspects of perceptual pro-
cessing may occur during states of acute psychosis. Evi-
dence for this is that perceptual grouping disturbance is
more prevalent among acutely psychotic poor premorbid
inpatients than among outpatients with schizophrenia who
have poor premorbid histories (Silverstein et al. 1996a), and
that degree of perceptual organization disturbance in schiz-
ophrenia patients is significantly correlated with severity of
disorganized symptomatology (Knight & Silverstein 1998;
Silverstein et al. 1998a; 2000). We therefore conclude that
impairments of cognitive coordination can range from mild
impairments of a few aspects to severe impairments of
many.
The neurodevelopmental model of Hoffman and McGla-
shan (1993) may be useful in explaining why perceptual
grouping impairments are found mainly among schizo-
phrenia patients with poor premorbid functioning, and
among such patients when they are exhibiting psychotic
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symptoms. Noting evidence of exaggerated developmental
neuronal pruning, they proposed that corticocortical con-
nectivity may be abnormal in schizophrenia in one of three
ways, depending on the number of initial connections and
the amount of later pruning that occurs. Low initial con-
nectivity combined with normal pruning would lead to an
early age of onset, whereas a normal amount of initial con-
nectivity combined with abnormally extensive pruning
would lead to good premorbid functioning and a fast onset
of psychosis. This is consistent with the view that more
global adaptive difficulties occur as a result of reduced den-
sity/connectivity earlier in life, and that more specific and
serious manifestations of impaired connectivity and coordi-
nation occur later, when further reductions in connectivity
create the potential for psychosis to emerge (Silverstein &
Schenkel 1997). These more serious manifestations of im-
paired connectivity and coordination could include both
disorganized symptoms and the impairments in perceptual
grouping with which they are associated (Knight & Silver-
stein 1998; Silverstein et al. 1996a; 1998a; 2000).
Cognitive disorganization and disorders of holistic Ge-
stalt processing, may also be involved in other conditions,
such as autism and some other neurodevelopmental disor-
ders.6 The tendency for autistic subjects to process inputs
as sets of independent parts, rather than as coherent
wholes, has been clearly shown in various cognitive do-
mains, including visual perception, visuospatial construc-
tion, and language processing ( Frith & Happé 1994; Happé
1997; 1999). Furthermore, a mild variant of this cognitive
style is seen in the parents of children with Asperger’s Syn-
drome (AS), and is more characteristic of males than of fe-
males (Baron-Cohen & Hammer 1997). A recent study
found that of fourteen men diagnosed as autistic, seven met
criteria for schizophrenia of the disorganized type (Kon-
stantareas & Hewitt 2001). Genetically specified variations
in the strength of coordinating neuronal interactions may
therefore play an important role in producing different cog-
nitive phenotypes, and this is in agreement with Karmiloff-
Smith’s (1998) argument that many neurodevelopmental
disorders arise from impairments of cellular-level processes
that are common to many brain regions, rather than to im-
pairments that are localized in high-level cognitive modules
with particular roles that are genetically prespecified.
7. The hypothesis of impaired coordination is
related to several other theories
Jansen and Faull (1991) note that it is impossible to propose
a model of schizophrenia without ignoring most of the data.
It is also impossible to do so without ignoring most of the
other theories! Though we have focussed on coordinating
interactions within the cortex, we assume that dynamic or-
ganization and contextual disambiguation are also relevant
to the function of other brain regions such as the basal gan-
glia, the limbic system, thalamus and cerebellum. All of
these have been implicated in schizophrenia, and have
been emphasized by many different theories of its patho-
physiology. Though there is no space to discuss them here,
our working assumption is that the coordination of activity,
mediated in part via NMDA channels, is as important to
their function as it is to that of the cortex.7
As our discussion of relevant theories is necessarily se-
lective, we emphasize only those that have led us to the per-
spective advocated. We discuss three groups of theories
that have for the most part been developed separately, hop-
ing to show ways in which they are mutually supportive.
7.1. Theories emphasizing disconnection between
cortical regions
The disconnection hypothesis is built on conceptual foun-
dations that combine ideas developed within the fields of
theoretical neurobiology, cognitive neuropsychology, and
neuroimaging (Dolan et al. 1999; Friston 1999). Schizo-
phrenia is interpreted as arising from malfunctions of the
dynamic interactions between cortical regions. It therefore
contrasts with classical neuropsychological syndromes in
that the disorder is not localized within specialized regions.
The disconnection is not primarily anatomical but func-
tional, that is, it is a disorder of the effective connectivity
that mediates dynamic interactions. These change both on
long and on short time-scales. The former relates to learn-
ing, and the latter to processing, and in particular to the dy-
namic modulation of effective connectivity. Symptoms of
reality distortion and disorganization are seen as arising
from a failure of the dynamic organizational processes that
integrate activity across different regions. One example is
the explanation of verbal hallucinations as a failure in self-
monitoring, as suggested by Frith (1992) and outlined in
section 6. Another is that delusions of alien control can be
seen as a failure to integrate the intention to act with the
perceptual registration of the consequences of that action
(Friston 1999). In relation to the neuropathophysiology it is
suggested that changes in effective connectivity arise in part
from over-activity of dopamine D1 receptors in the anterior
cingulate gyrus (Dolan et al. 1999).
There are several similarities between this hypothesis
and that presented here. (1) Both emphasize the distinction
between functional segregation and functional integration
(Tononi et al. 1994). (2) Both emphasize dynamic interac-
tions between cortical regions. For example, the explana-
tions for verbal hallucinations and alien control just out-
lined depend upon what we call dynamic grouping. (3) Both
distinguish between linear and non-linear interactions, with
the form of the non-linear interaction that they use being
remarkably similar (compare Equation 2 of Friston et al.
1995 with Equation 2 of Phillips et al. 1995). In both ap-
proaches, this non-linear interaction is interpreted as mod-
ulating the response of cortical neurons to their inputs from
other sources. (4) Both emphasize that long-term changes
to synaptic connectivity result from changes to the dynamic
modulation of short-term processing. Indeed, learning was
the initial focus of the Coherent Infomax theory (Phillips et
al. 1995), where analytically derived rules for synaptic plas-
ticity were used for the contextual guidance of learning, and
were shown to have detailed similarities to a form of synap-
tic plasticity for which there is physiological evidence
(Phillips & Singer 1997a). For an improved and even more
physiologically plausible version of these learning rules, see
Körding and König (2000).
There are also differences between the disconnection
hypothesis as developed so far and the perspective pre-
sented here. (1) Friston et al. emphasize faulty modulation
of long-term plasticity, whereas we primarily emphasize the
immediate effects of modulatory interactions on the dy-
namic organization of processing, and interpret the longer-
term changes in connectivity as being dependent on that.
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(2) They emphasize faulty interactions between cortical re-
gions, whereas we also emphasize interactions within re-
gions. (3) Though they distinguish between modulatory and
obligatory connectivity (Friston et al. 1995), they do not
emphasize the primary role of the modulatory connections
in the dynamic coordination of activity, whereas we do. (4)
As a consequence of the preceding, we put more emphasis
on the NMDA-receptor and its possible pathologies than
they do. Overall, the similarities are more fundamental than
the differences, so we see the two approaches as comple-
mentary.
7.2. Theories emphasizing impairments in cognitive
coordination
Our perspective extends the pioneering work of the Gestalt
psychologists and Gestalt theory-influenced psychiatrists.
For Matussek (1952/1987), the perceptual world of schiz-
ophrenia patients was characterized by a splitting of indi-
vidual perceptual components from their natural context.
This allowed normally incidental objects in the environ-
ment to take on unusual significance, and could relegate
important stimuli to background status. Matussek reported
cases of intense attentional focus on environmental details,
and compared this to the heightened sense of an object that
can occur under the influence of psychotomimetic agents
such as mescaline. Experiences of attentional alteration, re-
duced awareness of surroundings, and an altered sense of
reality and the self have been reported among nonpatients
during states of “absorption” (Tellegen & Atkinson 1974),
and similar states occur in schizophrenia (Fisher 1976a;
1976b; Silverstein 1988).
A major difference between the transient states and psy-
chotic episodes in schizophrenia is that the latter are not
under the control of the individual, and thus have more se-
rious long-term effects. These include giving atypical
meanings to stimuli and the formation of new perceptual
contexts that would further pull the patient away from re-
ality. A classic example of this process is provided by one of
Matussek’s patients: “these objects seemed altered from the
usual. They did not stand together in an overall context, and
I saw them as meaningless details” (Matussek 1952/1987).
Further research supports several of Matussek’s hypothe-
ses. For example, he hypothesized that the contextual
weakening would vary depending on the severity of the ill-
ness. This has been confirmed by evidence reviewed earlier
(Knight & Silverstein 1988; Silverstein et al. 1996a; 1998a;
1998c; 1998e). Matussek also believed that awareness of ap-
propriate contextual relationships could be brought about
by drawing attention to relevant information, but that this
awareness of context would be of only limited duration and
would soon disintegrate. The ability to improve perceptual
organization and other forms of context processing in schiz-
ophrenia through attentional manipulations has now been
demonstrated experimentally (Silverstein et al. 1996a, Study
2), as has the temporary nature of the effect (Cromwell
1975; Kaplan 1974; Nuechterlein 1977).
A more recent view of schizophrenia based on similar
principles is that of Carr and Wale (1986), who hypothe-
sized that there are basic deficits in processes that organize
both externally and internally generated activity. They view
much of schizophrenic disorganization as reflecting the
consequent failure to impose order on experience. They see
a subtle impairment in cognitive organization as a stable as-
pect of the illness, with more serious manifestations being
due to sensory gating impairments becoming so severe that
a system already deficient in organizing input is then over-
whelmed by an even greater amount to be processed.
Many theories emphasize specific deficiencies in the use
of context; for example, Gray et al. (1991) suggest that a key
cognitive deficit in schizophrenia consists in the failure to re-
late specific associations to the context in which they occur,
thus leading to impaired determinations of “relevance.” Con-
text plays a central role in the work of Cohen and colleagues
(Braver et al. 1999; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber 1992; Cohen
et al. 1999a), who show how impairments in the CPT, the
Stroop task, and lexical disambiguation could be due to mal-
function of a WM system in the PFC. In an early version of
their theory, these impairments were modelled as arising
from reduced gain of units in a component of the model in-
terpreted as being in the PFC (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber
1992). In a later version, they are modelled as arising from
increased noise levels in mesocortical dopamine (Braver et
al. 1999). In both cases, the changes are hypothesized to arise
from reduced dopaminergic modulation in the PFC. Our
work builds in part upon theirs, but with important differ-
ences. Both approaches combine psychological, biological,
and computational perspectives in their attempts to under-
stand cognition in schizophrenia; but we emphasize general
principles derived from the Coherent Infomax theory of cor-
tical computation (Phillips & Singer 1997a), and they em-
phasize connectionist simulations of performance in partic-
ular cognitive tasks. [For a detailed description of relations
between computational theory and computational model-
ling, see Phillips and Singer (1997b, Table R2).]
Both approaches hypothesize that many cognitive def-
icits and clinical symptoms arise from changes to a few ba-
sic mechanisms involving context. In both, this is thought
of as “information that is relevant to but does not form part
of the content of the response” (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber
1992, p. 46), but whereas we see this as a basic aspect of cor-
tical computation in general, they emphasize only task-rel-
evant information stored in a WM component of PFC. The
importance of the distinction between working memory
and sensory levels of processing is not in question, having
been clearly demonstrated long ago (Phillips 1974). The
point we emphasize here is that contextual interactions are
relevant to all levels. In support of this view we emphasize
contextual interactions within perception. An important
difference is therefore that Cohen et al. identify context
with a particular set of representations, whereas we identify
context with a widely distributed class of synaptic interac-
tions. Another difference is that we see dynamic grouping
as a fundamental form of coordination, and this relates our
approach in very specific ways to high-frequency cortical
rhythms as outlined in section 5. Finally, Cohen et al. em-
phasize dopaminergic modulation of explicit task-related
information in PFC, whereas we emphasize NMDA-hypo-
function. These are compatible. Indeed, they must be com-
plementary, as the neurotransmitter systems involved are
very different, but both have modulatory or coordinating
functions. A major goal for future research is therefore to
discover how they are combined.
7.3. Theories emphasizing NMDA-hypofunction
Several recent theories of pathophysiology in schizophrenia
emphasize NMDA-hypofunction (Coyle 1996; Ellison 1995;
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Hoffman & McGlashan 1993; Javitt & Zukin 1991; Jentsch
& Roth 1999; Olney & Farber 1995; Tamminga 1998), but
they rarely relate that to cognitive coordination, and they do
not emphasize the ability of NMDA-channels to provide
gain-control through voltage-dependence. One research
group that does both, however, is that of Javitt and col-
leagues. They interpret their studies of primary auditory
cortex (Javitt et al. 1996) as showing that NMDA-channels
are involved in modifying the strength of response to infre-
quent deviant stimuli within a sequence of repetitive stim-
uli. They note that this modification involves the contextual
component of response rather than the obligatory stimulus-
induced response, and interpret it as showing how a stimu-
lus of one type can alter the response to a related but dif-
ferent stimulus. This component therefore provides a clear
example of what we call contextual coordination. Javitt et al.
(1996) also suggest further ways in which the role of in-
hibitory interneurons can be incorporated into an account
of NMDA function and malfunction. Furthermore, al-
though they demonstrate malfunction of preattentive pro-
cesses in sensory cortex, they hypothesize, as we do, that
analogous malfunctions can also apply to higher cognitive
processes. Their studies using the CPT and mismatch neg-
ativity in both schizophrenia (Javitt et al. 2000) and in
healthy volunteers (Umbricht et al. 2000) provide strong
support for this hypothesis.
8. Issues arising
The perspective advocated here has implications for con-
ceptions of cognitive neuropsychiatry, which when mod-
elled too closely on cognitive neuropsychological studies of
the effects of brain damage tends to neglect cellular physi-
ology and neuropharmacology. This stands in stark contrast
to the central role of pharmacotherapy in psychiatric prac-
tice. From our perspective, cognitive neuropsychiatry has
much to gain by relating psychological disorders to neuro-
science at the cellular level. Our perspective also encour-
ages the application of new analytic techniques to neu-
roimaging data. Studies of cerebral blood flow have
associated symptoms of disorganization with decreased
perfusion in the right ventral prefrontal cortex and insula
and with increased perfusion in the right anterior cingulate
gyrus (Liddle et al. 1992). These are not the regions ex-
pected to be involved in the perceptual disorders outlined
above. Failure to find changes in gross activity in percep-
tual regions is not incompatible with the hypothesis of im-
paired perceptual coordination, however, because both
contextual disambiguation and dynamic grouping could oc-
cur with little or no change in gross activity. This empha-
sizes the need to consider not just gross activity within each
region, but also its fine spatiotemporal structure both
within and between regions. Techniques for imaging the ex-
tent to which brain regions interact (Tononi et al. 1998a)
may therefore be relevant to psychosis, particularly when
applied to data with high temporal resolution. Similarly,
techniques for imaging synchronization on a fast time scale
using EEG data (Phillips & Pflieger 2000; Tallon-Baudry &
Bertrand 1999), and for distinguishing modulatory from
obligatory intracortical interactions using fMRI data (Fris-
ton et al. 1995), may also have much to contribute.
The central hypothesis examined in this target article is
that disorganization in some forms of psychotic cognition
arises from reduced ion-flow through the NMDA family of
glutamate receptors. Though both the cognitive and the
neuropharmacological components of this argument are
currently receiving much attention and support, neither is
yet clearly established, and the wide-ranging implications
of their mutually supportive relationship have been little
discussed. We are well aware that our argument goes be-
yond what is currently widely agreed, and four central 
issues for commentary arise. (1) Does reduced ion-flow
through NMDA-channels play a crucial role in the patho-
physiology of cognitive disorganization in schizophrenia,
and, if so, how does that relate to dopamine dysregulation
and other pathophysiologies more widely thought to be in-
volved in the disorder? (2) Is a reduction in context-sensi-
tivity central to many of the cognitive impairments known
to be associated with schizophrenia? Some investigators
have suggested that context-sensitivity is not reduced in
schizophrenia, but increased (David 1994). Should further
tests show this to be so, then that will disprove what we ad-
vocate. (3) Does reduced flow through NMDA-channels
play a central role in producing disorders of context-sensi-
tivity? If it is shown that both occur, but apply to different
patients, then that will be strong evidence against the posi-
tion we advocate. (4) Does cognitive disorganization in
PCP-psychosis provide evidence that normal cognition
depends upon coordinating interactions that are imple-
mented via NMDA-receptors?
Several closely related issues arise, the most important
being as follows. (1) Can impairments of a fundamental un-
derlying process in schizophrenia account for disorganiza-
tion across cognitive, behavioral, and symptomatic do-
mains, or are deficits in these domains best seen as being
independent and capable of occurring in many different
combinations? (2) Insofar as contextual interactions are in-
volved in these disorders, is the relevant context only that
which is provided by preceding information held in a work-
ing memory that is located in prefrontal cortex, or is it much
wider than that, including current stimulus context and
part-whole relationships? (3) Clinically, semantic associa-
tions are seen to be much less focussed in thought disor-
dered patients, and this may be reflected by greater indi-
rect semantic priming (Spitzer et al. 1993). How can our
perspective be related to this? The first thing to note is that
semantic associations require compositionality, which can
be implemented via the dynamic grouping processes we
have emphasized. These depend on contextual interactions,
and mediated or indirect contextual interactions require
primary input to the mediating items (Kay et al. 1998).
Thus, if primary sources of activation, for example, from
memory retrieval processes, noise, or other sources of acti-
vation is less focused in thought disorder, then more indi-
rect associations can be predicted. (4) NMDA-receptors
are widely thought to play a major role in learning, but not
in ongoing processing, so how well supported is our claim
that this view is mistaken and that NMDA-receptors also
play a crucial role in ongoing processing? (5) The voltage-
dependence of NMDA-channels is usually ignored in dis-
cussions of their role in schizophrenia and PCP-psychosis,
so how justified is our emphasis upon this property? (6) Are
any other receptors plausible candidates for the role of im-
plementing coordinating interactions between the pyrami-
dal cells whose activity embodies our cognitive contents?
(7) Which clinical symptoms are likely to be due to reduced
context-sensitivity, and which are not? (8) How similar are
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the cognitive deficits that occur in PCP-psychosis and
schizophrenia? (9) Is there a spectrum of cognitive pheno-
types characterized by genetic variations in the balance be-
tween locally independent processes and context-sensitive
holistic Gestalt interactions? (10) Is there evidence for un-
deractivity of NMDA receptor channels in any other disor-
ders involving cognitive disorganization? (11) Is the molec-
ular and regional diversity of NMDA receptor channels
(Kutsuwada et al. 1992) crucial, and is NMDA dysfunction
limited to the cortex or does it also occur in other brain re-
gions? (12) What pathophysiologies other than NMDA-hy-
pofunction can impair the specific class of neuronal inter-
actions that underlie cognitive coordination? Though we
have focussed on NMDA-hypofunction, they could also be
disrupted in other ways, such as via abnormal pruning
(Hoffman & McGlashan 1993; McGlashan & Hoffman
2000), or via impaired consolidation of coordinating con-
nections due to abnormal input during development, for
example. (13) Do high-frequency rhythms provide a useful
window on processes of dynamic organization and their im-
pairment in schizophrenia? (14) Do postmortem and other
studies indicate that cognitive disorganization is associated
with reduced lateral and descending long-range connec-
tions of the kind that mediate contextual coordination via
NMDA-receptors? (15) Why do some antipsychotic med-
ications reduce cognitive disorganization? One recent re-
view (Mechri et al. 2001) concludes that clozapine signifi-
cantly reduces the ketamine-induced positive symptoms in
schizophrenic patients. Another concludes that the effects
of some atypical antipsychotics such as clozapine and olan-
zapine on NMDA receptors differentiates them from typi-
cal antipsychotics such as haloperidol (Goff & Coyle 2001).
It is therefore possible that some widely used antipsychotics
enhance NMDA-receptor activity and thus reduce cogni-
tive disorganization. If so, then agents more specifically de-
signed to enhance NMDA activity, perhaps via the glycine
modulatory site, may be even more beneficial. (16) Finally,
how widely supported is our view that neuroscience at cel-
lular and molecular levels should play a far greater role in
cognitive neuropsychiatry than it has done so far in cogni-
tive neuropsychology?
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NOTES
1. Consider illusory contours. Prima facie, this seems to be a
case where context provides primary drive as it produces signals
for things that are not there. This is clearly different to the exam-
ples shown in Figure 1a, right-most column, where context does
not produce the perception of absent things. One way to handle
such exceptions is to say that, to the extent that surrounding items
produce primary drive, then they are, by definition, not acting as
context. This view could be tested for coherence with the rest of
our perspective in various ways, including investigations of the RF
inputs to cells in visual cortex to see whether they included input
from surrounds that produce illusory contours. Note that this is
not merely a matter of finding out whether surrounds influence
the activity of cells in visual cortex (we know that they do), it is a
matter of finding out whether that influence is driving or modu-
latory. It could be both. Another way to view such exceptions is
therefore to see them as the faint ghosts of modulatory inputs that
in these exceptional cases produce output, possibly by amplifying
selected components in background or noise activity. This latter
view implies that the function of processes reflected in illusory
contours is to amplify relevant but weak evidence that is actually
present, rather than to signal the presence of absent things.
2. The creation, maintenance, and use of strategies that meet
longer-term goals of the organism as a whole are computationally
feasible because they are performed by systems that do not need
to coordinate all the local details. Psychology and neurobiology
have for many years provided evidence of such strategic or exec-
utive functions (Baddeley 1996; Fuster 1997; Miller & Cohen
2001; Shallice 1988). Functional neuroimaging now adds to that
evidence (Posner & Raichle 1994), and shows that new theories
are required to improve our conceptions of executive functions
(Grafman et al. 1995). They involve several distinct sub-divisions
of the PFC and anterior cingulate gyrus which operate via inter-
actions with limbic, striatal, and posterior cortical regions. Though
no definitive taxonomy is yet agreed, several classes of executive
function are often postulated: modulation of schemas or routines
in lower-level systems, including the inhibition of dominant re-
sponse tendencies when they are inappropriate in the current con-
text (Frith 1992; Liddle & Morris 1991; Shallice 1988); modula-
tion of perception and the control of attention in visuospatial and
other modalities (Posner & Raichle 1994); the maintenance or use
of information in components of working memory (Goldman-Ra-
kic et al. 2000); the formation and use of contextual associations
in episodic and source memory (Janowsky et al. 1989: Shallice et
al. 1994) and the assignment of affective significance (Damasio
1994; Petrides 1994; Robbins 1996); and the creative manipula-
tion of information to solve novel problems (Owen 2000; Robbins
1996; Shallice & Burgess 1996). Anatomical localization within
PFC depends on semantic content, for example, with some parts
being specialized for phonological information and others for vi-
suo-spatial information (Goldman-Rakic et al. 2000). Different
subdivisions of PFC may also be specialized for some executive
functions rather than others. For example, some may be special-
ized for selectively disinhibiting lower-level routines, and others
for the creative manipulation of information (Owen 2000).
3. Another aspect of executive function may be the gating of
input to a component of WM in PFC that holds contextual infor-
mation (Braver et al. 1999). It was clear from the original studies
of visual short-term memory that interference due to subsequent
activities was a major cause of short-term forgetting, and that cen-
tral executive functions are important in controlling that interfer-
ence (Phillips & Christie 1977). The theory of Braver et al. (1999)
offers a connectionist model that relates such interference to the
gating of access to WM in PFC.
4. The rich anatomical complexity of the glutamatergic system
greatly increases the scope for heterogeneity. NMDA-channels
are built from varying combinations of five different sub-units
with varying regional distributions, developmental histories, and
physiological properties (Watanabe et al. 1992). Different disor-
ders, including those with genetic origins, could therefore effect
these different subtypes of NMDA receptor in different ways; for
example, schizophrenia is associated predominantly with abnor-
malities of the obligate NMDA-receptor subunit (Meador-
Woodruff & Healy 2000). The close interactions between the
NMDA and dopamine systems implies that a primary pathology
in either could lead to dysregulation of the other. Another possi-
ble source of heterogeneity is that the amount of neurodegenera-
tion may depend upon whether glutamatergic overactivity due to
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reduced NMDA-channel activity on inhibitory cells outweighs un-
deractivity due to reduced NMDA-channel activity on gluta-
matergic cells. This is compatible with evidence for cases of schiz-
ophrenia both with and without progressive degeneration (Benes
& Coyle 1998).
5. When patients experience verbal hallucinations they do not
know that the words they experience are due to activity in those
other parts of their cognitive system that generate things to be said
(Frith 1992). Such hallucinations are possible because the sub-sys-
tems that instantiate the phonological and semantic forms of
words can be activated by input from any of several different
sources, some internal, some external. To signal the origin of ac-
tivity within them on any particular occasion, that activity must be
dynamically linked to the activity from which it arose on that oc-
casion. Failure of this dynamic linking could produce the strange
experience of having words in mind, but not as part of a larger pat-
tern of activity that links them to their origin in other brain regions
on that occasion. Verbal activity might then be experienced as
coming from outside the self, and delusional beliefs might then re-
flect attempts to account for this experience.
6. Silverstein and Palumbo (1995) describe similarities be-
tween schizophrenia and nonverbal perceptual-organization-out-
put disability, which is a severe form of nonverbal learning dis-
ability thought to fall within the autism spectrum (Rourke 1982).
They suggest that this disorder also involves impaired stimulus or-
ganization mechanisms, and that studies of such disorders could
compliment high-risk studies in the attempt to uncover the aeti-
ology of schizophrenia. Furthermore, some learning disabled in-
dividuals have deficits in backward masking (Blackwell et al. 1983)
and span of apprehension tasks (Tarnowski et al. 1986), which are
often thought to be vulnerability markers for schizophrenia. Thus,
there is evidence of common cognitive impairments in schizo-
phrenia and some other neurodevelopmental disorders. It is not
the case that all of these populations perform similarly simply by
virtue of a general intellectual impairment. Certain developmen-
tal disorders exhibit a very different pattern of cognitive deficits.
For example, patients with Williams Syndrome show increased
rather than decreased global processing (Pani et al. 1999), when
tested on the same perceptual organization task as used with schiz-
ophrenic patients by Silverstein et al. (1996a). Much may there-
fore be gained by comparing these disorders using relevant
process-oriented designs (Knight 1992; Knight & Silverstein
1998).
7. Discussing the role of the thalamus in the pathophysiology
of schizophrenia, Patterson (1987) concludes “If one were to sin-
gle out a brain structure that displayed the possibility for central
‘timing’ functions in brain, it would most likely be the thalamus.”
The basal ganglia are also often implicated in schizophrenia (Rob-
bins 1990). Graybiel (1997) argues that just as they contribute to
the coordination of motor output so they may also contribute to
the coordination of cognitive activity. She argues that in both cases
this coordination involves dynamic binding through the synchro-
nization of firing patterns so as to produce appropriate and pre-
cisely timed sequences of activity. In their review of the functional
architecture of the basal ganglia, Alexander and Crutcher (1990)
conclude that “the functional integration that is widely assumed
to occur within these circuits may prove to be based less upon the
spatial convergence of functionally disparate pathways than upon
the temporal coincidence of processing within pathways whose
functional segregation is rather strictly maintained” (p. 270). All
these views are highly consonant with that proposed here. One
function of the limbic system is thought to include putting things
in context while maintaining their individual identities, so that too,
may involve the formation of contextual associations that are im-
plemented in part by NMDA-receptors, which are particularly
dense in the hippocampus.
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The ketamine model for schizophrenia
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Abstract: This commentary compares clinical aspects of ketamine with
the amphetamine model of schizophrenia. Hallucinations and loss of in-
sight, associated with amphetamine, seem more schizophrenia-like. Flat
affect encountered with ketamine is closer to the clinical presentation in
schizophrenia. We argue that flat affect is not a sign of schizophrenia, but
rather, a risk factor for chronic schizophrenia.
The Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) target article provides striking ev-
idence for the explanatory power of drug models of psychotic psy-
chopathology, although the paper is broader than the ketamine
story, touching on clinical, cognitive, electrophysiologic, neuroa-
natomic, and other domains. We will focus on the clinical aspects
of drug models of psychosis and compare ketamine with amphet-
amine, with some consideration of hallucinatory processes and
loss of insight. In addition, we will touch on questions related to
the role of flat affect. The target article should facilitate empirical
study of important questions such as differences between keta-
mine and competing drug models.
At present, a number of drugs tied to different neurotransmit-
ters have been shown to provoke psychotic symptoms. Early on,
LSD produced considerable interest because of the tiny dose re-
quired for an induction. It was possible to imagine that a meta-
bolic error could produce an endogenous intoxicant. Mescaline
attracted interest because of its structural similarity to dopamine,
and the authority of the transmethylation hypothesis. Neither
LSD nor mescaline produced a clinical presentation that had the
“look and feel” of schizophrenia. It appeared that different trans-
mitters might provide some specificity for the different psy-
choses: Prolonged exposure to steroids could produce states that
mimicked manic psychoses, and a ditran induction shared char-
acteristics with the alcohol-withdrawal psychoses (Alpert et al.
1970).
The amphetamine model psychosis provides the “look and feel”
of paranoid schizophrenia and nests nicely with the dopamine hy-
pothesis of schizophrenia. Because of the risk of cardio-toxic ef-
fects, the rate of dosing of amphetamine must be slow, and the rate
and duration of dose increase may be important for the ampheta-
mine model (Alpert & Friedhoff 1980). Many of these issues ap-
pear accessible to empirical study within the conceptual frame-
work of the P&S article. The amphetamine model seems more
attractive than ketamine for a number of reasons. A model should
demonstrate a schizophrenic presentation without altering con-
sciousness, and ketamine is an anesthetic. It has a narrower range
of action below a threshold for clouding.
In addition, the hallucinatory phenomena with ketamine are
less compelling: The hallucinations are more mixed with illusions
and there is a shift to visual compared with auditory changes. In
surveys of hallucinations in schizophrenic patients (Alpert & Sil-
vers 1970), about 50% of the patients reported auditory halluci-
nations and about 20% reported visual hallucinations, and all of
the patients with visual hallucinations also had auditory ones.
Schizophrenic hallucinations are primarily verbal, of high intelli-
gibility, and give the impression of “thoughts becoming audible.”
The alcoholic auditory hallucinations resemble “sounds becoming
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verbal.” The hallucinating schizophrenic differs from the nonhal-
lucinator in regard to cognitive style and semantic processing
(Alpert et al. 1976). Amphetamine-associated hallucinations are
phenomenologically like those in schizophrenia.
In their Figure 2, P&S suggest horizontal and vertical neu-
roanatomic geometric models of neurotransmitter interactions for
psychopathologic disturbances. It has been shown that sensory
transduction of auditory sharpening mechanisms (lateral inhibi-
tion) may be affected by alcohol exposure in alcohol-withdrawal
psychoses (Alpert & Bogorad 1975). Similar processes may occur
in schizophrenia, and could be accessible to psychophysical ex-
amination. In addition, hallucinators differ from nonhallucinating
schizophrenics in regard horizontal organization of cognitive pro-
cessing (Alpert & Martz 1977). The P&S model provides a rea-
sonable context for investigation of these issues.
The loss of insight and other behavioral effects with ampheta-
mine can be very impressive. Among Angrist’s amphetamine sub-
jects, one was reluctant to report his auditory hallucinations for
fear that he would be locked away in a psychiatric hospital. He had
predicted at baseline that he would experience verbal hallucina-
tions as part of the amphetamine experience. When they oc-
curred, he thought that he was becoming schizophrenic. Another
subject spoke of “setups and traps” and rejected our attempts to
reassure him. He was convinced that a gang was coming to the
ward to get him. A third subject felt that he had received special
enlightenment and had become a “prophet.” He preached to the
ward for about an hour (Angrist 1972; Angrist & Gershon 1970).
Loss of insight appears to be a direct, primary effect of the am-
phetamine induction, not the subjects’ reaction to their perplex-
ing subjective experiences. These important aspects of the induc-
tion do not appear to be duplicated in the ketamine model.
A ketamine induction, perhaps more than amphetamine, is as-
sociated with affective flattening. Although the DSM IV (Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual IV, of the American Psychiatric 
Association) has added flat affect as a diagnostic criterion for
schizophrenia, this may be an error. Flat affect appears early in
life, perhaps years before schizophrenia appears (Knight & Roff
1985), and may diminish at the time of an acute schizophrenic
episode. Similarly, flat affect is reduced in cocaine abuse while hal-
lucinations and delusions are markedly increased (Serper et al.
1995; 1996). Emotions appear to be intact in schizophrenics with
flat affect (Alpert et al. 2000), and flat affect can be conceptual-
ized as a disturbance in motor expression. Flat affect may worsen
in treatment with typical neuroleptics but respond to treatment
with atypical antipsychotic drugs, even while other psychotic signs
remain. For these reasons, flat affect does not appear to be co-
herent with diagnostic signs for a schizophrenic episode. It may
be conceptualized as a risk factor for schizophrenia rather than a
sign of schizophrenia. Further, flat affect may represent a condi-
tion involving lowered dopamine turnover. The role of flat affect
in ketamine model psychosis may represent complex interactions
with dopamine. The P&S article will help to clarify the actions of
neurotransmitters in psychosis.
Where the rubber meets the road: The
importance of implementation
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Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein argue that a range of cognitive distur-
bances in schizophrenia result from a deficit in cognitive coordination at-
tributable to NMDA receptor dysfunction. We suggest that the viability of
this hypothesis would be further supported by explicit implementation in
a computational framework that can produce quantitative estimates of the
behavior of both healthy individuals and individuals with schizophrenia.
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) put forth an interesting and provoca-
tive hypothesis as to the ways in which NMDA receptor dysfunc-
tion might lead to disturbances in cognitive coordination in schiz-
ophrenia. They do an elegant job of synthesizing psychological,
computational, and neurobiological perspectives on the cognitive
coordination construct and its underlying mechanisms. We are
grateful that P&S acknowledge our own work (with Jonathan Co-
hen and colleagues) as trying to achieve similar goals with regard
to understanding cognition in schizophrenia (Braver et al. 1999).
P&S contrast their hypotheses to our theory, which suggests that
one of the core cognitive deficits in schizophrenia is a dysfunction
in the ability to represent and maintain context information, as a
result of a disturbance in dopamine function in prefrontal cortex.
P&S highlight a potentially more fundamental mechanism of con-
text processing (cognitive coordination in their model) that in-
volves the NMDA-receptor and computational processing within,
as well as between, cortical modules. As such, P&S suggest that
deficits in the kinds of cognitive control mechanisms that are cen-
tral to our theory could arise from disturbances in basic mecha-
nisms that may be involved in processing throughout the entire
brain. This contrasts with our theory, which focuses on processing
mechanisms that more selectively involve dopamine interactions
with prefrontal cortex, and on the cognitive capabilities that de-
pend on such interactions. We have argued that disturbances in
such mechanisms among individuals with schizophrenia give rise
to relatively selective cognitive deficits that are most severe under
particular task conditions.
We are excited by the prospect of a theory of cognition in schiz-
ophrenia that attempts the same integration of psychological,
computational, and neurobiological perspectives that we have
tried to incorporate in our work. An especially exciting prospect is
the suggestion by P&S that their mechanism could account for
deficits among individuals with schizophrenia, both on high-level
cognitive tasks and in more basic sensory and perceptual domains.
If this were true, it would constitute an advance upon our own the-
ory, which is admittedly more constrained in terms of the phe-
nomena for which it attempts to account. Phillips and colleagues
have conducted computational studies demonstrating that NMDA-
receptors have properties (i.e., their voltage-dependence) that al-
low these receptors to help organize processing and learning.
However, a more convincing demonstration of the explanatory
power of the P&S model would be to explicitly demonstrate that
a disturbance in the same mechanism could lead to changes in
both high-level cognitive processing and sensory/perceptual (e.g.,
Gestalt grouping phenomena).
P&S refer to a distinction between computational theory and
computational modeling. Their theory seems to be rooted in the
former approach. In contrast, our work has focused on the latter
approach, using simulations of specific cognitive tasks. We would
advocate that explicit simulations of cognitive tasks provide an
useful means by which to compare and contrast theories such as
ours and that of P&S. In particular, simulations of actual cognitive
tasks enable quantitative estimates of the success with which a
model can account for the relevant behavioral phenomena. Such
estimates provide an objective metric by which to evaluate com-
peting models. For example, one would judge the P&S model to
be a more successful model of cognition in schizophrenia than our
own if, in addition to accounting for sensory/perceptual phenom-
ena, the P&S model could also account for the behavior of indi-
viduals with schizophrenia on tasks such as our AX version of the
Continuous Performance Task (a task that our theory suggests is
highly dependent on integrity of context processing functions)
with the same degree of success that our model can.
Such explicit implementation may also help to identify task con-
ditions that would help arbitrate between competing theories. For
example, our simulation work has suggested that deficits in con-
text processing among individuals with schizophrenia should be
amplified under conditions in which context needs to be actively
maintained in working memory and/or used to inhibit dominant
response tendencies that are not appropriate for the task at hand.
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A number of empirical studies provide support for these model
predictions (e.g., Barch et al. 2003; Cohen et al. 1999b; Javitt et
al. 2000; Servan-Schreiber et al. 1996; Stratta et al. 1998). How-
ever, it is not clear from the level of description provided by P&S
whether their theory would also predict that such factors should
influence the severity of cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. It is
also possible that simulations of specific cognitive tasks in the P&S
framework would identify other conditions that are especially de-
pendent on their proposed NMDA-receptor mechanism. In our
experience we have found that the process of simulating empiri-
cal phenomena forced us to refine and elaborate our initial con-
ceptual hypotheses in ways that we could not have predicted
ahead of time.
In summary, we are intrigued by the theory put forth by P&S
and encourage the authors to take this theory to the next level by
providing an explicit computational implementation that can be
compared with competing theories.
A wide-spectrum coordination model of
schizophrenia
Hendrik Pieter Barendregt
Nijmeegse Instituut voor Informatica en Informatiekunde, 6500 GL Nijmegen,
The Netherlands. henk@cs.kun.nl http://www.cs.kun.nl/~henk
Abstract: The target article presents a model for schizophrenia extending
four levels of abstraction: molecules, cells, cognition, and syndrome. An
important notion in the model is that of coordination, applicable to both
the level of cells and of cognition. The molecular level provides an “im-
plementation” of the coordination at the cellular level, which in turn un-
derlies the coordination at the cognitive level, giving rise to the clinical
symptoms.
The model of schizophrenia presented by Phillips & Silverstein
(P&S) can be depicted as follows:
NMDA d Þ neur. coord. d Þ cogn. coord. d Þ schiz. D
This requires some explanation from the following dictionary:
NMDA N-methyl-D-aspertate glutamate receptor activity
neur. coord. neuronal coordination
cogn. coord. cognitive coordination
schiz. schizophrenia symptoms
X d X decreases
X D X increases
In somewhat more detailed terms, the model states the following.
If the activity of NMDA glutamate receptors in the cortex is be-
low normal, then neural coordination within and between cortical
regions is decreased; this in turn implies decreased cognitive co-
ordination, such as disambiguation and dynamic grouping; this
then will be the direct cause of the symptoms of schizophrenia,
such as impairments of perception, preattentive sensory gating,
selective attention, working memory, and long-term memory. The
authors choose to focus on disorganization.
The way the authors come to their model is as follows: NMDA-
antagonists cause schizophrenia-like symptoms; schizophrenia
implies impaired cognitive coordination, and vice versa; neural co-
ordination is behind cognitive coordination. The model postulates
that the NMDA glutamate channels provide a control for the
neural coordination. The rationale behind this is that the NMDA-
receptors are voltage-gated, that is, they depend on both the lig-
and and the right voltage to be opened. So they may indeed be
used to coordinate processes (they essentially have the function of
an AND-gate in a computer).
One virtue of the model is that it is wide-spectrum. It ranges
from a molecular mechanism via cellular phenomena, via cogni-
tion, to psychiatric symptoms. The model makes predictions about
patients suffering from schizophrenia: There is impairment of
global, but not local, motion perception; high frequency rhythms
(gamma) will be reduced. This implies that the model is falsifiable.
The main virtue of P&S’s model is its emphasis on coordination,
interaction. In computer science, a notion and theory has emerged
that seems relevant here: that is, the notion and theory of com-
municating systems (see Milner 1999). Although everything hap-
pening in a computer may be described by fluctuating bits, the
theory of communication forms a convenient level of abstraction.
Some bits encode meaningful information to be used later, other
bits represent actions that are relevant at the very moment. An in-
teracting communication, the most fundamental concept in the
mentioned theory, needs two half-acts, each waiting for the other
half to be present simultaneously (like two persons who want to
shake hands).1 All this may be useful for a thorough theoretical
underpinning of the way in which coordination is implemented by
NMDA glutamate channels.
Although a single model for schizophrenia is presented, this
does not imply that it is a homogeneous condition. For, there are
many ways in which coordination can be impaired. Also, the ef-
fects can vary in severity. The authors give several examples of this
and it is also apparent from the computer science theory of com-
municating systems, mentioned above.
The authors mention how their model is similar to many other
theories, though not in all aspects. The theories they put forward
regarding the cause of the disconnection between cortical regions
are mainly similar to each other, apart from the fact that they do
not speak about coordination within regions and focus on long
term, that is, learning, effects (see Dolan et al. 1999; Friston 1999).
P&S do focus in their model on the cortex but mention that other
brain regions will also be involved. A paper not mentioned by the
authors, in which such an involvement is described, is van Hoof
(2002). Van Hoof provides a model of the pathogenesis of schizo-
phrenia, in which the drive and guidance mechanisms in the brain
(specific brain regions are mentioned) are said to be underdevel-
oped (in the terminology of the target article, they do not coordi-
nate well). Such intentional aspects fit well with the model of P&S.
The target article ends by stating many open questions. Yet, one
puzzle that has been ignored is the claim in Menninger et al. (1963)
that some of the schizophrenic patients get “weller than well.”
The theory of mobile systems (also see Milner 1999) goes beyond
that of communicating ones. The intended model in ICT (Informa-
tion and Communication Technology) is that of mobile telephones,
or Web pages with links. Here, the number of action channels is vari-
able and a communication may create a new channel between other
processes. This theory may model very well the way in which cells
communicate. In some cases, there is no receptor in a cell for a cer-
tain transmitter T, but there is for another transmitter T9. Reception
of T9 will cause the DNA code for the receptor for T to be read from
the genome, and brought to expression, so that T can be received.
NOTES
1. A typical example of a communicating process is a vending machine.
It has a slot for coins and one button for coffee and one for tea. The process
of the machine is:
M 5 want_coin.(ready_tea-button 1 ready_coffee-button).M.
This means that the machine (M) is waiting for a coin and, after that, for
a push on either the tea or the coffee button. Here, the period (.) stands
for sequential composition and the (1) for choice. The M is repeated on
the right-hand side because we’d like the machine to keep operating. A
human that regularly wants to use the machine has the process:
H 5 put_coin.(push_tea-button 1 push_coffee-button).H.
Now, the interaction of the human (H) with the machine (M) is denoted
by HiM. Provided that we postulate that there are communications c, such
that:
c(put_coin,want_coin) 5 accept_coin
c(push_tea-button,ready_tea-button) 5 pour_tea
c(push_coffee-button,ready_coffee-button) 5 pour_coffee
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and that noncommunicating processes (like c[push_coffee-button,ready_
tea-button] are abstracted away, we obtain:
HuuM 5 accept_coin.(pour_tea 1 pour_coffee).(HuuM)
This is indeed the outlook on the world from the point of view of such a
vending machine (we left out considerations that the machines need to be
refilled, and that water and energy are available in unlimited quantities).
We see the difference with ordinary algorithmic programming, which is
directed towards termination. Programming a process is often directed in
an interactive environment to unlimited continuation.
The theory of communicating systems carefully describes processes
with a global control, versus ones with a local distributed control without
global knowledge.
Context rules
Steven L. Bressler
Center for Complex Systems and Brain Sciences, Florida Atlantic University,
Boca Raton, FL 33431. bressler@fau.edu
http://www.ccs.fau.edu/~bressler
Abstract: It is proposed that cortical activity is normally coordinated
across synaptically connected areas and that this coordination supports
cognitive coherence relations. This view is consistent with the NMDA-
hypoactivity hypothesis of the target article in regarding disorganization
symptoms in schizophrenia as arising from disruption of normal interareal
coordination. This disruption may produce abnormal contextual effects in
the cortex that lead to anomalous cognitive coherence relations.
The human brain is an engineering marvel. Its range of capabili-
ties far surpasses that of any animal or machine. Understanding
the factors that give the human brain its unique cognitive abilities
is of central importance to numerous human endeavors. Aware-
ness has been growing in recent years that a major factor deter-
mining the brain’s computational power is its connectional com-
plexity (Stone & Kotter 2002). While it is commonly agreed that
cortical areas are specialized for processing different types of in-
formation, relatively little attention has been given to the depen-
dence of this specialization on the connectional architecture of the
cortex. A major determinant for an area’s ability to process a cer-
tain type of information is the inputs that it receives. Yet, the con-
nections between areas appear to be overwhelmingly supported
by bidirectional pathways, implying that, through recursive inter-
actions, an area’s inputs from other areas will be affected by the
output signals that it sends to them. Therefore, it would seem that
the unique processing that is characteristic of each cortical area
must be defined in terms of its interactions with other areas. It is
therefore necessary, in seeking to determine the function of a cor-
tical area, to consider the collection of areas with which it is con-
nected, and with which it may jointly process information. This
collection has been called an area’s “connection set” (Bressler
2002) or “connectional fingerprint” (Passingham et al. 2002).
The anatomical pathways linking the areas of a connection set
are undoubtedly crucial for defining what inter-areal interactions
are possible, but the specific interactions that occur will ultimately
depend on the dynamics of inter-areal coordination (Bressler &
Kelso 2001). Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) are amply justified in ad-
dressing the basic question of how specialized cortical processes
are coordinated (Varela et al. 2001). They rightly stress the im-
portance of dynamic coordination in visual perception (Bressler
1996) and its possible disruption as a determinant of schizophre-
nia (Bressler 2003). Moreover, they correctly assess the impor-
tance of coordination for the issue of local contextual effects
within cortical areas (Bressler 1999; 2002).
P&S are on weaker ground, however, when they attempt to for-
mulate a general principle of cortical function from the distinction
between primary and contextual influences. To define the “pri-
mary input” to cortical neurons as arising from their receptive
fields, as P&S do, is a decision fraught with difficulties. The con-
cept of receptive field cannot serve as a sound basis for deriving a
universal computational property of cortical neurons. Neurons in
non-sensory cortical areas do not have unambiguous receptive
fields, and neurons in higher-level sensory areas have large recep-
tive fields that derive from multiple converging inputs rather than
clearly defined primary inputs. In short, cortical areas with a
clearly defined primary input pathway are the exception rather
than the rule.
The overall lack of primary inputs should not, however, be taken
to denigrate the role of local context in cortical processing. In a
broad sense, all inputs to a cortical area may be considered as con-
textual – even those primary inputs that can obviously be defined
as directly originating in the periphery. Therefore, contextual in-
fluence may be seen as a common outcome of cortical function, a
property that emerges from the coordinating interactions in which
a cortical area engages with the other areas of its connection set.
Included within the various types of coordinating interactions may
be top-down effects from high-level areas (connectionally far from
the periphery), as well as bottom-up effects from low-level areas
(connectionally near the periphery).
From this perspective, the interactions that a cortical area 
undergoes in conjunction with the members of its connection set,
automatically provide context for that area’s local processing
(Bressler & Kelso 2001). An understanding of the rules that gov-
ern the contextual influences exerted by cortical areas on one an-
other may come from the study of cognitive coherence (Thagard
2000). If we assume that cognitive domains are spatially mapped
in the cortex, then the dynamic coordination of cortical areas, con-
strained by the cortical connectional architecture, may instantiate
cognitive coherence relations. In this interpretation, cognitive
state depends on interacting cortical areas, which normally reach
a consensus that resolves cognitive coherence and incoherence re-
lations among participating cognitive domains. Large-scale net-
works of coordinated cortical areas that emerge during cognitive
processing consequently reflect the recruitment and exclusion of
areas according to the satisfaction of these relations. Areas that are
able to express mutually consistent information are included in
these networks, thereby satisfying coherence relations (positive
constraint). Conversely, areas that would express information that
is inconsistent with any of the included areas are excluded from
participation, thereby satisfying incoherence relations (negative
constraint). This viewpoint is consistent with that of P&S when
they assign a functional role to cognitive coordination in schemata
conflict resolution.
A prediction from this perspective is that cognitive dysfunction
of the type presented by the disorganization syndrome in schizo-
phrenia reflects an underlying discoordination of cortical areas
(Bressler 2003). This interpretation is consistent with the NMDA-
hypoactivity hypothesis proposed by P&S if one assumes, as they
do, that inter-areal constraints are mediated by NMDA synapses.
In neural terms, inter-areal discoordination would mean that cor-
tical areas were unable to maintain a proper balance between en-
gagement in and disengagement from large-scale coordinated
networks (Bressler & Kelso 2001). In terms of cognitive coher-
ence, discoordination would be expected to result in cognitive
states marked by a breakdown of coherent relations and the man-
ifestation of incoherent ones. The disruption of coordination be-
tween areas that normally would be coordinated might appear
phenomenologically as a failure to make correct associations
among sensory fragments, percepts, events, or concepts, depend-
ing on the areas involved. The coordination of areas expressing in-
consistent information could result in erroneous associations
among those same entities. Therefore, discoordination could pro-
duce both degradative and illusory symptoms in schizophrenia.
These predicted effects would not involve a malfunction of the ac-
tivity within any cortical area, so they could not be detected by
recording the activity of any single neuron or single area. Rather,
they would have to be detected as departures from normal pat-
terns of coordination, reflecting violations of the normal rules of
context.
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Spatial integration in perception and
cognition: An empirical approach to the
pathophysiology of schizophrenia
Yue Chen
Mailman Research Center, Harvard Medical School/McLean Hospital,
Belmont, MA 02478. ychen@wjh.harvard.edu
Abstract: Evidence for a dysfunction in cognitive coordination in schizo-
phrenia is emerging, but it is not specific enough to prove (or disprove)
this long-standing hypothesis. Many aspects of the external world are spa-
tially mapped in the brain. A comprehensive internal representation relies
on integration of information across space. Focus on spatial integration in
the perceptual and cognitive processes will generate empirical data that
shed light on the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.
When Bleuler (1911/1961) coined the term schizophrenia, few re-
alized how difficult it would be to unravel the brain mechanisms
underlying this devastating mental disorder. Bleuler’s view of
“split mind” as a basis of schizophrenia is sensible but neverthe-
less intricate for empirical assessment, at least up to now. Several
theories have been developed to address issues of functional im-
pairments of the brain associated with schizophrenia (e.g., Beau-
mont & Dimond 1973; Friston 1998). Because the search for a re-
lationship between schizophrenia and observable organic loss in
the brain regions does not seem very promising, the hope of using
dysfunction in brain networks to understand schizophrenia has
been revived. Phillips & Silverstein’s (P&S’s) perspective on cog-
nitive coordination in schizophrenia represents a new endeavor in
this direction.
By incorporating recent advances in neurophysiology into the
study of psychotic conditions and reviewing experimental data as-
sociated with schizophrenic patients, P&S conjecture that dys-
function in cognitive coordination is implicated in schizophrenia.
This perspective appears to be reasonable in that it is consistent
with many clinical and laboratory observations reported for schiz-
ophrenic patients. On the other hand, some of these observations
are also consistent with a different perspective – a dysfunction re-
stricted to a specialized perceptual or cognitive process.
Does dysfunction of cognitive coordination play a major role 
in some, rather than in other, pathophysiological processes of
schizophrenia? Or does dysfunction in cognitive coordination
processes and in specialized cognitive processes co-exist in schiz-
ophrenia? To distinguish these two possibilities, current empirical
evidence is not adequate. To further appreciate the cognitive co-
ordination issue, we need empirical data that address not only ab-
normal functions in cognitive coordination but also normal func-
tions in relevant specialized cognitive processes in schizophrenia.
Separating a deficit in cognitive coordination from a deficit in
a specialized cognitive process has never been an easy task. This
is because many cognitive functions involve both specialized and
coordinated processes and, as a consequence, the two types of
deficits sometime show similar characteristics in behavioral re-
sponses. One aspect of cognitive function – spatial integration –
is, however, distinctive in this respect. Information from the ex-
ternal world is represented largely point-to-point in the percep-
tual and cognitive systems. Take vision as an example: Images of
visual fields are retinotopically mapped to the striate cortex in
primates. In order for the visual brain to form a coherent per-
cept, information from different spatial locations must be inte-
grated. This representation principle used by the brain presents
a unique opportunity to differentiate the two types of dysfunc-
tions – cognitive coordination versus functioning of a specialized
cognitive process – that are potentially linked to schizophrenia.
By assessing the processing of spatially localized information ver-
sus spatially distributed information, we can, in principle, disso-
ciate the coordination of cognitive processes from the function-
ing of specialized cognitive processes in schizophrenia (Holzman
1994).
Perceptual organization, a visual process requiring cognitive co-
ordination, has been explored in schizophrenia. The results re-
main inconclusive as far as whether a grouping dysfunction exists
(Rief 1991). On the one hand, Place and Gilmore (1980) showed
that, when asked to report the number of lines displayed hetero-
geneously, a task that is performed more efficiently without group-
ing, schizophrenic patients performed better than normal sub-
jects, suggesting deficient perceptual organizing ability. On the
other hand, Chey and Holzman (1997) showed that schizophrenic
patients performed as well as normal controls did on tasks requir-
ing the application of Gestalt principles of organization (i.e., prox-
imity, collinearity, or similarity). A number of other studies
showed results either consistent or inconsistent with a dysfunc-
tional perceptual grouping in schizophrenia (e.g., John & Hems-
ley 1992; Silverstein et al. 2000). These apparent inconsistencies
may be due to schizophrenic patients’ reduced but not diminished
ability to combine information into a coherent whole, as pointed
out by P&S. Before attributing these results to a dysfunction in
cognitive coordination, it is necessary to assess whether the pro-
cessing of other elementary information – for example, spatially
localized information – is normal in schizophrenia. This critical as-
sessment is often missing from many studies. Without such an as-
sessment, the demonstrated deficits in schizophrenia cannot be
attributed solely to a dysfunction in perceptual grouping.
One example of incomplete separation of a specialized versus a
coordination deficit can be seen in the study of global and local
motion processing in schizophrenia (Chen et al. 2003; cited by
P&S). This study aimed to identify the stage of motion processing,
the global or the local, responsible for the deficient behavioral
manifestation shown in previous studies (e.g., Chen et al. 1999a;
1999b), and found that detection of coherent motion embedded
in a random-dot field, but not detection of motion embedded in
gratings, was deficient in schizophrenic patients. Because only de-
tection of coherent motion requires spatial integration of motion
signals, the results were taken as evidence for a deficit in global
motion processing (or dynamic grouping, as stated by P&S). The
detection of coherent motion also involves rejection of noise;
whether this nonintegration component contributes to the per-
formance of the patients remains unclear. Thus, further empirical
studies are needed to differentiate whether or not the deficit
shown in the patients is due mainly to a failure in spatial integra-
tion, rather than in noise rejection. The same reasoning can be ap-
plied to the contour integration study in schizophrenia (Silverstein
et al. 2000; also cited in the target article). That study showed 
that schizophrenic patients were less able to detect the contours
that are composed of Gabor elements. Again, contour detection
in that stimulus configuration also involves rejection of Gabor el-
ements that do not belong to contours (distractors or noise). To be
qualified as evidence for dysfunction in cognitive coordination,
empirical studies need to show functional integrity of other cog-
nitive processes, including filtering out noise and encoding spa-
tially localized visual information (such as single dot, in the case of
detection of coherent motion, or single Gabor element, in the case
of contour detection).
The concept of cognitive coordination, put forward by P&S,
emphasizes the importance of the interaction among different
cognitive processes, rather than the integrity of individual cogni-
tive processes. One empirical approach to address the issue of cog-
nitive coordination is to study spatial integration in relation to spa-
tial structure of the perceptual and cognitive systems. Take vision
again as an example. One aspect of spatial interaction in the visual
system can be described as the effect of visual stimulation in the
surround on the responses to visual stimulation in the center. This
effect has been shown at both the neuronal and the psychophysi-
cal levels (e.g., Allman et al. 1985; Born 2000; Xing & Heeger
2000). One advantage of this center-surround paradigm is that
there is no involvement of noise or distractor in the visual stimuli.
Application of this paradigm will allow spatial integration of visual
information to be isolated from specialized sensory encoding and
allow assessment of how visual information at different spatial lo-
cations interact with each other. The outcomes of this type of study
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will then shed new light on cognitive coordination in schizophre-
nia.
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Abstract: Mechanisms that contribute to perceptual processing dys-
function in schizophrenia were examined by Phillips & Silverstein, and
formulated as involving disruptions in both local and higher-level coordi-
nation of signals. We agree that dysfunction in the coordination of cogni-
tive functions (disconnection) is also indicated for many of the linguistic
processing deficits documented for schizophrenia. We suggest, however,
that it may be necessary to add a timing mechanism to the theoretical ac-
count.
The notion that aberrations in sensory-perceptual and attentional
processing contribute to higher-order cognitive dysfunction in
schizophrenia was apparent to the first clinicians that studied the
disorder. Development of behavioral and neurophysiological
methodologies in the past four decades has provided neurobio-
logical links to those observations. Phillips & Silverstein (P&S)
provide a careful and compelling integration of such studies, be-
ginning with the experimental evidence indicating consistent dif-
ficulties in perceptual grouping and organization which cannot be
explained by inattention alone.
P&S describe the interference of perceptual discriminations
that is indicative of failures of Gestalt organization. We agree that
similar integrative and organization failures may contribute to
schizophrenia patients’ deficits in language comprehension, and
that the types of rhythmic activity (i.e., gamma band oscillations)
that P&S emphasize as relevant for primary perceptual integra-
tion are likely to be significant for language function. We empha-
size, however, the importance of a timing mechanism for any the-
oretical account of language dysfunction in this disorder. We will
direct our comments to the relevance of both mechanisms (cog-
nitive coordination and temporal processing) for language func-
tion in schizophrenia.
First, our data on receptive syntax processes in schizophrenia
(Condray et al. 2002) are consistent with a formulation of the
type advocated by P&S. Compared with controls, patients exhib-
ited reduced accuracy (i.e., not knowing who did what to whom)
about object-relative sentences (“The senator that the reporter at-
tacked admitted the error.”). More important, receptive syntax
and general intelligence were correlated in controls; these func-
tions were not associated in patients. Recent additional analyses
of those data illustrate P&S’s argument regarding the failure of
higher-order coordination of functions that may be more locally
specialized. An initial multiple regression analysis determined
comprehension accuracy was predicted by a model that included
the variables temporal processing accuracy (intelligibility of rapid
speech) and a diagnosis x semantic knowledge (WAIS-R Vocab-
ulary subtest score) interaction term [Model: R2 5 .32, Adjusted
R2 5 .30, F2,50 5 11.88, p , .001. Predictors: temporal process-
ing (t-test 5 3.21, p 5 .002); diagnosis x semantic knowledge (t-
test 5 2.94, p , .01)].
Table 1 presents the results of the separate regression analyses
conducted for each group to increase understanding about the sig-
nificant interaction. Findings show different patterns of associa-
tion for the two groups: For patients, temporal processing pre-
dicted comprehension accuracy, but semantic knowledge did not;
for controls, the reverse was true. Overall, the cumulative patterns
obtained for patients’ receptive syntax performance are generally
consistent with P&S’s assumption of a failure to coordinate corti-
cal activity within and between cognitive sub-systems. These data
suggest the additional importance of temporal processing for pa-
tients’ language comprehension.
As a second consideration, we suggest that inclusion of a timing
mechanism in theoretical accounts is necessary to explain the full
range of language dysfunction in this disorder. Deficits in time-de-
pendent processing as a core feature of schizophrenia have been
pursued as an independent line of investigation (for a review of
the early literature, see Braff et al. 1991). Findings indicate that
schizophrenia is associated with disturbances in the processing of
sequential, rapidly presented stimuli, including the disruptions in
auditory sensory gating and visual backward masking discussed in
the target article. Recognizing that this disturbance may be more
complex than a mere slow processing speed, Braff and colleagues
suggested that more refined distinctions are necessary, such as
Breitmeyer’s transient/sustained neural channel model (Breit-
meyer & Ganz 1976). That model is based on the parallel and com-
plementary pathways of the visual system, with functional distinc-
tions made on the basis of temporal latency, and temporal and
spatial resolution. Backward masking effects are assumed to be a
result of the interruption of the slower responding of the sustained
channels to the target stimulus by the faster responding of the
transient channels to the mask. One hypothesis is that the visual
backward masking deficit in schizophrenia is due to an overreac-
tive transient channel that compromises sustained channel func-
tion (Green et al. 1994).
Most of the experimental tasks described by P&S involve rapid,
sequential presentation of stimuli, but it is not clear whether they
subsume a dysfunction of timing under their cognitive coordina-
tion mechanism. In combination with our receptive syntax data,
considerations regarding semantic memory deficit in schizophre-
nia include the possibility that some type of timing dysfunction is
a key mechanism. In particular, compromised semantic memory,
as indexed by semantic priming deficits, may be due to dysfunc-
tion in the temporal dynamics of neural channel activation and
synchronization. Recent visual backward masking studies have
demonstrated that disruptions to patients’ perception of rapid, se-
quential bits of information (single letters) represent a robust phe-
nomenon (Butler et al. 2003; Cadenhead et al. 1997; Green et al.
1999). It is not known, however, if visual backward masking
deficit can account for semantic priming disturbance in schizo-
phrenia. Alternatively, it is possible that a temporal processing dis-
turbance alone is sufficient to explain semantic priming dysfunc-
tion in this population. This latter type of account has been
advanced for theories of dyslexia (“dyschronia”: Llinas 1993; cf.
the “cognitive dysmetria” for schizophrenia proposed by An-
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Table 1 (Condray & Steinhauer). Summary of separate multiple
regression analyses for variables predicting comprehension 
accuracy for schizophrenia patients and normal controls
R2 Adj. R2 F-ratio df p beta SE beta ttest p
Patients (n532) .22 .16 4.02 2.29 .03
Variables
Temporal Processing .64 .25 2.63 .014
Semantic Knowledge .03 .02 1.06 .30
Controls (n521) .59 .54 12.92 2,18 ,.001
Variables
Temporal Processing .92 .46 1.99 .061
Semantic Knowledge .10 .03 4.13 .001
dreasen et al. 1998). Moreover, researchers pursuing both lines of
investigation (dyslexia and schizophrenia) have suggested that
processing of rapid, sequential information produces cortical os-
cillations in the gamma range. Thus, converging lines of inquiry
and discussion include emphases on temporal processing and on
binding and coherence activity that may be reflected by high-fre-
quency cortical oscillations.
Physiologically, coherent activity of disparate brain regions must
occur to process relationships among stimuli. High-frequency
electrocortical oscillations in the gamma range (30–50 Hz) have
been proposed as one of the key types of binding processes. Pul-
vermuller (1999) has proposed the importance of this type of ac-
tivity for semantic memory formation and lexical access. John
(2001) has emphasized that electrocortical binding of functions,
based on gamma activity and other key oscillatory frequencies,
appears to progress from patterns of coherent activity across brain
regions to states where there is zero lag in onset of activity in 
different regions. He refers to this process as resonance. Thus, 
development and learning may underlie the progression to reso-
nance. As noted by P&S, schizophrenia may involve a neurode-
velopmental pathogenesis (Marenco & Weinberger 2000). To the
extent that brain organization is disrupted during crucial develop-
mental periods, such as the migration of cortical neurons during
prenatal development and the synaptic pruning during adoles-
cence, the likelihood of interference in the progression toward
resonance would therefore be increased.
We agree with the authors that the normal pattern of intercon-
nectivity among cognitive functions is disrupted in schizophrenia,
with some type of disconnection account potentially explaining a
range of language disturbances for this population. We wish to em-
phasize, however, the importance of adding a timing mechanism to
theoretical accounts of language dysfunction in schizophrenia.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health (MH
50631; MH 55762), and with resources and the use of facilities at the VA
Pittsburgh Healthcare System, Highland Drive Division.
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Abstract: The claim that the disorganized subtype of schizophrenia re-
sults from glutamate hypofunction is enhanced by consideration of current
subtypology of schizophrenia, symptom definition, interdependence of
neurotransmitters, and the nature of the data needed to support the hy-
pothesis. Careful specification clarifies the clinical reality of disorganiza-
tion as a feature of schizophrenia and increases the utility of the subtype.
The authors make clear at the outset that they are primarily con-
cerned with the “disorganization syndrome” of schizophrenia.
More should be said, then, about how the disorganization syn-
drome fits into the bigger clinical picture of this heterogeneous
brain disorder.
Subtyping schizophrenia. It is fair to say that heretofore, sub-
typing schizophrenic disorders has not approached the degree of
validity necessary to produce agreement about individual patients
among professionals who are practicing in the clinical setting. For
cognitive coordination, and its underlying neuropathology, to rep-
resent an isolatable subtype with clinical utility, it is necessary to
examine current schizophrenic subtypology briefly, and to support
a modification of its reformulation with better specification of
symptoms.
Conceptualizations of subtypes of schizophrenic disorder from
the 1930s to the 1990s used dichotomous categorizations: Type I/
Type II, Nondeficit/Deficit, Reactive/Process, and Positive/Neg-
ative. The first of each listed pair would be generally character-
ized by good premorbid function, abrupt onset with an identifi-
able stressor, flat affect, and fair to good prognosis; the second of
the pair is characterized by a baseline of social withdrawal, insid-
ious onset, absent stressors, affective lability, and unfavorable
prognosis.
The Diagnostic and Statistic Manual-IV (DSM-IV) does not
employ any dichotomous classification of schizophrenia. The Axis
II, Cluster A personality disorders (Schizotypal, Schizoid, and
Paranoid) comprise what was earlier designated as Simple Schiz-
ophrenia (Sanislow & Carson 2001). Although paranoid condi-
tions are still viewed as distinct from other psychotic disorders
(Blaney 1999), they are widespread throughout the DSM-IV,
falling into Cluster A, Delusional Disorder, and Paranoid Schizo-
phrenia. The remaining DSM-IV subtypes of schizophrenia are
Disorganized, Catatonic, Undifferentiated (also referred to in cur-
rent literature as “Mixed”), and Residual. Disorganized thought
(and behavior) are choice principle criteria that, when predomi-
nant, are sufficient to define the subtype. However, negative
symptoms are not placed into classification as a single subtype, but
rather are listed as one of the criteria of the choice principle, and
so may be associated with any subtype.
Recent studies, in line with the target article, have now estab-
lished that the dichotomous factor designated “Positive” is better
divided into two factors: Psychotic (hallucinations and delusions)
and Disorganization. A third factor, Negative symptoms, still
emerges. (Suggestions that there is furthermore a fourth dimen-
sion – relational – are not as well supported at this time.) Aware-
ness among the authors of the DSM-IV in 1994 evidently was
great enough to spur them to include an appendix with “Alterna-
tive Dimensional Descriptors for Schizophrenia” that corre-
sponds exactly to the three-factor solution: Psychotic (Hallucina-
tions or Delusions), Disorganized, and Negative.
Symptom definition. The three-factor solution of schizophre-
nia has the diagnostic effect of separating Disorganized thought
from the Psychotic symptoms in one subtype, although one may
reasonably hope that this was a de facto outcome of careful ob-
servation and diagnostic acumen anyway. The importance of this
insight is its etiologic implications. Following the lines of clinical
correlation, it appears that Negative symptoms are still associated
with the Psychotic as well as the Disorganized subtype. This raises
questions about the relationships among the symptom complexes.
Negative symptoms could be either a downstream effect of delu-
sions/hallucinations and thought disorder or could be a funda-
mental deficit that has different outcomes. This is a question to be
explored further empirically, for example by using clinical notes.
Similarly, one would like to know the comorbidity rates of Nega-
tive symptoms with Disorganized and Psychotic subtypes. By the
way, it proves a difficult task to find surprisingly simple demo-
graphics about the population with schizophrenia, such as the rel-
ative prevalence of subtypes. One reference notes 55% Paranoid
subtypes among successive admissions with any type of schizo-
phrenia (Hachem et al. 1997), but a prevalence figure for the Dis-
organized subtype was not found.
Neurotransmitter systems. The authors are well aware that hy-
pofunction of NMDA receptors has effects on other neurotrans-
mitters systems, and note that dysregulation of dopamine in pre-
frontal cortex, resulting in a chronic decrease of utilization, is
produced by NMDA-antagonists. This fact seemingly adds to the
basis on which Disorganization symptoms (NMDA-hypofunction)
can be separated from Negative symptoms (prefrontal dopamine
decreased utilization). The dissociation (or lack of it) of these neu-
rotransmitter system abnormalities is not directly addressed. This
harks back to the need, mentioned above, for comorbidity prev-
alence data, to determine how often a schizophrenic Disorgani-
zation syndrome occurs with and without Negative symptoms.
Clinical anecdotal perspective suggests that many patients with
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Disorganized schizophrenia have little or no trouble with Nega-
tive symptoms, and in fact can be impulsive, aggressive, and un-
predictable with potential for violence. It would be important to
know under what conditions prefrontal dopamine and glutamate
levels do interact. The suggestion has also been made, that hypo-
frontal glutamate activity causes excessive mesolimbic phasic dopa-
mine reactivity, producing psychotic symptoms (Grace 1991).
Data. The clinical research evidence linking the construct of
cognitive coordination to frank thought disorder is not as strong as
it needs to be to be conclusive. Disorganized symptoms were
found to be associated with exposure to NMDA-antagonists in hu-
mans, but so were Psychotic symptoms (delusions and hallucina-
tions) and Negative symptoms. Contextual disambiguation is
heavily relied on as an overarching proxy for cognitive coordina-
tion, stressing the fact that both information per se, and the mean-
ing of the signals, are embedded in context. Experimental opera-
tionalization of cognitive coordination depended heavily on the
perceptual-grouping method. Although it is quite clearly indi-
cated that perceptual-grouping scores were correlated with scores
of disorganization and associative thought disturbance, there is a
possible tautology in other citations which use language percep-
tion and production as indicators of cognitive coordination.
Stimulus configuration studies (Rudy & Sutherland 1989; Suth-
erland & Rudy 1989) developed a method of studying acquisition
of associated stimuli in rodents (light or tone, or light plus tone).
Although the original focus of interest was primarily the role of
hippocampus in learning and memory, there is a connection indi-
cated by the authors in their consideration of the influence of con-
textual constraints on long-term memory formation. A possible
source of controlled experimental data may exist if this method
were used to assess the effects of PCP-like substances on config-
ural stimulus acquisition in rats.
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Abstract: The Phillips & Silverstein model of NMDA-mediated coordi-
nation deficits provides a useful heuristic for the study of schizophrenic
cognition. However, the model does not specifically account for the de-
velopment of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. The P&S model is com-
pared to Meehl’s seminal model of schizotaxia, schizotypy, and schizo-
phrenia, as well as the model of schizophrenic cognitive dysfunction
posited by McCarley and colleagues.
Since Meehl’s (1962) address to the American Psychological As-
sociation, investigators have conjectured that a failure of inhibi-
tion at the cellular level is associated with a failure of inhibition at
the cognitive level. In Meehl’s model, a genetic diathesis produces
schizotaxia, an integrative neural defect in the CNS of preschizo-
phrenic individuals. In combination with social learning influ-
ences, the genetically determined defect of schizotaxia, gives rise
to a latent personality organization known as schizotypy. Accord-
ing to Meehl’s (l962; l989) model, all individuals who possess
schizotypy would be expected to show some evidence of aberrant
information processing.
Like others (cf. McCarley et al. l999), Phillips & Silverstein
(P&S) invoke advances in neuroscience to account for the infor-
mation-processing deficits observed in schizophrenia. P&S assert
that hypoactivity in the NMDA glutamate receptor channels
serves as the mechanism for cognitive dysmetria. There is consid-
erable overlap between the P&S theory of cognitive coordination
and the McCarley et al. (l999) model of cognitive dysfunction.
Both models discuss NMDA receptor blockage as a fundamental
mechanistic factor in the underlying cognitive deficits of schizo-
phrenia. The latter model also ties in event-related potential
(ERP) findings, most notably those pertaining to the N100 com-
ponent, which indicate that schizophrenia-spectrum subjects
show contextual processing abnormalities. While McCarley et al.
have focused primarily on temporal cortical regions, P&S propose
that the anatomical substrates of the cognitive coordination deficit
are more global, including, but not limited to, the prefrontal cor-
tex.
The authors’ conceptualization of a failure in cognitive coordi-
nation maps on very nicely to Meehl’s construct of schizotaxic 
cognitive slippage, which he proposed could account for the cog-
nitive, clinical, and behavioral symptoms associated with schizo-
phrenia. However, the cognitive impairments that characterize
schizophrenia are necessary but not sufficient for the develop-
ment of schizophrenia. In Meehl’s model, a key aspect is an un-
derlying genetic diathesis for the disorder. The P&S model is 
distinctly lacking a behavioral genetics perspective. Explicitly re-
lating a specific genetic diathesis for schizophrenia to NMDA-
channel hypoactivity might link the disruptions on the cellular
level not only to disruptions on the cognitive and phenomenolog-
ical levels, but also to a schizophrenia-spectrum outcome.
According to Meehl, there are various outcomes for schizotaxia;
these outcomes might include aberrant personality traits and/or
laboratory test performance, schizophrenia-spectrum disorders
such as schizotypal personality disorder and schizoaffective disor-
der, and schizophrenia. In the P&S model, the ways in which
schizophrenia arises from a failure in cognitive coordination are
not explicated. The failure in cognitive coordination that is posited
in the P&S model accounts for various psychotic conditions, in-
cluding, but not limited to, frequently observed phenocopies of
schizophrenia, such as PCP-psychosis. Although P&S compare
the effects of NMDA-antagonists to the impairments observed in
schizophrenia, the same impairments could be noted in non-schiz-
ophrenia patients who suffer from psychosis. Thus, the P&S
model appears to fall short in accounting for the ways in which the
neural bases of cognitive disorganization lead specifically to schiz-
ophrenia and/or schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.
One positive aspect of the P&S model is that it incorporates a
neurodevelopmental perspective. However, one corollary of a
neurodevelopmental model of schizophrenia is that signs of the
underlying liability for schizophrenia should precede the mani-
festation of schizophrenia symptoms. Schizotypal traits are more
common among first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients
(Gottesman l991) and other individuals at increased risk for the
later development of schizophrenia (Kwapil l998). In our lab, we
have observed that schizotypal individuals are more likely than
nonschizotypal controls to display deficits similar to the ones ob-
served in schizophrenia patients, namely, cognitive slippage (Good-
ing et al. 2001), disinhibition as measured by an anti-saccade task
(Gooding l999), increased perseverative errors on the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (Gooding et al. 1999), and subtle working mem-
ory impairments (Tallent & Gooding 2000), as well as smooth-pur-
suit eye-tracking deficits (Gooding et al. 2000). Findings that such
individuals also show evidence of NMDA-receptor channel hy-
poactivity and/or higher levels of endogeneous NMDA-receptor
blocker, N-acetyl-aspartyl-glutamate (NAAG), would buttress sup-
port for the P&S model.
We also assert that the cognitive coordination deficit described
by P&S does not adequately capture the cognitive signature of
schizophrenia. Inhibition is broadly defined to include the follow-
ing processes: deliberate controlled suppression of prepotent re-
sponses; decrease in activation of some nodes (as in connectionist
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models) and/or an increase in other nodes; and sensory gating or
filtering (Miyake et al. 2000). Through these processes, inhibition
provides interference control and assists in processing relevant in-
formation. Although inhibition and working memory are associ-
ated constructs, they are not entirely overlapping processes. While
P&S discuss inhibition as one aspect of cognitive coordination,
they discuss inhibition primarily in terms of its service in the main-
tenance of context. However, the disinhibition seen in patients
with schizophrenia encompasses a broader array of impaired
processes. In addition to disinhibition of prepotent responses such
as those seen during Stroop and anti-saccade tasks, schizophrenia
patients also manifest sensorimotor gating deficits as measured
through prepulse inhibition paradigms (cf. Braff et al. l999) and
perseveration in behavioral responses as well as in language pro-
duction. We would therefore assert that disinhibition, in addition
to failure to maintain contextual representations, is part of the cog-
nitive signature of schizophrenia.
The P&S model departs from that of Meehl (l962; l989) by al-
lowing for etiological as well as phenomenological heterogeneity.
Indeed, the authors assert that their model is particularly relevant
for the disorganized subtype of schizophrenia. In the final section
of their paper, P&S present several avenues for further theorizing
and investigation. One further avenue for refining the P&S model
might be to relate other aspects of neurochemical dysregulation,
for example, the effects of serotonergic hallucinogens and/or dys-
regulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (cf.
Walker & DiForio l996) to the coordinating interactions that are
implemented via NMDA-receptors. Such theorizing might ac-
count for the exacerbation of at-risk individuals’ cognitive impair-
ments under conditions of stress.
In summary, the P&S model fails to link the NMDA-mediated
cognitive dysmetria specifically to the development of schizo-
phrenia and spectrum disorders. Nonetheless, we believe that it
provides a valuable heuristic for our understanding of schizo-
phrenia and are encouraged by its potential for further research
inquiry.
Linking brain to mind in normal behavior and
schizophrenia
Stephen Grossberg
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems, Boston University, Boston, MA
02215. steve@bu.edu http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg
Abstract: To understand schizophrenia, a linking hypothesis is needed
that shows how brain mechanisms lead to behavioral functions in normals,
and also how breakdowns in these mechanisms lead to behavioral symp-
toms of schizophrenia. Such a linking hypothesis is now available that com-
plements the discussion offered by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S).
This interesting target article emphasizes the important role of
“cognitive coordination” – notably contextual disambiguation and
dynamic grouping – in schizophrenia, and proposes that a failure
of such coordination may occur during schizophrenia as a result of
reduced ion-flow through NMDA glutamate receptors. The arti-
cle summarizes a variety of useful data that support this hypothe-
sis to varying degrees. There is, however, a large gap in the authors’
argument that would need to be filled for the hypothesis to be
more compelling: Namely, no linking hypothesis is supplied to ex-
plain how brain mechanisms of cognitive coordination work, or
how they generate contextual properties at the behavioral level in
normal individuals; or how the proposed breakdown of these
mechanisms leads to schizophrenic symptoms. As a result, the au-
thors’ arguments are basically arguments of consistency with some
known data, rather than arguments from which a compelling de-
duction of cause and effect can be derived.
Because of this absence of computational rigor, some of their
statements can be confusing or even misleading. For example, the
authors write that “subsets of neuronal responses are grouped by
synchronizing the spiking activity of which they are composed”
(target article, sect. 1, para. 2). This seems to say that synchrony
causes grouping, whereas it is detailed neural models of vision
which show how grouping can sometimes cause synchrony (Gross-
berg 1976; Grossberg & Grunewald 1997; Grossberg & Somers
1991). A second possible cause of confusion is that mechanistically
different types of cognitive coordination tend to be lumped to-
gether, rather than distinguished by their unique characteristics.
For example, the authors mention working memory in the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC) as an example of cognitive coordination (sect.
1) but do not indicate that the circuits that control working mem-
ory in the PFC (e.g., Bradski et al. 1994; Grossberg 1978) can have
different organization and properties than, say, those which gov-
ern grouping in V1 and V2 (e.g., Grossberg 1999; Grossberg &
Raizada 2000).
The authors’ working hypothesis is “that cortical activity is co-
ordinated by widely distributed local interactions within and be-
tween regions, as well as by top-down strategic commands” (sect.
1, para. 12), a view that is presently shared by many neuroscien-
tists. Stated so broadly, this hypothesis is hard to use effectively. In
fact, detailed models of the laminar architecture of the neocortex
now clarify how such bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal inter-
actions are organized for purposes of perceptual grouping, atten-
tion, development, and learning (e.g. Grossberg 1999; Raizada &
Grossberg 2003), and would be a good foundation for testing the
authors’ general hypothesis. These LAMINART models have
qualitatively explained and quantitatively simulated key grouping
and attentional effects about visual What stream processing that
the authors review; for example, in section 2.1. The authors then
immediately discuss processing in the Where cortical stream of co-
herent object motion. Although these What and Where processes
share some mechanisms, they also have computational comple-
mentary properties (Grossberg 2000b), as a result of the differ-
ences between generating orientationally sensitive groupings of
object form and generating directionally sensitive groupings of ob-
ject motion. Key data about coherent object motion have also
been quantitatively simulated (Chey et al. 1997; Grossberg et al.
2001), and one can now study precisely how form and motion
processes differ, and how they interact to overcome their comple-
mentary deficiencies.
Models have elsewhere been proposed that attempt to show
how cognitive-emotional neural processes can explain normal be-
havioral and brain data about learning in animals and humans, and
prescribed breakdowns in these models give rise to schizophrenic
negative symptoms. These models include feedback interactions
between brain regions such as the sensory cortex, amygdala, and
prefrontal cortex, and propose how an overaroused or under-
aroused opponent process in the amgydala or prefrontal cortex
can lead to negative symptoms (Grossberg 1984; 2000c). These
models do include a possible role for DA (dopamine) dysfunction
in giving rise to overaroused or underaroused condition. Given the
derivation of these models from properties of cognitive-emotional
learning, they may also accommodate problems with NMDA-
receptors. Related models of sensory and cognitive learning sug-
gest how tonically hyperactive volitional signals, say from the basal
ganglia, could lead to positive symptoms like hallucinations (Gross-
berg 2000a), as a manifestation of the learned top-down expecta-
tions that normally help to stabilize learning and, along the way,
focus attention on, and prime, the brain to selectively process ob-
jects of interest.
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Schizophrenic cognition: Taken out of
context?
David R. Hemsley
Psychology Department, Institute of Psychiatry, Denmark Hill, London SE5
8AF, England. d.hemsley@iop.kcl.ac.uk
Abstract: This commentary addresses: (a) the problems of definition
which have been prominent in the use of the term context in schizophre-
nia research; (b) potentially useful distinctions and links with other theo-
ries of schizophrenic cognition; and (c) possible pathways to schizophrenic
symptoms. It is suggested that at least two major aspects of the operation
of context may be distinguished and that both may be impaired in schizo-
phrenia.
In this stimulating article, the authors define context in terms of
its mode of operation rather than in terms of stimulus parameters.
This neatly sidesteps the problem of the various ways in which
context has been defined in the schizophrenia literature, ranging
from task instructions to an immediately preceding simple stimu-
lus. Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) are therefore dealing with what
Mayes et al. (1985) refer to as interactive context. However, the
characteristics of nontarget stimuli will determine whether they
influence target processing. Although such factors as temporal
and spatial contiguity will play a role, a crucial determinant will be
the pattern of stored predictive relationships existing between tar-
get and nontarget stimuli, as emphasized by Phillips and Singer
(1997a). This is similar to the operation of Broadbent’s (1971) “pi-
geon-holing” mechanism, which acts to bias category state thresh-
olds; a disturbance of this process in schizophrenia was proposed
many years ago (Hemsley 1975).
A number of distinctions may be important to an understanding
of schizophrenic dysfunctions: (1) Temporal versus spatial context.
These may influence the processing of target stimuli in different
ways and in many experimental situations may be difficult to dis-
entangle. For example, the situation may be complicated by ab-
normalities of visual scan paths in schizophrenia (e.g., Green et al.
2000). (2) The parameters of the target/nontarget relationship may
crucially affect the nature of the influence observed and the extent
of any schizophrenic abnormalities (cf. Strandburg et al. 1997). (3)
Context can clearly have both inhibitory and facilitatory effects (cf.
Cohen et al 1996). Abnormalities in both inhibitory (e.g., Braff et
al. 1999; Hemsley 1994) and facilitatory (e.g., Spitzer 1997)
processes have been documented in schizophrenia, although find-
ings on the former, employing a variety of paradigms, appear bet-
ter established. (4) Linked to (2) is the issue of “tonic” versus “pha-
sic” context. Lubow (1989) goes so far as to define context as “all
of those environmental stimuli relatively constant during the
course of a procedure” (p. 74). Depending on one’s definition of
“procedure,” this could exclude many findings that have been con-
sidered relevant to contextual disturbance in schizophrenia.
The word context is derived from the Latin contexere – to weave
together – and can mean both “the connection of the parts of a
discourse” and, more concretely, “the parts which immediately
precede or follow any particular passage of text and determine its
meaning” (Standard Oxford English Dictionary). It is clear that
the above definition relates specifically to language, and in fact
many of the early studies of schizophrenic contextual disturbance
were concerned with language behaviour (e.g., Hemsley &
Richardson 1980). However, current research is clearly not re-
stricted to this domain, and the presumed abnormality is claimed
to underlie a much wider range of behaviours and experiences
characteristic of schizophrenia. Thus, Anscombe (1987) argued
that “perceptions are not placed in a context of background knowl-
edge” (p. 256). In similar vein, Hemsley (1994) suggested that it
is a failure of context to activate appropriate schema to guide pro-
cessing that is crucial to the emergence of some forms of delu-
sional beliefs. For example, the application of entirely inappro-
priate frames of reference to sensory input could correspond to
primary delusions.
Although the most straightforward link between contextual dis-
turbance and schizophrenic symptoms is that concerning lan-
guage behaviour, thought disorder is but one instance of the dis-
organisation that may characterise psychosis. Jensterle et al.
(2000) argue that there are “two sources of constraint on our be-
haviour which increase its long term coherence and organization”
(p. 116). First, there is “contextual priming,” roughly equivalent
to Shallice’s (1988) “contention scheduling system.” Second, a
“top-down” process, dependent on goals and plans. Failure of ei-
ther may lead to disorganised behaviour, but it is apparent that at
times the latter has also been viewed as a contextual disturbance
– for example, when context is taken to include task instructions.
This well illustrates the problems of definition that exist in this
area and which the target article goes some way to resolve.
A disturbance in the operation of context has even been invoked
to explain the disruption in the “sense of self” that many see as
characteristic of schizophrenia (cf. Hemsley 1998). In this paper
(Hemsley 1998), I argued that the influence of context may cor-
respond to the “transitive” aspects of conscious experience. In a
related formulation, Epstein (2000) suggests that one component
of James’ (1890) “stream of thought” consists of “a fringe of dimly
sensed contextual information” that controls the entry of infor-
mation into awareness (Epstein 2000, p. 550). Hemsley (1998) ar-
gued that the sense of self in normal subjects in part arises from
the consistent manner in which context activates stored material
to integrate with sensory input; a disturbance in the system is em-
phasized in the model of schizophrenia put forward by Gray,
Hemsley, and their colleagues (e.g., Gray et al. 1991; Hemsley et
al. 1993).
To emphasise the breadth of research findings which have been
subsumed under the context deficit model, it should be noted that
this model has been invoked to explain schizophrenic perfor-
mance on Latent Inhibition (LI), Negative Priming (NP), and Pre-
Pulse Inhibition (PPI) paradigms. Therefore, in Hemsley (1994),
I suggested that all involved a weakening of contextually elicited
inhibitory processes. While I acknowledged that they appear to be
very different, all are heavily dependent on the integration of pre-
viously presented material with current sensory input.
It is clear that in the schizophrenia literature, a disturbance in
the operation of context has been inferred from numerous para-
digms. However, a study by Elvevag et al. (2000) employing a va-
riety of tasks “did not suggest a simple unitary context deficit”
(p. 885). This is perhaps not surprising: Even within the field of
animal learning theory, at least four different roles for context have
been proposed (Hemsley et al. 1993). It is possible that abnor-
malities in schizophrenia exist in several aspects of the operation
of context. A possible way forward is suggested by O’Reilly and
Rudy (2001). While accepting the important role of the hip-
pocampus in “encoding conjunctions between context and stimu-
lus elements” (p. 316), they argue that this system must operate in
parallel with a contextual system which “integrates over multiple
experiences to extract generalities” (p. 311). They emphasize the
bidirectional influences operating, and note that “the develop-
ment of cortical representation can affect the trajectory of hip-
pocampal learning and vice versa.” If the development of schizo-
phrenic symptoms is based on circuits involving both frontal and
temporal regions (cf. Friston 1998), abnormalities in both aspects
of the operation of context might be expected.
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NMDA-receptor hypofunction versus
excessive synaptic elimination as models of
schizophrenia
Ralph E. Hoffman and Thomas H. McGlashan
Department of Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven,
CT 06520. ralph.hoffman@yale.edu thomas.mcglashan@yale.edu
Abstract: We propose that the primary cause of schizophrenia is a patho-
logical extension of synaptic pruning involving local connectivity that un-
folds ordinarily during adolescence. Computer simulations suggest that
this pathology provides reasonable accounts of a range of symptoms in
schizophrenia, and is consistent with recent postmortem and genetic stud-
ies. NMDA-receptors play a regulatory role in maintaining and/or elimi-
nating cortical synapses, and therefore may play a pathophysiological role.
The target article by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) proposes that the
primary lesion producing disorganization symptoms in schizo-
phrenia is dysfunction of the NMDA-receptor. They postulate
that a primary consequence of this pathophysiology is a break-
down of local coordination of cortical processes, expressed be-
haviorally as a disruption in contextual sensitivity of information
processing.
It would be surprising to us if NMDA-receptors were not some-
how involved in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. Alterations
in learning and adaptation are hallmarks of this disorder. These
processes rely, at least in part, on neuroplastic alterations medi-
ated by NMDA-receptors (Contestabile 2000). However, we have
some concerns.
The authors disclaim that their hypothesis about NMDA-hypo-
function and context disorganization can explain the different
symptoms associated with schizophrenia. This is a familiar caveat
among schizophrenia researchers and scholars, the conundrum of
heterogeneity. However, the authors also appear uncomfortable
with this disclaimer when they mention Jansen and Faull’s (1991)
quip to the effect that it is “impossible to propose a model of schiz-
ophrenia without ignoring most of the data” (target article, sect. 7,
para. 1). We agree that schizophrenia seems maddeningly hetero-
geneous, but we also feel that to model the disorder successfully,
a large number of findings need be accounted for, including the
nature and course of a relatively full range symptoms, plus epi-
demiological, genetic, and neurobiological findings.
The theory of NMDA-hypofunction and context disorganiza-
tion proposed by the authors explains some phenomenology of
persons with schizophrenia. We have argued, however, that more
than NMDA-hypofunction must be involved; and, specifically,
that cortical connectivity is reduced neuroanatomically in schizo-
phrenia (Hoffman & Dobscha 1989; Hoffman & McGlashan
1997; McGlashan & Hoffman 2000; see also Feinberg 1982/
1983). The most parsimonious explanation for such connectivity
reductions, we propose, is that schizophrenia arises from an ex-
tension of synaptic pruning in association cortex that ordinarily
unfolds during adolescence. These arguments have been based on
computer simulations of neural networks showing how this neu-
rodevelopmental abnormality produces a range of schizophrenic-
like abnormalities – including disruptions of context-based infor-
mation processing such as described by P&S – and spurious
attractor states that could produce hallucinations, delusions, and
thought disorder (Hoffman & Dobscha 1989; Hoffman & McGla-
shan 1997; Siekmeier & Hoffman 2002). We have also shown how
synaptic pruning based on neural competition, when turned off
just below the psychotogenic threshold, produces robust cognitive
advantages (Hoffman & McGlashan 1997; 2001; McGlashan &
Hoffman 2000). Therefore, genetic factors are predicted to push
to the limit synaptic pruning in higher-level association cortex, to
maximize these advantages in human populations. Schizophrenia,
we postulate, will represent the small percentage of the popula-
tion where genetically programmed synaptic pruning is pushed
too far. The genetic predisposition to schizophrenia will be main-
tained across generations – even though reproductive success for
persons with this disorder is greatly reduced (Kendler et al. 1993)
– given the cognitive benefits afforded to the larger population.
Persons with schizophrenia are predicted to be especially vul-
nerable to NMDA-antagonists because these drugs may function
as temporary disconnection agents in a condition where discon-
nection is already excessive. We do agree with the authors that the
main locus of disconnection in schizophrenia is within cortical re-
gions rather than involving distant connections between regions.
Our reasoning is based on a recent monkey study demonstrating
that “late” (i.e., peripubescent) neurodevelopment is character-
ized by a loss of local, within-module connectivity while distant
connections remain unchanged (Woo et al. 1997). If schizophre-
nia is an extension of normal adolescent cortical pruning, then lo-
cal connectivity would be most vulnerable to loss in this disorder
(Lewis & Gonzales-Burgos 2000). This prediction is consistent
with our more recent neural network models of this disorder
(Hoffman & McGlashan 1997; Siekmeier & Hoffman 2002).
Are NMDA-receptor hypofunction and excessive cortical prun-
ing really the same thing? We think not. First, only the latter per-
spective readily accounts for a range of post mortem findings. One
such study demonstrated increased packing density of prefrontal
neurons in the postmortem tissue of persons with schizophrenia
compared with controls (Selemon et al. 1995). Since there is little
evidence of significant loss of neurons in the cerebral cortex in
schizophrenia (Selemon & Goldman-Rakic 1999), the most likely
explanation is a loss of neuropil volume, that is, the dense entan-
glement of dendrites and axons surrounding neurons. Other post-
mortem studies more consistent with an anatomic pruning model
of schizophrenia include those demonstrating reduced dendritic
spines on pyramidal neurons (Garey et al. 1998; Glantz & Lewis
2000), and reduced phosphoproteins utilized by synaptic termi-
nals (Eastwood & Harrison 1995; Glantz & Lewis 1997; Karson et
al. 1999). Second, a pruning model predicts that the molecular ba-
sis of schizophrenia will be found in processes that maintain the
corresponding microanatomy, namely, synapses and neuropil,
rather than reflecting disturbed function of a particular receptor.
At the time of this writing, only two genes have been specifically
linked to schizophrenia in the published literature as far as we
know – one coding for dysbindin and the other coding for neu-
roregulin I (Stefansson et al. 2002; Straub et al. 2002). Both pro-
teins appear to be concentrated in synapses rather than being di-
rectly referable to a particular receptor. However, the second
protein has been shown to alter expression and activation of glu-
tamate receptors. Mutant mice heterozygous for this gene have
fewer functional NMDA-receptors than wild-type mice, and show
behavior overlapping with mouse models for schizophrenia that is
partially reversible with clozapine, a drug used to treat schizo-
phrenia. Moreover, there is now a growing body of literature in-
dicating that NMDA-receptors play an important role in main-
taining and/or eliminating synaptic connections (Bock & Braun
1999; Hasbani et al. 2001). Thus, bets are on that NMDA-recep-
tors are involved in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, but
where and how these receptors fit into the causal chain of an-
tecedents and consequences of this enigmatic illness remains un-
certain.
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Peeling the onion: NMDA dysfunction as a
unifying model in schizophrenia
Daniel C. Javitt
Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Orangeburg, NY 10962.
javitt@nki.rfmh.org www.rfmh.org/nki
Abstract: N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor (NMDAR) dysfunction plays a
crucial role in schizophrenia, leading to impairments in cognitive coordi-
nation. NMDAR agonists (e.g., glycine) ameliorate negative and cognitive
symptoms, consistent with NMDAR models. However, not all types of
cognitive coordination use NMDAR. Further, not all aspects of cognitive
coordination are impaired in schizophrenia, suggesting the need for speci-
ficity in applying the cognitive coordination construct.
Although neuropsychological dysfunction in schizophrenia has
been extensively characterized, the majority of studies have fo-
cused on anatomical, rather than neurophysiological, characteri-
zations. The article by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) highlights the
critical but long neglected need to peel away the layers that sepa-
rate overt behavior from underlying neurophysiological mecha-
nisms, and then to build new conceptualizations of schizophrenia
from the bottom up.
The pattern of neuropsychological dysfunction in schizophre-
nia, in general, fits poorly with predictions of dopamine models.
The review by P&S highlights an important alternative hypothe-
sis wherein a single ongoing deficit in N-methyl-d-aspartate recep-
tor (NMDAR) transmission could account for both the sympto-
matic and the neuropsychological features of the disorder. Deficits
in perceptual organization are particularly difficult to shoehorn
into dopamine theories of the disorder. In contrast, this type of
deficit is an expected and anticipated consequence of NMDAR
dysfunction. The review by P&S points out an intermediate mech-
anism, impaired cognitive coordination that labels a class of inter-
action contributing to cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia.
Basic support for the NMDAR models of schizophrenia comes
from the observation that phencyclidine (PCP), ketamine, and
other NMDAR antagonists induce symptoms that closely resem-
ble negative and cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia. Moreover,
the pattern of dysfunction induced by NMDA antagonists closely
resembles the pattern observed in schizophrenia. For example,
the AX-type Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT) is a test de-
signed to evaluate working memory/executive dysfunction (Co-
hen & Servan-Schreiber 1992). In this task, subjects respond to a
specific sequence of letters (A followed by X) presented sequen-
tially on a computer screen while ignoring all other sequences. We
(Javitt et al. 2000) have observed, as have others (Cohen et al.
1999a), that stabilized patients with chronic schizophrenia show
persistent deficits in the ability to inhibit responses following pre-
sentation. In a parallel study performed by Umbricht and cowork-
ers (Umbricht et al. 2000), an identical pattern was observed fol-
lowing ketamine administration to normal volunteers (Fig. 1).
In both cases, deficits were observed only in the AX (correct de-
tection) and BX (invalid cue) conditions. Neither persons with
schizophrenia nor ketamine volunteers showed false alarms to in-
valid targets, indicating a selective deficit in executive processing
rather than a generalized performance deficit. Further, in both
cases, the magnitude of deficit was similar at short and long ISI
(Interstimulus interval), indicating that deficits were a result of
deficits of encoding the go/no-go contingency, rather than failure
in information retention. The difference in pattern is critical since
dopaminergic mechanisms, in general, are involved in information
retention, whereas NMDAR mechanisms are involved in initial
encoding. The pattern of dysfunction in schizophrenia, following
stabilization, thus corresponds to the pattern induced by ketamine
challenge in normals and the pattern predicted by basic concep-
tualizations of NMDAR function.
Most recently, Javitt et al. (2001) have also investigated the abil-
ity of an NMDAR agonist, glycine, to reverse AX-CPT deficits in
schizophrenia (Fig. 2). In our study, AX-CPT performance was
evaluated prior to and following 6 weeks of treatment with either
glycine (n 5 5) or placebo (n 5 6) added to typical or atypical an-
tipsychotics. Patients showed significant improvement in negative
and cognitive symptoms during treatment with glycine but not
placebo (Javitt et al. 2001). A parallel improvement in BX errors
was observed in the AX-CPT. During glycine treatment, a signifi-
cant reduction in BX errors was observed at both short (p 5 .06)
and long (p , .03) ISI. In contrast, rates of BX errors during
placebo treatment were unaffected, leading to significant be-
tween-group difference in improvement at both short (p , .05)
and long (p , .03) ISIs. The effects of glycine on AX-CPT were
over and above any degree of improvement that had occurred dur-
ing antipsychotic stabilization. Therefore, P&S are correct that
deficits in working memory/executive processing, as measured
with tests such as the AX-CPT, may reflect underlying NMDAR
dysfunction.
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Figure 1 (Javitt). Performance of schizophrenia patients (top row) and ketamine-treated normal controls (bottom row) on the AX-type
continuous performance task (AX-CPT). Note increased rates of omission (AX) errors, and increased false alarm rates only to BX-type tri-
als in both groups. Schizophrenia data is from Javitt et al. 2000. Ketamine challenge data is from Umbricht et al. 2000. *p , .05
Although we agree with P&S about the role of NMDAR dys-
function in schizophrenia, we are concerned that “cognitive coor-
dination,” while broader than the previous conceptualizations
such as “executive processing” or “working memory,” still does not
capture both the breadth and specificity of NMDAR-related phe-
nomena in schizophrenia. For example, NMDARs play a crucial
role in regulating subcortical dopamine systems (Balla et al. 2001;
Kegeles et al. 2000). While this type of interaction does not fit
easily within the “cognitive coordination” rubric, it is neverthe-
less a critical mechanism whereby a single neurochemical deficit,
NMDAR dysfunction, could lead to complex dopaminergic dys-
function such as is observed in schizophrenia.
Similarly, in our studies of sensory processing, my colleagues
and I have demonstrated that despite having severe bottom-up
deficits, patients show minimal top-down deficits. Thus, in the au-
ditory system, patients show elevated tone-matching thresholds
but no increase in distractibility (Rabinowicz et al. 2000). Simi-
larly, in the visual system, patients require greater detail before
they can identify fragmented images but show relatively normal
benefit from stimulus repetition or verbal cueing (Doniger et al.
2001). Both bottom-up and top-down elements of these tasks re-
quire cognitive coordination. Therefore, the need for coordina-
tion between brain regions, of itself, does not seem to predict
which class of functions will be impaired in schizophrenia.
In the visual system, perceptual organization deficits, such as
those observed by Silverstein and others, most likely arise because
of impaired magnocellular input in dorsal stream visual areas
(Butler et al. 2001), giving rise to impaired recurrent processing
within the ventral stream object recognition areas as described by
Schroeder and others (Schroeder 1995). Contrast gain within the
magnocellular system is a process that explicitly depends upon
NMDAR-mediated nonlinear amplification mechanisms (Kwon
et al. 1992). Other aspects of cognitive coordination may or may
not, depending on the specific underlying brain substrates. Cur-
rent literature suggests that those aspects of cognitive coordina-
tion that depend upon NMDAR activation are impaired in schiz-
ophrenia. Those that are unaffected by NMDAR antagonists (e.g.,
ketamine, PCP), in contrast, appear to be unimpaired. Therefore,
while the cognitive coordination construct adds to our under-
standing of mediating mechanisms in schizophrenia, it is NMDAR
involvement that serves as the necessary and sufficient condition
for predicting patterns of cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia.
Is sensory gating a form of cognitive
coordination?
Michael A. Kisleya and Deana B. Davalosb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs,
Colorado Springs, CO 80933-7150; bDepartment of Psychiatry, University of
Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver, CO 80262. mkisley@uccs.edu
deana.davalos@uchsc.edu
Abstract: Neurophysiological investigations of the past two decades have
consistently demonstrated a deficit in sensory gating associated with schiz-
ophrenia. Phillips & Silverstein interpret this impairment as being consis-
tent with cognitive coordination dysfunction. However, the physiological
mechanisms that underlie sensory gating have not been shown to involve
gamma-band oscillations or NMDA-receptors, both of which are critical
neural elements in the cognitive coordination model.
As evidence to support a unified model of cognitive dysfunction
in schizophrenia, Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) interpret “sensory
gating” abnormalities as a form of impaired cognitive coordina-
tion. To qualify as such, however, sensory gating must satisfy phe-
nomenological and physiological requirements. It would be hard
to argue that sensory gating isn’t a form of cognitive coordination
as delineated by P&S, as any sensory stimulus can modify the con-
text of any other stimulus, provided they are proximal in space
and/or time. The physiological proposition, on the other hand, is
more amenable to critical evaluation.
Sensory gating has traditionally been investigated as the reduc-
tion in amplitude of middle latency auditory evoked potentials as
a result of stimulus repetition. For example, Adler et al. (1982)
were the first to demonstrate that wave P50 (also P1 or Pb) di-
minishes in size from one acoustic click to the next for healthy in-
dividuals, but not for those afflicted with schizophrenia. This was
demonstrated with a “paired-click” paradigm, in which a pair of
clicks (0.5-second interclick interval) was presented every 10 sec-
onds. Sensory gating was quantified as the ratio of P50 amplitude
evoked by the second (“test”) click of the pair to that evoked by
the first (“conditioning”) click. The observed impairment in re-
sponse-suppression, manifest as a test-response/conditioning-re-
sponse ratio near 1 compared with a ratio near 0 for controls, was
suggested to underlie schizophrenia patients’ common complaint
of an inability to ignore, or “gate out” irrelevant sensory informa-
tion. The preattentive nature of this impairment has recently been
supported by sensory gating measurements taken during states of
sleep (Kisley et al. 2003).
Sensory gating, as measured with the paired-click paradigm, is
to be distinguished from sensorimotor gating, in which a warning
stimulus tends to reduce the magnitude of startle movement
elicited by a loud sound (“prepulse inhibition”). Even though ab-
normalities in sensorimotor gating have also been reliably demon-
strated in schizophrenia, the relevant neural mechanisms differ
from those of P50 gating (Braff et al. 2001). Sensory gating is also
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Figure 2 (Javitt). Rates of BX errors on the AX-type continuous performance task (AX-CPT) in patients with schizophrenia prior to
and following treatment with glycine (an NMDA agonist) or placebo. Note decrease in BX error rate from pre- to post-treatment at both
short (left panel) and long (center panel) interstimulus intervals (ISI) following treatment with glycine but not placebo. This improve-
ment was significantly greater in the glycine, than placebo, group (right panel). *p , .05
to be distinguished from the preattentive processing function(s)
measured with the mismatch negativity (MMN) paradigm, the lat-
ter being associated with increased cortical activity elicited by
stimulus novelty (Picton et al. 2000), as opposed to decreased ac-
tivity due to stimulus redundancy.
In the terminology of (P&S), the conditioning click in the tra-
ditional sensory gating paradigm modifies the salience and subse-
quent neural processing of the test click. This is consistent with
the phenomenological constraints of cognitive coordination.
However, do the neural mechanisms that mediate sensory gating
involve coordinating activity of gamma-band oscillations through
NMDA-receptors, as specified in the physiological portion of
P&S’s cognitive coordination model?
Regarding oscillations in the gamma-band, there is substantive
evidence that neuronal oscillatory activity in the 20–50 Hz range
– which is known to be abnormal in schizophrenia patients (Kwon
et al. 1999) – is involved in the generation of middle latency au-
ditory evoked potentials (Basar et al. 1987). In the context of sen-
sory gating, the results of a preliminary investigation by Clementz
et al. (1997) involving 10 schizophrenia patients and 10 controls
suggested a possible link between the magnitude of gamma-band
response and P50 suppression. However, a more recent study of
20 patients and 20 controls concluded that low frequency activity
(,20 Hz) is a more important contributor to the suppression of
middle latency evoked potentials in response to repetitive stimu-
lation (Clementz & Blumenfeld 2001). For example, evoked po-
tentials shown in both reports suggest that the 20–50 Hz oscilla-
tions evoked by the conditioning click expire before the test click
occurs. Given this, it is difficult to imagine how gamma-band os-
cillations could serve to “coordinate” the contextual relationship
between the first and second clicks.
To date, the only evidence that NMDA-channels might play a
role in sensory gating comes from pharmacological studies in a ro-
dent model. Adler et al. (1986) demonstrated that sensory gating
is disrupted in rats when an NMDA-antagonist – phencyclidine
(PCP) – is administered. However, a subsequent investigation
concluded that this effect does not occur through NMDA-recep-
tor blockade, but rather by an indirect pathway involving a nora-
drenergic mechanism (Miller et al. 1992). More recently, two
studies were conducted to determine whether NMDA-channels
might still be important for sensory gating in humans (Oranje et
al. 2002; van Berckel et al. 1998). Both studies showed that keta-
mine, another NMDA antagonist, does not disrupt sensory gating
as measured by the paired click paradigm. Although glutamater-
gic neurotransmission appears to be involved in the generation of
wave P50, other neurotransmitter and receptor systems – partic-
ularly nicotinic-cholinergic – play a more central role in the sup-
pression of this wave during the paired-click paradigm (Adler et
al. 1998b).
In summary, evidence to support the claim that sensory gating
is mediated by the physiological mechanisms described in the cog-
nitive coordination model of P&S is lacking. On the other hand,
sensory gating deficits could still play a role in cognitive coordina-
tion dysfunction. As summarized by P&S, and originally proposed
by Venables (1964), the inundation that would result from an in-
ability to filter out irrelevant sensory stimulation could lead to cog-
nitive fragmentation. Based on this idea, a fruitful theoretical ap-
proach would be to model the mechanism by which unselected
and overwhelming input signals could disrupt the subsequent for-
mation of laterally-connected cortical networks that are central to
the cognitive coordination framework.
Theory of mind in schizophrenia: Damaged
module or deficit in cognitive coordination?
David Leiser and Udi Bonshtein
Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ben-Gurion University, IL 84105
Beersheva, Israel. dleiser@bgumail.bgu.ac.il udib@bgumail.bgu.ac.il
http://www.bgu.ac.il/~dleiser
Abstract: Schizophrenics exhibit a deficit in theory of mind (ToM), but an
intact theory of biology (ToB). One explanation is that ToM relies on an
independent module that is selectively damaged. Phillips & Silverstein’s
analyses suggest an alternative: ToM requires the type of coordination that
is impaired in schizophrenia, whereas ToB is spared because this type of
coordination is not involved.
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) document how schizophrenic pa-
tients exhibit deficits that may be explained by impaired cognitive
coordination. The specific phenomena they discuss involve para-
digms that engage perceptual and low-level semantic processes.
Can this line of analysis also account for specific deficit patterns
in higher cognitive and social-cognitive functioning in schizo-
phrenia?
We summarize here work of our own and by others on the abil-
ities of schizophrenic patients to handle “naïve theories” in two
contrasting domains: Theory of mind (ToM) and theory of biology
(ToB). ToM is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to
the self and to others, to predict and explain their behavior with
reference to mental states (Premack & Woodruff 1978). Several
recent studies examined ToM in schizophrenia, and all indicate
that ToM is damaged in the acute phase (e.g., Doody et al. 1998;
Frith & Corcoran 1996) but returns to normal in periods of re-
mission (Drury et al. 1998). This is a specific deficit that cannot be
accounted for by IQ or memory. As is well-known, a similar spe-
cific deficit is found in the case of autism, where it is also perma-
nent (Baron-Cohen 1995). The relation between schizophrenia
and autism was pointed out by Frith (1992), who speculated that
there is a common cognitive failing in these two conditions: Autists
never develop a ToM, whereas schizophrenics attempt to exercise
a lost capability.
One way of testing ToM in schizophrenia uses a nonverbal par-
adigm, where subjects are presented with cartoons (Sarfati et al.
1997). Each cartoon strip contains three pictures, depicting a
character performing some activity. Understanding these strips
requires deriving the mental state and goals of the character. Af-
ter studying the cartoon strip, subjects are presented with three
additional pictures, one of which provides a suitable ending to the
story. Another filler depicts a common, everyday activity, per-
formed by the character, and the third is very similar to the last
picture in the strip. Neither of them is related to the context of the
mental states of the character as established by the strip. In a vari-
ant of the task which involved an absurd filler (Sarfati et al. 1999)
virtually no patients selected that option. This indicates that the
patients do attempt to make sense of the task, and the paradigm
makes it possible to identify the compensatory strategy used by
schizophrenic patients. Lacking understanding of what the char-
acter is up to, schizophrenic patients who are not disorganized
tended to select the picture that is visually similar to the last pic-
ture. Disorganized patients and manic patients tend to select fa-
miliar everyday activities, regardless of their resemblance to the
preceding pictures.
We replicated these findings, and complemented them with the
more common set of stories used to test ToM (Frith & Corcoran
1996). These stories involve understanding cheating and false be-
liefs, either “first-order beliefs,” requiring distinguishing the be-
liefs of characters from the true state of affairs, or “second-order
beliefs,” about others’ beliefs. These stories are read aloud, and
simple drawings help the subjects follow and remember the plots.
Schizophrenics performed significantly worse than the control
groups (both normals and affective-disorders hospitalized pa-
tients).
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We tested the same subjects for ToB, adapting the battery de-
signed by Johnson and Carey (1998). This battery relies on two
levels of understanding biology, known to discriminate younger
from older children. The lower level relies on acquired informa-
tion about living beings. The higher level marks accession to the
understanding of living beings as functional systems, which gives
meaning to biological functions. (For example, because all organ-
isms expand energy, they all must eat somehow, even if they have
no apparent food ingesting organs.) In their study of Williams Syn-
drome (WS) patients, Johnson and Carey found that for all their
verbal fluency, WS patients remain at the lower, childlike level of
understanding.
Schizophrenic patients test normal on ToB, even during acute
episodes. One explanation for this difference between ToM and
ToB would be to posit a “module” or cerebral specialization for
ToM (Povinelli & Preuss 1995). The alternative, “theory-theory”
view, maintains that ToM is acquired like any other naïve theory
(Gopnik & Wellman 1992). On that view, it would seem difficult
to account for the dissociation of ToB and ToM.
We suggest that the challenge of ToM may be different from
that encountered in other naïve theories (Leiser 2001). The tasks
used to test for ToM require coordination of several pieces of in-
formation. Integration of multiple relations is a specific source of
cognitive complexity (Astington et al. 2002; Halford et al. 1998;
Waltz et al. 1999). In the false beliefs tasks, subjects must hold sep-
arate and coordinate the actual state of affairs, the first character’s
beliefs about them, and the second character’s beliefs about the
first one’s. This coordination is evidently beyond schizophrenics.
In Sarfati’s paradigm tasks, selecting the right answer implies
building a context for the character’s actions, and this requires co-
ordination of the successive steps. Failing this complex contextual
disambiguation, subjects fall back on either familiar actions to pro-
vide meaning, or use a much reduced context, consisting of the
last picture only. If this line of reasoning is correct, we would have
in ToM a symptom that arises, not from a module, but from the
vulnerability of ToM to a deficit in coordination. Preservation of
ToB, by contrast, can be explained by the absence of such coordi-
nation once the higher level of understanding is achieved.
This conclusion remains tentative as an account of deficits spe-
cific to schizophrenia. The authors’s description of the effects of
“schizomimetic” drugs fit psychotic-like state in general, yet non-
schizophrenic psychoses (e.g., affective psychosis) do not damage
ToM to the same extent as schizophrenic psychosis (Bonshtein &
Leiser, in preparation; Sarfati et al. 1997). Equally, Sarfati et al.
(1997) reported that a breakdown of schizophrenia into subtypes
is unrelated to the severity of deficit in ToM, except for disorga-
nized schizophrenia, which is associated with severe deficit in
ToM. But this condition is characterized by a breakdown of per-
sonality and further traits that render cognitive collapse almost
self-evident.
Reconciling schizophrenic deficits in
top-down and bottom-up processes: Not yet
Angus W. MacDonald
Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455.
angus@umn.edu
Abstract: This commentary challenges the authors to use their computa-
tional modeling techniques to support one of their central claims: that
schizophrenic deficits in bottom-up (Gestalt-type tasks) and top-down
(cognitive control tasks) context processing tasks arise from the same dys-
function. Further clarification about the limits of cognitive coordination
would also strengthen the hypothesis.
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) put forward a hypothesis that ad-
dresses an important middle ground between a purely biological
level of analysis and one that is entirely behavioral or cognitive.
Such a cognitive neuroscience approach to schizophrenia is infor-
mative because it takes advantage of constraints from each domain
to build a more comprehensive (and more convincing) story about
the nature of schizophrenic psychopathology. In addition to the
substantive theory put forward in the target article, this is a strong
example of how to build hypotheses that incorporate, rather than
simply pay lip service to, multiple levels of analysis.
The authors’ hypothesis is particularly ambitious in that it at-
tempts to weave together two competing domains of psycho-
pathological research. One tradition of research has identified 
abnormalities in a variety of bottom-up perceptual processes, in-
cluding the Gestalt phenomena noted by the authors, as well as
backward masking, mismatch negativity, and other physiological
and behavioral effects associated with posterior regions of the
brain. A second tradition has focused on impairments in top-down
processes such as executive functioning, working memory, atten-
tional control, and other higher cognitive processes associated
with the prefrontal cortex. There is a growing body of evidence for
specific deficits in both traditions of research. The authors hy-
pothesize that the distinction between schizophrenic deficits in
bottom-up holistic perceptual processes and top-down control
processes is unparsimonious and misleading; both bottom-up and
top-down processes are impaired by the same mechanism, NMDA-
hypofunction.
Science is often pushed forward by bold claims like this. For ex-
ample, Cohen and Servan-Schreiber (1992) used computational
modeling to demonstrate that schizophrenic impairments in at-
tentional control and some working memory maintenance
processes could be accounted for by a single mechanism (reduced
gain attributable to tonic dopamine hypoactivity in prefrontal cor-
tex). While the present authors have also developed computa-
tional models to support their claims about cognitive coordination,
they have not yet taken the important steps of (1) demonstrating
that the same model accounts for nontrivial, normal behavioral re-
sults in top-down control and bottom-up Gestalt tasks, both of
which they refer to as “context processing” tasks, and, especially,
that (2) impairments in such context processing associated with
NMDA-hypofunction can reproduce impairments similar to those
observed in schizophrenia patients in both domains. For example,
it would be very compelling to find that the same lesion in Phillips
and colleagues’ models (e.g., Phillips et al. 1995) accounted for the
patterns of impairment and spared performance in schizophrenia
observed in both Place and Gilmore’s (1980) Gestalt numerocity
paradigm and in the expectancy manipulation of the AX task
(MacDonald et al. 2003; Servan-Schreiber et al. 1996). Until such
time, the argument that a single impairment leads to abnormal
performance on both bottom-up and top-down tasks that require
cognitive coordinating, is not compelling enough to reform this
traditional distinction.
The task of breaking down artificial distinctions, if they exist,
would be aided by greater clarity around the core construct in the
hypothesis of cognitive coordination. The authors define “coordi-
nating interactions” as “those that affect the salience or dynamic
grouping of neuronal signals without changing what they mean.
Such interactions do affect the interpretation of stimulus inputs,
however” (sect. 1, para. 11). As it stands, the concept could be read
to cover the waterfront of cognitive tasks (all of which require co-
ordinating a task set with specific incoming stimuli). The authors
have provided a number of specific examples of what they feel
qualify as tasks of cognitive coordination, but it is not clear what
tasks do not require cognitive coordination, or whether all tasks
require this, but to varying degrees. If all tasks require cognitive
coordination, the hypothesis becomes more difficult to test, as per-
formance is confounded by other task demands generally present
for cognitive tasks (including motivation, intelligence, and so on).
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Context, connection, and coordination: The
need to switch
Robert D. Oades, Bernd Röpcke, and Ljubov Oknina1
Clinic for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, University of Essen, D-45147
Essen, Germany. {oades;bernd.roepcke;ljubov.oknina}@uni-essen.de
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Abstract: Context, connection, and coordination (CCC) describe well
where the problems that apply to thought-disordered patients with schiz-
ophrenia lie. But they may be part of the experience of those with other
symptom constellations. Switching is an important mechanism to allow
context to be applied appropriately to changing circumstances. In some
cases, NMDA-voltage modulations may be central, but gain and shift are
also functions that monoaminergic systems express in CCC.
“An apple falls not far from the tree.” So runs a proverb familiar
to many, particularly if living in Germany. If in doubt about a di-
agnosis of schizophrenia, it can be helpful to ask the patient for an
explanation of such a proverb. Especially, but not only, persons
with a disorganised form of schizophrenia experience difficulties
that may range from a shrug to profuse tangential explanations
(Straube & Oades 1992). It is reasonable, and in line with the the-
sis of Phillips & Silverstein (P&S), to describe such problems in
terms of context, connection, and coordination (CCC).
Conditioned blocking places an aspect of CCC within a labora-
tory setting. Normal persons experience a temporary problem
with learning about the associations of a stimulus component B
that has just become part of a stimulus complex AB, where one has
already started to learn about A. Persons with negative schizo-
phrenic or schizotypal symptoms learn about B quicker! (Bender
et al. 2001; Moran et al. 2003; Oades et al. 1996). The normal in-
teraction of events, whereby conditioning to B is blocked by con-
ditioning to A, is reduced in these patients. This example illus-
trates the contention of Hemsley et al. (1993) that such patients
have difficulties in selecting current responses on the basis of
stored regularities. This view is assimilated in the thesis advanced
by P&S here.
A change of context requires a change of coordination to effect
a switch between the appropriate connections in order to mediate
an adaptive response. A problem with the viewpoint of P&S lies
with the nature of the systems mediating the switches. In the case
of conditioned blocking, mesocortical dopamine systems control
the expression of the blocking effect (Oades et al. 1987). A parsi-
monious interpretation of the role of dopamine is that it facilitates
switching between channels within the innervated region that
controls the output that determines response (Oades 1985). Too
little dopamine reduces the probability of change (perseveration,
inhibit set-shift; Coull 1998), while too much jams the system
(e.g., stereotypy).
However, neuroimaging studies repeatedly find marked activ-
ity related to switching elsewhere; for example, in part of the left
or right intraparietal sulcus during covert or overt reversal-like
shifts of attention (Beauchamp et al. 2001; Dove et al. 2000; Gurd
et al. 2002). This region is not known to receive a major dopamine
innervation. Indeed, these very reports also noted another patch
of activity much further forward in the inferior frontal gyrus, close
to one of the frontal generators of mismatch negativity (MMN:
Jemel et al. 2002). The MMN is an event-related potential that has
been postulated to demonstrate an involuntary switching mecha-
nism (Näätänen 1990) and is repeatedly referred to by P&S. (I
may add that we have looked for associations of MMN with pe-
ripheral measures of dopamine metabolism in healthy and schiz-
ophrenic subjects in vain [unpublished data], and haloperidol is
without effect on MMN [Kähkönen et al. 2002].)
These parietal and frontal loci of course depend much on glu-
tamatergic and perhaps voltage-dependent NMDA-channels for
the expression of their functions, even though the basis of the
mechanism for a switch remains a subject for speculation. Cer-
tainly, local GABA mechanisms may inhibit/disinhibit local input
and output, and some of these local circuits interacting with glu-
tamate and dopamine are known to be dysfunctional in schizo-
phrenia (Benes 2000a). But is it a hyper- or a hypoactive state that
in these loci disrupts the glutamatergic contribution to switching
in attention-related thought disorder (Shim 2002)? In the ex-
change of communications referred to, the question revolves
around whether the inhibition of the psychiatric effects of keta-
mine by lamotrigine and the attenuation of glutamate release re-
flects downstream or upstream effects of the drug (or neither). In
addition, the question is raised whether ketamine (as a model for
the induction of psychosis) induces a hyperglutamatergic state
(Shim) or in fact the blockade of the NMDA site induces a hypo-
functional receptor that should represent the target of therapy in
schizophrenia (Olney, cited in Shim 2002).
A further complication is that one of the mainstays of P&S’s the-
sis, the ketamine and PCP models for inducing psychotic features,
is insecure. The affinities of ketamine and PCP for NMDA sites is
astonishingly similar to the affinity for dopamine D2 and seroton-
ergic 5-HT2 sites, respectively (Kapur & Seeman 2002). The 
potentially nonselective effects of these substances in eliciting
psychotic phenomena is disturbing for the neatly specific voltage-
dependent effect that forms the basis of P&S’s hypothesis. Indeed,
we believe that the report in section 3 from Umbricht et al. (2000),
cited in the target article to support the ketamine-glutamate
model, is better viewed in these terms. The reported relationship
between the psychotic-like effects of ketamine and a small MMN
was based more on scores from a less widely used rather than the
more commonly used rating scale, and the effect noted was but
marginally more than that achieved with a serotonergic hallucino-
genic agonist psilocybin.
Finally, this raises the relationship of saliency and serotonin ac-
tivity, where again part of the argument of P&S relies on MMN
studies. In the context of MMN and change detection care must
be exerted in assuming that the saliency of a stimulus, another
mainstay of the disruption of context perception in the hypothesis
of P&S, is crucial to change detection in schizophrenia. Although
the authors relate reduced MMN to the poor ability to discrimi-
nate tone frequencies (Javitt et al. 2000, sect. 4.2), MMN is rela-
tively insensitive to the loudness and length of the tone (Michie
2001). Further, both Javitt and we (Oades et al. 1993) noted the
strong association of MMN reduction with negative symptoms.
This is not immediately consistent with the emphasis of P&S on
thought-disorder. The activity of serotonin, a transmitter that me-
diates gain-like effects in stimulus-processing (Reuter et al. 1997),
naturally affects stimulus salience in perception (Winter et al.
1999), stimulus context in learning (latent inhibition; McDonald
et al. 2003), and MMN (Ahveninen et al. 2002), and is anomalous
in schizophrenia characterised by paranoid (Angelopoulos et al
2002), disorganized (Oades et al. 2000), and negative symptoms
(Jockers-Scherubl et al. 2001).
Windfalls may make a great apple pie, be poison for Dr. Spock,
or represent youth following in the footsteps of their elders. It re-
mains difficult, a priori, to determine which of these (or other) cir-
cumstances that require switches between stored regularities for
an appropriate response, depends on glutamatergic or monoamin-
ergic mechanisms. P&S, to their credit, recognise this and call for
refinements in our understanding about monoaminergic-gluta-
matergic interactions in CCC.
NOTES
1. Dr. Oknina is on leave from the Institute of Higher Nervous Activ-
ity and Neurophysiology, Moscow.
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Schizophrenia: Putting context in context
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Abstract: Although context-processing deficits may be core features of
schizophrenia, context remains a poorly defined concept. To test Phillips
& Silverstein’s model, we need to operationalize context more precisely.
We offer several useful ways of framing context and discuss enhancing or
facilitating schizophrenic patients’ performance under different contex-
tual situations. Furthermore, creativity may be a byproduct of cognitive
uncoordination.
Current neurobiological theories of schizophrenia mirror the
dominant, localizationistic trends in neuroscience. Yet, after de-
cades of “lobe-trotting” under intense scrutiny, no single region
has emerged as the clear culprit. Similarly, psychological models
tend to favor omnipotent single mechanisms (e.g., context pro-
cessing, working memory, inhibitory control, sensory gating, etc.)
to explain a bewildering range of symptoms that characterize
schizophrenia. Alas, the glass slipper does not fit.
Reasonable theories of schizophrenia must address multiple
cortical and subcortical interactions that can explain a wide range
of symptoms under different conditions. Phillips & Silverstein’s
(P&S’s) hypothesis that the disorganized syndrome is the clinical
manifestation of deficits in cognitive coordination caused by
NMDA-hypoactivity is a great leap forward in demystifying the het-
erogeneity of schizophrenia. One major contribution of the target
article is a stimulating and thoughtful discussion of the concept of
context. Although context-processing deficit has been proposed to
be a core feature of schizophrenia (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber
1992), it is not entirely clear what is included or excluded in this
context. Extending the definitions of context presented in the tar-
get article, we will discuss several ways of framing context (see
Fig. 1) and examine the hypothesis that context processing is im-
paired in schizophrenia.
Perceptual context. Focusing on the role of the attended ver-
sus unattended features (or stimuli) against the background is
helpful in understanding the relationship between the selected
target (or feature) and the background (or context). Context can,
but does not necessarily, influence target processing.
1. Context represented within the target stimulus. A stimulus con-
sists of multiple dimensions and features. If the task is to process
one feature of the target (e.g., color), other unattended features
provide the contextual environment (e.g., location, identity, size,
speed, etc.). The same is true with auditory stimuli.
2. Context surrounding the target stimulus. The layout (whether
visual or auditory) around the target provides contextual informa-
tion and may influence the processing of the target. (e.g., percep-
tual grouping). Context can also influence the target processing
across modalities.
3. Temporal relationship between the target event and the con-
textual background. The interval between the target onset and the
contextual element may determine the extent of interaction. For
example, lexical disambiguation depends on the temporal prox-
imity between the target and the context. In associative condi-
tioning, temporal contiguity is crucial.
Cognitive context. 1. Long-term memory, skills, and habits pro-
vide the context. There is an “influence of stored memories of reg-
ularities of previous input on current perception” (Gray et al.
1991). The contextual influence can be direct, explicit, and aware
or indirect, implicit, and subconscious. For example, in a seman-
tic priming task, experiences and associations play a key role in de-
termining the speed of lexical decision. The Kamin blocking ef-
fect and latent inhibition also depend on the context.
2. Task-relevant information in working memory is identified as
providing context (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber 1992). For example,
in a AX-type Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT) task, sub-
jects must respond to an X only if it follows an A. In the Stroop
task, the correct response depends on the inhibition of over-
learned relationship in context.
Socio-affective context. A more global context is set by the af-
fective state of the individual. The target article is focused on cog-
nitive coordination, but affect is likely to influence all levels of per-
ceptual and cognitive processing. Moreover, NMDA-hypoactivity
or PCP-psychosis is accompanied by changes in affect. Positive af-
fect alters a wide range of cognitive processes via moderately in-
creasing dopaminergic action (Ashby et al.1999). Different affec-
tive states can either facilitate or reduce prefrontal functions
(Gray et al. 2002).
Do schizophrenia patients have deficits in context process-
ing? Deficits in context-processing are central to major theories
of schizophrenia, but data from our laboratory suggest that con-
text processing may depend on the context.
Perceptual context. We found that schizophrenia patients are
sensitive to the context represented within the target stimulus in
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Figure 1 (Park et al.).
a spatial working memory (SWM) task. About 80% of schizophre-
nia patients show profound deficits in SWM. We were able to fa-
cilitate SWM by manipulating the target type without changing
the task itself. In 80% of the trials, we presented a black circle as
the target. In remaining trials, we presented unusual stimuli (e.g.,
Korean letters or faces) and found that accuracy of schizophrenia
patients on SWM was increased in these trials: Schizophrenia sub-
jects benefited from the contextual information embedded within
the target (Lee & Park 2002a; Park et al. 2000). Schizophrenic
subjects are also sensitive to the perceptual context surrounding
the target.
We asked subjects to remember a random configuration of spa-
tial locations, one of which was probed with a cue after a short de-
lay. Performance on this task is best when the global spatial con-
figuration of the display is preserved from the encoding to
retrieval stages. Schizophrenic subjects were just as sensitive to
global spatial configurations as controls. These results indicate
that, at least in SWM tasks, schizophrenics may exhibit intact per-
ceptual grouping and normal contextual processing (Lee et al.
2003a).
Cognitive context. We found that by manipulating the salience
of the target to maximize the role of stimulus-driven attention at
the encoding stage, we could improve AX-CPT performance in
schizophrenic patients. The working memory component within
the AX-CPT was manipulated by varying the interstimulus inter-
val (ISI). Salient cue (e.g., red A) improved the performance of
schizophrenia patients in AX-CPT with long ISI, relative to nor-
mal controls, but not in AX-CPT with short ISI. In other words,
strengthening the context without changing the meaning of the
target improved AX-CPT performance in schizophrenia. (Lee &
Park 2002b).
Socio-affective context. Our data show that SWM deficits in
schizophrenic subjects can be ameliorated by manipulating socio-
affective input. For example, giving positive feedback in a social
context improved SWM in schizophrenic patients. SWM was also
facilitated by introducing direct social interaction context prior to
the memory task (Park et al. 2000).
When context is “uncoordinated.” While coordination allows a
conventional cognitive trajectory, lack of it may be the key to cre-
ative output. Thought disorder, which is the hallmark of disorga-
nized syndrome, may be viewed as a creative, unconventional way
of using language; however, there is little empirical evidence for
the speculative relationship between creativity and madness
(Prentky 1979). The concept of cognitive coordination gives us a
framework for deriving concrete methodology and for explaining
the relationship. Unconventional solutions may occur when coor-
dination is fragmented or randomized, or during periods of intu-
ition when the initial context has been temporally and semanti-
cally removed from the stimulus event (Bowers et al. 1990). The
facilitation of creativity in “pathological” states may result from an
inherent loosening or associative elimination of contextual rela-
tionships. Here lies a potential empirical link between madness
and creativity.
In sum, we laud the target article for bringing the concepts of
cognitive coordination and context into a sharp focus and thereby
generating specific, testable hypotheses. Once one delves into
multiple levels of context, it is possible to find pockets of intact
context processing in schizophrenia. The challenge is in coordi-
nating these performance profiles across multiple levels of context
to derive a coherent model of the disorder.
Inferring contextual field interactions from
scalp EEG
Mark E. Pflieger
Source Signal Imaging, Inc., San Diego, CA 92102.
mep@sourcesignal.com
Abstract: This commentary highlights methods for using scalp EEG to
make inferences about contextual field interactions, which, in view of the
target article, may be specially relevant to the study of schizophrenia. Al-
though scalp EEG has limited spatial resolution, prior knowledge com-
bined with experimental manipulations may be used to strengthen infer-
ences about underlying brain processes. Both spatial and temporal context
are discussed within the framework of nonlinear interactions. Finally, re-
sults from a visual contour integration EEG pilot study are summarized in
view of a hypothesis that relates receptive field and contextual field pro-
cessing to evoked and induced activity, respectively.
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) propose that diverse impairments as-
sociated with schizophrenia may be traced to disruptions in some
basic mechanisms of intraregional and interregional cortical coor-
dination. In particular, the idealized distinction between receptive
field (RF) and contextual field (CF) connections (Phillips &
Singer 1997a) may be useful, considering that CF connections
function principally to coordinate multiple RF modules that
process signals bearing primary content. Under the headings of
“cortical rhythms” and “issues arising,” P&S review some relevant
EEG studies, and project that EEG techniques are poised to play
a role for imaging fast neuroelectric activity that reflects cognitive
coordination and its impairments. This commentary discusses fur-
ther considerations that arise in this context.
The RF/CF model distinguishes activity within and between
cortical columns and cortical layers (see Fig. 2 of the target arti-
cle). However, scalp EEG potentials (and MEG fields) are gener-
ated at each temporal instant by the net summation (weighted by
sensor sensitivities) of macroscopic currents oriented throughout
the gray matter volume: Currents within layers or columns cannot
be distinguished directly. On the other hand, experimental ma-
nipulations combined with prior knowledge may enable some in-
ferences about the activity of layers or columns. For example,
knowledge gained from invasive studies about the local effects and
mechanisms of neuromodulators (e.g., al-Amin & Schwarzkopf
1996), particularly experiments that measure stimulus-related
cortical current source density profiles as modulated by local neu-
rochemical infusions (e.g., Javitt et al. 1996), could be combined
with systemic neuropharmacological manipulations in humans
(e.g. Duncan et al. 2001; Pekkone et al. 2002; van Berckel et al.
1998) to enable qualified inferences from scalp potentials about
the relative contributions of activity in different cortical layers.
Potentials produced by simultaneous disjoint generators in the
brain sum linearly at the scalp – a fact which enables inferences
about spatial interactions in cortex based on observations of spa-
tial nonlinearities of evoked potential responses at the scalp. If the
evoked response to stimuli A and B presented simultaneously dif-
fers from the sum of responses to A and B presented separately,
then the brain regions that process A and B interact. A prime ex-
ample of this logic for making inferences about CF interactions
based on scalp potential measurements is provided by the psy-
chophysics-based VEP studies of Polat and colleagues (Polat &
Norcia 1996; Polat et al. 1997). Similarly, a study recently reported
by Kim et al. (2002) used nonlinear interactions of partially con-
trast-reversing windmill-dartboard stimuli to infer that “signifi-
cantly greater short-range lateral interactions and significantly less
long-range lateral interactions were found in patients with schiz-
ophrenia compared to controls.”
An analogous logic may be used to infer temporal interactions
based on observations of temporal nonlinearities. For example,
the P50 suppression effect (Boutros et al. 1995; Clementz et al.
1997) is a temporal nonlinearity whereby an auditory evoked com-
ponent at about 50 msec post-stimulus is modified by the prece-
dence (within about 500 msec) of an identical click stimulus. In
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other words, the brain system generating the evoked response is
not linearly characterized by the response to a single stimulus:
Temporal context affects the evoked response to primary stimulus
information. Mismatch negativity (MMN) is another temporal
context effect: Auditory cortex responds differently to the same
physical stimulus as a function of its frequency or infrequency of
occurrence relative to a physically different stimulus. Although
both P50 and MMN may be altered in schizophrenia, MMN de-
pends crucially on NMDA-receptors (Javitt et al. 1996), whereas
P50 suppression possibly may not (van Berckel et al. 1998).
Phillips & Pflieger (2000) hypothesized that evoked EEG re-
sponses, which are phase-locked to the stimulus, reflect RF pro-
cessing; whereas induced EEG responses, which are event-re-
lated but not phase-locked to the stimulus, reflect CF processing.
Grounds for thinking that this may approximately hold, are: (a)
phase-locking to the stimulus naturally suggests external event-
driven processing; and (b) non-phase-locking with respect to the
stimulus may reflect ongoing cortical coordinating activity with in-
trinsic timing. We devised a high-density EEG pilot study (un-
published) that used complex visual contour integration stimuli
consisting of many small Gabor patches (Field et al. 1993), as spe-
cially modified by George Lovell (see his submitted doctoral the-
sis [Lovell 2002]). Pairs of stimuli were presented simultaneously
to the right and left visual fields. One stimulus consisted of struc-
tured sets of Gabor patches with perceived contours embedded in
a background of randomly oriented patches. The second stimulus
consisted of the same configuration with 40-degree random jit-
tering of patch orientations (which obliterated perceived con-
tours). The subject’s task was to detect “structure right” or “struc-
ture left.” Average reaction times were about 400 msec with nearly
100% accuracy. Between-condition differences for the broadband
average event-related potentials (about 275 epochs per condition)
were subtle at best for all scalp locations up to about 250 msec.
Evoked and induced responses were calculated using the method
of complex demodulation for the following symmetric bands: 10
Hz 6 5 Hz, 20 Hz 6 10 Hz, 30 Hz 6 15 Hz, and 40 Hz 6 20 Hz.
A nonparametric permutation procedure was used to convert all
differences to uncorrected p-value waveforms, with low values
(close to 0) indicating left.right visual field differences, and high
values (close to 1) indicating right.left visual field differences.
Significant induced and evoked 40 Hz differences were observed:
Right.left at left para-occipital locations at about 32 msec (in-
duced) and 34 msec (evoked), and left.right at right para-occip-
ital locations at about 76 msec (induced) and 58 msec (evoked).
Similar induced, but not evoked, 30 Hz response differences were
observed. No induced 20 Hz or 10 Hz differences attained signif-
icance, nor did the evoked 20 Hz differences. Evoked 10 Hz dif-
ferences were about 36 msec for right.left (left para-occipital)
and about 26 msec for left.right (right para-occipital). Therefore,
both induced and evoked differences were found at the expected
sides, with generally slower latencies for structure on the left.
By definition, these subtle differences reflect contextual field
processing. Because evoked differences sometimes precede in-
duced differences, this single subject pilot study does not support
our hypothesis. However, the finding of relatively early 40 Hz
band differences may be meaningful in the context of P&S.
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NMDA synapses can bias competition
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Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein emphasize the gain-control properties of
NMDA synapses in cognitive coordination. We endorse their view and
suggest that NMDA synapses play a crucial role in biased attentional com-
petition and (visual) working memory. Our simulations show that NMDA
synapses can control the storage rate of visual objects. We discuss specific
predictions of our model about cognitive effects of NMDA-antagonists
and schizophrenia.
Phillips & Silverstein’s (P&S’s) target article is a major step in the
development of a coherent theoretical framework for under-
standing how spatially distributed brain activity is coordinated or
integrated in normal function, and how this coordination may be
impaired in schizophrenia. Their perspective reconciles localist
and holist approaches to brain function into a dialectic functional
scheme, in which invariant local (modular) processing operations
or neural representations are flexibly integrated into larger con-
text- or task-dependent processing or representational units.
We endorse P&S’s view on the crucial role of NMDA synapses
in cognitive coordination and control, based on their amplifying
voltage-dependent properties. Specifically, the gain-control prop-
erties of NMDA synapses on ongoing processing discussed in the
target article may be plausibly involved in selective encoding and
maintenance of task-relevant information in cortical networks of
(visual) working memory.
In our neurocomputational approach to maintenance and control
in visual working memory (Raffone & Wolters 2001; Raffone et al.
2001), the neural representations of features and objects are kept ac-
tive after stimulus-offset by feedback connections from prefrontal
cortex to posterior cortical areas. In this model, object features are
integrated by synchronizing connections (within-chunk integration),
and different objects are segregated by fast mutual inhibition (be-
tween-pattern segregation). The storage capacity reflects the equi-
librium point between these two neural representational forces. In
a current study (Raffone et al., in preparation), cortical feedback,
within-chunk integration, and between-pattern segregation are
combined with NMDA synapses. In this commentary we will out-
line how NMDA synapses can play a crucial role in biased attentional
competition (Desimone & Duncan 1995) between neural represen-
tations of objects, and discuss specific implications and predictions
from our model consistent with P&S’s general perspective.
Competition between object representations is a fundamental as-
pect in many theories of visual attention. For instance, in Bundesen’s
(1990) Theory of Visual Attention (TVA), the units of visual repre-
sentation are parallel categorizations of visual elements in limited-ca-
pacity visual short-term memory. These categorizations compete in
terms of parallel processing speed (affecting the storage probability),
which depends on the relative attentional weight of visual elements.
Theories of attention often refer to the concept of biased competi-
tion principle between object representations (Desimone & Duncan
1995). According to the biased competition model, the attentional
weights (saliency or priority values) of different objects (saliency or
priority values) are correlated with selectively biased firing rates of
associated competing neural representations in the visual cortex.
It is generally assumed that attentional weights are encoded in
terms of firing rate modulation by top-down cortical feedback,
plausibly from prefrontal cortex. NMDA synapses, because of
their voltage-dependent properties, can implement a gain mech-
anism in which bottom-up signals are selectively amplified, de-
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pending on their top-down saliency. They can, therefore, imple-
ment a multiplicative computational scheme in attentional pro-
cessing, as in Bundesen’s (1990) TVA.
We have simulated this NMDA-dependent gain effect in visual
working memory storage (Raffone et al., in preparation). In the
model, separate objects are encoded by disjoint sets of recur-
rently-coupled neural assemblies located in the inferotemporal
cortex, parietal cortex, and prefrontal cortex. Neural assemblies in
parietal cortex receive top-down NMDA signals from control as-
semblies with a differential firing rate located in a prefrontal area.
In the simulation series shown in Figure 1, the cortical network
model was presented with displays of eight objects. Given that on
average only four objects are stored in terms of reverberations in
the absence of any attentional bias (Raffone & Wolters 2001), the
storage rate for each object is about 50%. Figure 1A shows the typ-
ical evolution of membrane potentials (firing patterns) of eight
parietal neurons coding for different objects, with interneuron
time-lags reflecting between-pattern segregation. In Figure 1B,
the storage rate of eight objects over 200 trials is shown with and
without attentional bias toward Object 1. Note the higher storage
rate of Object 1 with the amplifying effect of NMDA function (in
terms of latent glutamate binding, see Fig. 3 in the target article)
added to the parietal assembly coding for it, as compared with the
unbiased condition. All the other structural and dynamic param-
eters are kept constant across the two conditions. Figure 1C shows
the evolution of latent NMDA synaptic signals (amount of bound
glutamate modeled in terms of a dual exponential with rise time
of 5 msec and decay time of 50 msec) to target and distractor as-
semblies in the biased attentional weight condition.
As shown by our simulations, an important property of NMDA
signals is that they are voltage-dependent, and therefore are enabled
only in the presence of bottom-up input (sensory evidence). In our
model, this dynamic property is also crucial to prevent spurious ac-
tivation spreading to irrelevant neurons by feedback connections
from prefrontal cortex during maintenance. In this case, NMDA sig-
nals are generated at the level of recurrent connectivity intrinsic to
neural assemblies in posterior areas, and top-down signals from pre-
frontal cortex selectively act on non-NMDA input-activated assem-
blies with a sufficient amount of intrinsic glutamate binding. There-
fore, reverberations for maintenance only capture input-activated
neurons in feature and location dimensions. The absence of NMDA
from this circuitry would imply either reduced maintenance capac-
ity or the emergence of hallucinatory neural representations.
If NMDA synaptic systems are impaired in schizophrenia, as sug-
gested by P&S in the target article, and if NMDA synapses play a
crucial role in attentional selection and control of storage and main-
tenance in visual working memory, as suggested by our model, then
differences between groups of schizophrenic patients and control
groups are predicted in cognitive tasks with interactions between vi-
sual working memory and selective attention. Similar functional and
pathological principles may be involved in auditory (verbal) work-
ing memory and selective attention. Our model also predicts hallu-
cinations as a result of spurious activation spreading from prefrontal
cortex to posterior cortical areas under the effect of NMDA-antag-
onists, and, following P&S, in schizophrenia.
Why do schizophrenic patients hallucinate?
Pieter R. Roelfsemaa and Hans Supèra, b
aThe Netherlands Ophthalmic Research Institute, 1105 BA Amsterdam, The
Netherlands; bGraduate School of Neurosciences Amsterdam, Department
of Visual System Analysis, Academic Medical Center (UvA), 1100 AA
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. {p.roelfsema;h.super}@ioi.knaw.nl
Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein argue that schizophrenia is a result of a
deficit of the contextual coordination of neuronal responses. The authors
propose that NMDA-receptors control these modulatory effects. How-
ever, hallucinations, which are among the principle symptoms of schizo-
phrenia, imply a flaw in the interactions between neurons that is more
fundamental than just a general weakness of contextual modulation.
The target article distinguishes between “primary input” and
“contextual input” onto a neuron. Primary input drives the cell and
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Figure 1 (Raffone et al.). NMDA-dependent biased competition
effects in visual working memory storage. (A) Typical evolution of
membrane potentials of eight model neurons from eight parietal
assemblies coding for eight different objects (stimulus onset is at
100 msec, and offset at 250 msec; only four objects are maintained
after stimulus offset). (B) Percent storage rate of eight objects
with (grey bars) and without (black bars) bias toward Object 1,
over 200 trials with a storage capacity of about four objects.
(C) Glutamate binding at NMDA synapses for attended (black
curve) and unattended (grey curve) objects. See text for further
explanations.
A
B
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is generally attributed to feedforward connections that propagate
activity from lower to higher areas (Felleman & Van Essen 1991).
Contextual input, on the other hand, does not activate a neuron,
but rather modulates its response. One source of contextual ef-
fects in vision is the stimulus context, because properties of the
stimulus outside the receptive field can modify neuronal re-
sponses. These contextual effects are usually attributed to preat-
tentive vision (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). Task requirements are
another source of contextual effects that depend on shifts of visual
attention (Roelfsema et al. 2000).
Both types of contextual influences are particularly strong for
neurons that are well driven by the visual stimulus, and much
weaker for cells that receive little bottom up activation (Kapadia
et al. 1995; Knierim & Van Essen 1992; McAdams & Maunsell
1999; Zipser et al. 1996). We agree with the target article that con-
textual effects appear to multiply the effect of driving connections,
by some factor. Here we focus on the multiplicativity of this in-
teraction, and argue that it is important for the specificity of both
preattentive and attentive response modulation.
Visual search is an example of an attention-demanding task that
depends on interactions between cortical areas, and that is im-
paired in schizophrenia (Lubow et al. 2000). In visual search, the
identity of an item is given and its location has to be determined.
This implies an interaction between ventral stream areas encod-
ing the identity of the target item, and areas in the dorsal stream,
as well as early visual areas that encode locations. A scheme that
incorporates the essential ingredients of contemporary models of
search is indicated in Figure 1. Three areas have been indicated,
at different levels of the visual cortical hierarchy. In this simplified
scheme, two features (a and b) are represented in each of the ar-
eas. Feedback connections interconnect neurons with a similar
feature preference. Neurons that are driven by feedforward con-
nections are indicated as black circles. Search for a particular tar-
get feature (e.g., feature a) can be implemented by feedback from
higher areas to enhance the activity neurons in lower areas that
have the target feature in their receptive field (Roelfsema et al.
2000; van der Velde & de Kamps 2001).
Figures 1B and 1C compare the effects of multiplicative (mod-
ulatory) and additive (driving) feedback. If feedback is multi-
plicative, as in Figure 1B, only neurons that receive bottom-up
support from feedforward connections are influenced by it, and
feedback does not spill over to neurons without a matching fea-
ture in their receptive field (stippled connections in Fig. 1B are
disabled since there is no bottom-up input to these cells). When
the search has been completed, the location of the target item is
encoded by a response enhancement in early visual areas, which
can be read out by areas of the dorsal stream (van der Velde & de
Kamps 2001). Figure 1C shows that this focusing of activity at the
location of the target item cannot be achieved by additive feed-
back (driving connections), because it would also activate neurons
at locations of distractors (e.g., connection 1 in Fig. 1C). More-
over, additive feedback can even activate neurons at locations
where there are no objects at all (connection 2). Grossberg argued
that feedback therefore has to be multiplicative, to prevent hallu-
cinations (Grossberg 1999). Models of “preattentive” texture seg-
regation have also exploited the virtues of multiplicative feedback,
to enhance activity in early visual areas evoked by a figure over ac-
tivity evoked by the background (Roelfsema et al. 2002).
The proposal of the target article that contextual effects are me-
diated by NMDA-receptors would account for the multiplicative
interaction between contextual and driving connections (Fox et al.
1990). Current can flow only through NMDA-channels of neurons
that are sufficiently depolarized by driving connections to remove
the Mg-block. We note, however, that certain anesthetic agents not
acting on NMDA-receptors but operating through different
routes, also interfere with contextual modulation without an effect
on driving connections (Lamme et al. 1998; Pack et al. 2001). Nev-
ertheless, we agree that the possibility that NMDA-receptors are
important for contextual modulation is exciting and worth testing.
But what about hallucinations? They are among the defining
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Figure 1 (Roelfsema & Supèr). Involvement of feedback con-
nections in visual search. (A) In models of visual search, feedback
connections are assumed to interconnect neurons with a similar
feature preference. Two features (a and b) are represented in
three areas of the temporal stream of the visual cortex. In reality,
more stages are interposed between the primary visual cortex
(area V1) and the inferotemporal cortex (area IT). Neurons that
are activated by the stimulus below (by feedforward, driving con-
nections, not shown) have been indicated as black circles. Neu-
rons not activated by the visual stimulus are indicated as small gray
circles. (B) Multiplicative feedback. Connections to neurons not
activated by the input have no effect (stippled connections). Vi-
sual search for feature a can be implemented by feedback from
area IT, enhancing neuronal responses to the target feature “a”
(thick connections) in lower visual areas. In retinotopic areas, the
response enhancement occurs at the target object’s location, and
this solves the search task. (C) Additive feedback activates neu-
rons at lower hierarchical levels that are not activated by bottom
up. It activates neurons at the location of the distractor object
(connection 1), and even at locations without an object (connec-
tion 2), causing hallucinations.
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symptoms of schizophrenia. We have just argued that the multi-
plicative interaction between driving and contextual connections
is important to avoid hallucinations, since hallucinations may oc-
cur if feedback drives neurons in early sensory areas that are not
activated by bottom-up. This multiplicativity may be lost in schiz-
ophrenia; recent imaging work demonstrates that the primary au-
ditory cortex is activated by auditory hallucinations in schizo-
phrenic patients (Dierks et al. 1999). This implies that feedback
in schizophrenia is too strong, because it can create activity pat-
terns in sensory areas that are not supported by the sensory organ
itself – and contradicts Phillips & Silverstein’s (P&S’s) hypothesis
that the main deficit in schizophrenia is a weakness of contextual
modulation.
We conclude that a general weakness of contextual effects can-
not be the only deficit in schizophrenia. Mechanisms other than
contextual modulation must be disturbed in the communication
between neurons in the same and different brain areas. Unfortu-
nately, we still know too little about these interactions, even in nor-
mal subjects. Some hold, for example, that they are carried by syn-
chronous neuronal rhythms (Phillips & Singer 1997a; Singer &
Gray 1995), whereas others argue that they are rather associated
with the modulation of firing rates (Desimone & Duncan 1995;
Lamme & Roelfsema 2000), although these possibilities are not
mutually exclusive. The target article is an important contribution
because it pinpoints our lack of knowledge about how neurons in
different cortical areas exchange information. Moreover, it pro-
vides an inspiration to study disturbances in the neuronal interac-
tions to gain insight in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.
No blind schizophrenics: Are NMDA-receptor
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Abstract: Numerous searches have failed to identify a single co-occur-
rence of total blindness and schizophrenia. Evidence that blindness causes
loss of certain NMDA-receptor functions is balanced by reports of com-
pensatory gains. Connections between visual and anterior cingulate
NMDA-receptor systems may help to explain how blindness could protect
against schizophrenia.
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) have pieced together a plausible and
detailed connection between NMDA-receptors and schizophre-
nia. Our commentary is intended to illustrate the idea that recep-
tor hypofunction is a dynamic process that in certain cases may
lead to compensatory and protective neural circuitry. We first con-
sider implications of research on early sensory deprivation, and
then provide substantiation for our claim (Sanders et al. 2002) that
blind people do not become schizophrenic.
Variation in sensory experience has important effects on cere-
bral architecture and connectivity (overview in Geary & Huffman
2002). Some of this impact applies directly to blindness and
NMDA-receptor structure and function. For example, when mar-
mosets undergo monocular eyelid suture, their ocular dominance
columns exhibit suppressed NMDA-receptor NR1 subunit im-
munoreactivity (Fonta et al. 2000). This suggestion of impaired re-
ceptor integrity is consistent with reductions in NMDA-evoked,
but not baseline, calcium uptake in the striate cortex of dark-
reared kittens (Feldman et al. 1990). Dark-rearing also increases
sensitivity of rats’ visual cortex NMDA-receptors to certain chem-
ical antagonists (Fathollahi & Salami 2001), which may be a re-
flection of receptor loss or abnormality.
The impact of visual deprivation on NMDA-receptors probably
extends beyond the occipital cortex. Given the substantial role of
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in cognitive coordination and
in schizophrenia (Sanders et al. 2002), it is noteworthy that ACC
and primary visual cortex have strong physical (Vogt & Miller
1983) and functional (Nishijo et al. 1997) connectivity mediated
by glutamate transmission and NMDA-receptors (Sah & Nicoll
1991). As a result, hypofunction in visual cortex may lead to di-
minished input for and altered structure or function of NMDA-
receptors in the ACC. Consistent with this possibility, the ACC
participates in the generation of visual images (Deiber et al. 1995),
and the visual images of blind people suffer from deficiencies in
dynamic grouping and context sensitivity (DeBeni & Cornoldi
1988), which the target article attributes to reduced ion flow in
NMDA-receptors.
Despite indications of widespread NMDA abnormality in blind
people, there is no evidence that they develop the severe cogni-
tive coordination problems characteristic of some types of schizo-
phrenia. On the contrary, blind people seem to be completely pro-
tected. Five independent searches, varying considerably in scope,
methods, and population, failed to identify even one well-defined
co-occurrence of total blindness and schizophrenia (Abely & Car-
ton 1967; Chevigny & Braverman 1950; Feierman 1982; Horrobin
1979; Riscalla 1980). We dedicated portions of 2000 and 2001 to
e-mail and postal mail surveys of relevant professionals; e-mail and
telephone discussions with officials of health, mental health,
blindness, and schizophrenia organizations and research insti-
tutes; and extensive keyword probes of Medline, PsychINFO, and
ScienceDirect databases. Some ambiguity was introduced by very
low return rates for our surveys, but the consistent result of all
these inquiries was that no instance of totally blind/schizophrenic
co-occurrence was found.
How could blindness protect against schizophrenia? Our hy-
pothesis (Sanders et al. 2002) centers on the idea that certain
compensations in the ACC for loss of visual input may provide
“immunity.” Blindness leads to neural reorganization and restruc-
turing (Hamilton & Pascual-Leone 1998; Liotti et al. 1998). Psy-
chologically, these cortical changes allow the blind to achieve nor-
mal cognitive development (Warren 1994) despite formidable
challenges (e.g., Sandler & Hobson 2001). One example of the
compensatory reactions to blindness is the development of above-
average verbal memory (Decker & Koole 1992).
We believe that some of these blindness-induced neural and
psychological compensations involve the dynamics of NMDA-
receptor function. Evidence of deprivation-induced receptor hypo-
function is balanced by a report of upregulation of NMDA-
receptor 1A subunits in optic and intermediate gray layers of su-
perior colliculus resulting from peripheral blindness (Vizuete et
al. 2001). This upregulation led to an increase in corticocollicular
synapses as a compensation for the loss of retinocollicular in-
teraction. In the same vein, dark-rearing forestalls the normal 
upregulation of NMDA-receptor 2A subunits in striate cortex
(Quinlan et al. 1999). This interference with normal receptor elab-
oration has the paradoxical, or compensatory, effect of enhancing
NMDA-receptor activity, ultimately prolonging the critical period
for plasticity and modulation in the visual cortex (Fox et al. 1999).
Such trade-offs between loss and gain in visual system NMDA-re-
ceptors of blind people may help explain the mature viability and
reorganization of a sensory region deprived of its primary affer-
ents (Breitenseher et al. 1998).
As was the case for losses discussed above, there is reason to be-
lieve that blindness-induced NMDA-receptor gains in primary vi-
sual system are matched in other regions, particularly the ACC. A
pertinent example is the report of a larger mismatch negativity
(MMN) evoked-potential response to deviant auditory stimuli in
blind than in sighted humans (Kujala et al. 1995). This demon-
stration of enhanced context sensitivity in the blind stands in stark
contrast to the diminished MMN (mismatch negativity) observed
in schizophrenics, and also in control samples administered the
NMDA-receptor antagonist ketamine (Umbricht et al. 2000).
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Strong involvement of ketamine in ACC function is firmly estab-
lished, and the ACC is a relatively late (top down?) generator of
MMN (Waberski et al. 2001). It is reasonable to speculate that the
dynamics of blindness-induced NMDA-receptor hypofunction in
visual cortex extends to NMDA-receptor gains in the ACC, which
in turn increase some types of context sensitivity, perhaps ulti-
mately resulting in protection against schizophrenia.
In the light of these results, the answer to point 11 in P&S’s con-
cluding section – “Is the molecular and regional diversity of
NMDA receptor channels . . . crucial?” (target article, sect. 8) – is
likely to be “Yes!” (see de Belleroche et al. 1998 for direct evi-
dence). The impression of dynamic, heterogeneous, and compen-
satory processes produced by research on visual deprivation is en-
hanced when deafness is added to the picture. Loss of auditory
input produces a pattern of loss and gain in NMDA-receptor 
function in some ways similar to and in other ways different from
the effects of dark-rearing or blindness (e.g., Nakagawa et al.
2000; Oleskevich & Walmsley 2002). Most unlike the effects of
blindness, deafness does not serve to prevent schizophrenia (e.g.,
Schonauer et al. 1999).
Many of the issues raised by P&S may be better understood fol-
lowing certain comparisons among blind, deaf, schizophrenic, and
control samples. For example, how might blind people respond to
ketamine antagonism of their ACC NMDA-receptors? It would be
especially interesting to extend to blind and deaf samples the work
on cortical rhythms reviewed in section 5 of the target article. Pat-
terns of beta and gamma frequencies, and their modulation by ke-
tamine, may reveal differences in local and top-down cognitive co-
ordination in blind versus deaf people, thus helping explain the
dramatic difference in their susceptibility to schizophrenia.
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Abstract: Impairments in cognitive coordination in schizophrenia are
supported by phenomenological data that suggest deficits in the process-
ing of visual context. Although the target article is sympathetic to such a
phenomenological perspective, we argue that the relevance of phenome-
nological data for a wider understanding of consciousness in schizophre-
nia is not sufficiently addressed by the authors.
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) propose an innovative model of the
characteristic cognitive disorganization of schizophrenia, based on
neurobiological, pharmacological, and cognitive data. The authors
also refer to the classic psychiatric writings of Matussek (1952/
1987) and Conrad (1958), who adopt a Gestaltist perspective and
describe subjective experience in schizophrenia in detail. Al-
though we applaud the mention of such Gestaltist work with its
emphasis on phenomenological data, we believe that the theory of
P&S neglects important aspects of consciousness in schizophrenia
that are central to the understanding of the condition.
In Anglophone psychiatry, phenomenology generally refers to
the study of observable signs and symptoms. In philosophy and
phenomenological psychiatry, however, phenomenology refers to
the systematic study of conscious experience from a first-person
perspective and is tied to certain philosophical positions regard-
ing mind and its relationship to the world. We believe that inclu-
sion of a phenomenological perspective (in the second sense) is
essential to gain insights into the cognitive abnormalities and their
wider relevance for understanding the schizophrenic condition
(Sass & Parnas, in press a).
Gurwitsch (1964) offers a phenomenological analysis that may
help to clarify the subjective dimension of these disorders and the
role of context in consciousness. In Gurwitsch’s view, the field of
consciousness always involves a “theme,” “thematic field,” and
“margin” of awareness. Gurwitsch’s first domain, the “theme,” is
that which engrosses the subject, stands in the focus of his atten-
tion, and “upon which his mental activity concentrates” (p. 4). The
theme is characterized by the kinds of relationships classically de-
scribed by Gestalt psychology: Here, each constituent “exists in
the very qualifications by which it is defined and made to be that
which it is in a given case, only in conjunction with, and deter-
mined by, co-constituents” (p. 139). The second domain, the
“margin,” is the realm of objects of awareness that are simultane-
ously present to consciousness but not experienced as relevant to
the focal theme; it includes elements of ongoing bodily existence,
the perceptual surround, and the stream of consciousness (p. 11).
The third domain – a kind of middle realm – is that of the “the-
matic field,” defined as “the totality of facts, co-present with the
theme, which are experienced as having material relevancy or per-
tinence to the theme” (p. 55).
Constituents of the thematic field are not merely copresent;
they hang together in a mutually implicative way, and have rele-
vance for the focal theme. Thus, the way in which each of these
constituents is experienced is a function of some larger unifying
significance that also determines the aspect of the theme that will
emerge as significant. Gurwitsch (1964) speaks here of “unity by
relevancy,” which is bound up (as both source and product) with
the unity of context (p. 341); it can be distinguished from the even
tighter form of unity inherent in “Gestalt-coherence.”
The main disturbance in schizophrenia, according to P&S, con-
cerns the capacity for “context-processing.” From a phenomeno-
logical and experimental perspective, a disturbance in context-
processing is most obvious at the level of context that Gurwitsch
calls the “the thematic field,” because schizophrenia patients are
not deficient in the ability to perceive basic Gestalts (Knight et al.
2000; Sass, in press). The work of Matussek (1952/1987) and Con-
rad (1958) supports this view. Examination of Matussek’s clinical
illustrations shows that there is seldom, if ever, a breakdown of the
basic spatial form; indeed, the integrity of the visual object may
even be heightened as it stands out with special clarity while the
background recedes in dullness and indifference (Matussek 1952/
1987, p. 92). The main perceptual alteration Matussek emphasizes
is a “loosening of the natural perceptual context” or of the “co-
herence of perception.”
Impairment in context-processing at the level of the thematic
field has wide implication for the understanding of consciousness
in schizophrenia. According to Gurwitsch (1964), the “thematic
field” determines the “perspective under which, the light and ori-
entation in which, the point of view from which” the theme ap-
pears to consciousness (p. 359). Accordingly, weakening of the
“thematic field” is associated with a loosening of perceptual con-
text that may alter the organization or salience of the theme. The
phenomenological evidence suggests that this is so. Matussek, for
example, describes everyday objects that are framed in isolation,
and thus come to seem strange or to acquire exaggerated and of-
ten enigmatic symbolic “weighting” as a result of the “loosening of
the natural perceptual context” (Matussek 1952/1987).
Relevancy relationships (characteristic of the thematic field)
are the kind that are most directly related to the ongoing projects
or concerns of the subject; for this reason they may be especially
closely linked to fundamental aspects of self-experience, that is, to
the underlying sense of existing as a vital and unified subject of
awareness or first-person perspective, which has been referred to
as “ipseity” (from the Latin ipse, which means self or itself; Sass
2000; Sass & Parnas, in press b). The typically schizophrenic al-
terations of the cognitive/perceptual field are, in fact, usually ac-
companied by disruptions in this most basic sense of selfhood
(Klosterkoetter et al. 1997; Møller & Husby 2000; Parnas et al.
1998). Such a patient may complain of an “inner void,” of “painful
distance to self,” of being “occupied by, and scrutinizing, my own
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inner world,” of not feeling himself, or even having no conscious-
ness at all (Møller & Husby 2000, pp. 221–23, 228).
Normal ipseity (and the normal tacit-explicit structuring of ex-
perience this implies) is a condition for the experience of appetite,
vital energy, and point of orientation: It is what grounds human mo-
tivation and organizes our experiential world in accordance with
needs and wishes, thereby giving objects their affordances – their
significance for us as obstacles, tools, objects of desire, and the like.
In the absence of this vital self-affection and the lines of orienta-
tion it establishes, there can no longer be clear differentiation of
means from goal; no reason for certain objects to show up in the
focus of awareness while others recede; no reason for attention to
be directed outward rather than inward toward one’s own body or
processes of thinking (i.e., “hyperreflexivity”; Sass 2000).
Most attempts to explain the disturbances of schizophrenic cog-
nition have assumed they are rooted in purely cognitive and often
rather modular dysfunctions, such as associational disturbance,
failures of attention or working memory, or an incapacity for the
planning or monitoring of discourse or thought. Such functions
may indeed be abnormal. It is possible, however, that these dis-
turbances are secondary to a more fundamental distortion of psy-
chological processes that are relevant for adopting a practical,
goal-oriented stance toward the world, and for constituting a lived
point of orientation and the correlated pattern of meanings that
make for a coherent and significant world. We believe that P&S’s
view of schizophrenia as an “impairment in cognitive coordina-
tion” may be relevant for identification of such a fundamental 
distortion of psychological processes in schizophrenia. However,
future research would benefit from incorporating phenomeno-
logical approaches to examine relationships between disorders of
cognition and self-experience.
Cortical connectivity in high-frequency
beta-rhythm in schizophrenics with positive
and negative symptoms
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Abstract: In chronic schizophrenic patients with both positive and nega-
tive symptoms (see Table 1), interhemispheric connections at the high fre-
quency beta2-rhythm are absent during cognitive tasks, in contrast to
normal controls, who have many interhemispheric connections at this fre-
quency in the same situation. Connectivity is a fundamental brain feature,
evidently greatly promoted by the NMDA system. It is a more reliable
measure of brain function than the spectral power of this rhythm.
Recently we have studied several EEG measures revealing some
abnormalities in schizophrenia (Burgess et al., submitted; Strelets
et al., under review). In our work aimed at the study of different
brain rhythms’ spectral power and connectivity, it was revealed
that, in schizophrenic patients with positive and negative symp-
toms, the spectral power of all brain rhythms except the beta2-
rhythm was decreased in comparison with normal controls (Strelets
et al. 2002). We refer to this rhythm, consisting of oscillations with
a frequency of 20–40 Hz, more precisely as 38 Hz. Therefore,
the spectral power of this rhythm in schizophrenic patients does
not differ significantly from that of the normal controls, though
the literature on this point is controversial. The interhemispheric
connections at this rhythm, studied by the coherence method, in
contrast to those in normal controls, were absent, while at other
rhythms we can observe in patients normal connections or even hy-
perconnectivity. One can propose that the high frequency rhythms
aren’t well organized enough to form necessary connections dur-
ing cognitive tasks in schizophrenic patients. The glutamatergic
ionotropic NMDA system and other neurotransmitters evidently
play a great role in this disorganization of connectivity at the beta2-
rhythm in schizophrenic patients.
The EEG was recorded from ten derivations using the standard
scheme in the rest condition (eyes closed) and during task perfor-
mance – silently counting the hours on an imaginary clock dial.
EEG traces of 100 seconds were recorded. Subsequent analy-
sis of each EEG segment consisted of selection of 10 to 20 five-
second EEG fragments, free from artifacts. These fragments un-
derwent Fast Fourier Transform, the results of this procedure
being used for subsequent analysis.
The study of connectivity was carried out using two methods:
(1) Coherence, the most commonly used method – measure of
synchronization, based on the evaluation of functional integration
between the brain areas at the frequency, averaged across fre-
quency domain for each subject; and (2) the method of typical
connections analysis, developed by our group (Strelets et al. 2002),
based on the analysis of the peaks, precisely coinciding in fre-
quency in individual power spectra of different derivations for
each frequency domain. The most typical connections for the
group were selected by their probabilities, and their significance
was tested by a Monte-Carlo method. Therefore, this method en-
ables us to detect the real (not averaged) frequency at which the
connections between cortical areas are established.
Coherence study. In the rest condition in the beta2-range (20–
40 Hz), in normal subjects there were two interhemispheric con-
nections. During the task performance, the number of connec-
tions at this rhythm increased to eight in comparison with the rest
condition. The connections were revealed mostly in the anterior
cortical areas.
In patients with positive symptoms, in the beta2-range inter-
hemspheric connections were absent, and the number of intra-
hemispheric connections was significantly more, the latter includ-
ing the temporal areas. During task performance, a paradoxical
reaction was observed in this group: opposite to the norm, the num-
ber of connections decreased compared to the rest condition.
In comparison with the norm, in both experimental situations
patients with negative symptoms had no interhemispheric con-
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Table 1 (Strelets). Demographic characteristics of three subject groups
Group
Normals Patients with “positive” symptoms Patients with “negative” symptoms
Age (years) 20–50 (32.5668.67) 25–47 (33.2167.94) 20–53 (34.9469.18)
Education (years) 10–15 (12.5662.25) 8–15 (11.2562.40) 7–15 (10.20662.52)
The age of first onset (years) — 17–39 (26.5765.80) 19–53 (28.10610.95)
Chronicity:
since the last admission (years) — 0–9 (1.4261.31) 0–4 (1.0560.93)
since the first admission (years) — 0–23 (6.4366.01) 0–29 (6.6866.16)
Number of admissions — 1–24 (5.3465.11) 1–9 (3.4762.34)
nections in the beta2-range, revealing pathological rigidity. Dur-
ing task performance, the differences in coherence patterns be-
tween these two groups were insignificant.
As we see from the above, the results obtained in the coherence
study showed dramatic results: the absence of interhemispheric
connections in both patient groups in comparison with the norm
at the frequency 20–40 Hz (beta2) in all conditions. At the same
time there were no significant differences between the two patient
groups.
Typical connections study. In the normal group in rest condi-
tion, there were two interhemispheric and three intrahemispheric
connections at the frequency 38 Hz. During the task, the number
of connections at this frequency increased to four interhemi-
spheric and five intrahemispheric ones, with the predominant in-
clusion of areas of the left hemisphere. In patients with positive
symptoms in the rest condition, in the beta2-range interhemi-
spheric connections were absent. In comparison with the norm, in
this group there were significantly more connections of temporal
areas with other ones. During task performance in patients with
positive symptoms, typical interhemispheric connections in the
beta2-range were also absent.
In patients with negative symptoms, in the beta2-range (20–40
Hz) typical connections were revealed only in the left hemisphere.
The interhemispheric connections were absent in both situations.
The comparison between the patients with positive and nega-
tive symptoms during task performance revealed in the beta2-
range (20–40 Hz) a sort of “parity” in the number of significant
differences between these groups, but patients with negative
symptoms had more connections in medial areas, including inter-
hemispheric ones, and patients with positive symptoms had more
connections in the temporal areas.
The greatest departure of schizophrenics from the norm was re-
vealed at the frequency 35–40 Hz: In the norm there were many
typical interhemispheric connections, while in schizophrenics
there were no interhemispheric connections at this frequency. In-
stead, a new pathological system seems to have evolved in patients
– the system of connections at a frequency (29 Hz) significantly
lower than normal.
Conclusions. 1. In both groups of schizophrenic patients there
is phase shift instability, revealed by the coherence method. This
instability causes functional disconnections between the hemi-
spheres in the beta2-rhythm, this rhythm being important for cog-
nitive functions and consciousness.
2. In both groups of patients, the number of typical connec-
tions was decreased in comparison with the norm. In patients with
negative symptoms, this number was greater than in the other pa-
tient group, but on account of lower frequency connections.
3. All the abovementioned deficiencies observed in schizo-
phrenic patients may be at least partly connected with NMDA-
hypofunction.
Synchronous dynamics for cognitive
coordination: But how?
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Abstract: Although interesting, the hypotheses proposed by Phillips & Sil-
verstein lack unifying structure both in specific mechanisms and in cited
evidence. They provide little to support the notion that low-level sensory
processing and high-level cognitive coordination share dynamic grouping
by synchrony as a common processing mechanism. We suggest that more
realistic large-scale modeling at multiple levels is needed to address these
issues.
The main hypothesis advanced by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) is
that synchrony of fast rhythms (e.g., gamma or beta rhythms) can
explain “cognitive coordination” throughout the cortex at multiple
levels of processing, and that schizophrenia results from a break-
down of this coordination. These dynamics, in turn, are hypothe-
sized to be regulated by NMDA-receptor activity, which is
thought to be reduced in schizophrenia. The evidence presented
by P&S mainly derives from studies of context in perceptual pro-
cessing, and P&S suggest that the principles at this level can be
extended to higher level cognitive processing throughout the cor-
tex. They hypothesize that synchrony of high-frequency rhythms
across cell assemblies is sufficient as an explanatory mechanism
for a dynamic grouping that underlies cognitive coordination at
multiple levels. But is this consistent with the evidence? Further-
more, while the P&S hypothesis is appealing in its parsimony, it is
not clear that synchrony is necessary to explain the phenomena
described. In the debate on the role of rhythms in the cortex, it
has been argued, including by one of the authors (Phillips &
Singer 1997a), that no rhythmic patterns are necessary for syn-
chronization to occur (Roy et al. 2001).
How appropriate is it to assume a unified process across multi-
ple levels, such as low-level perception and cognitive coordination
of high-level processes? In general, there is little explanation in
the target article of specific mechanisms that make use of syn-
chrony that might support the authors’ view. Rather, supporting
evidence is drawn for each of the parts of the argument, but little
is done to induce a “Gestalt”: How, exactly, do all the pieces fit to-
gether? Does “coordination” of perceiving the parts of an object
as a whole equate with selecting an appropriate answer to a sim-
ple perceptual matching task, and does the latter require the same
type of coordination that is needed for playing chess or for day-
dreaming? If so, then which components of each task are bound
by the dynamic grouping, and in what order? Synchronous gamma
band activity has been proposed to serve a role in binding com-
ponents of a percept into a unified whole, and most of the evi-
dence cited by P&S draws on this literature. This, in itself, is not
coordination, in the more common sense of the word. Coordina-
tion implies sequences of actions in some useful order in time, and
certainly, higher-order cognitive processes require coordination in
this sense. No satisfactory definition is given to the term “coordi-
nation,” and no explanation is given here of how the proposed syn-
chronous mechanisms could mediate the necessary transitions be-
tween states for coordination to occur.
A large part of the authors’ argument revolves around the role
of NMDA both in mediating the synchronous behavior across
multiple levels, and in the lack of this coordination in schizophre-
nia. Yet it is widely believed that dopamine plays a significant role
in control of processing in the frontal cortex, but not in early sen-
sory and association regions of the cortex. This fact already sug-
gests potentially different basic mechanisms. With respect to
schizophrenia, virtually all antipsychotics have dopamine receptor
binding action. Although the evidence for NMDA-receptor in-
volvement in schizophrenia is compelling (Holcomb et al. 2001;
Medoff et al. 2001; Tamminga 1998), it is not clear that it alone
can explain the disease, since NMDA partial agonists seem to be
most effective in treating negative symptoms (van Berckel et al.
1996), and mainly in conjunction with other, more standard an-
tipsychotics. Recent theories of schizophrenia have rather em-
phasized the likely role of multiple interacting receptor systems in
this disease. One theory that might involve the type of dynamics
proposed by P&S is in studies of the regulation of dopamine by
NMDA-receptor activity. Specifically, there is evidence that
NMDA-receptor-based mechanisms may regulate the flow of
dopamine from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) in a reciprocal interaction which depends on a tem-
poral pattern of activity in the VTA (Svensson 2000).
A bursting pattern of activity at 5 Hz (near the alpha-rhythm)
in the VTA caused dopamine release to the PFC, while nonburst-
ing spiking at the same mean rate did not. This dynamic behavior
was found to depend on NMDA-receptor activation by afferents
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from the PFC. Although dynamic interactions are very much a
part of this theory, both the qualitative behavior and the temporal
scale are inconsistent with the fast-frequency mechanisms pro-
posed by P&S. Low-frequency rhythms such as alpha are thought
to synchronize loosely at best (Kopell 2000). Although on the sur-
face this could be viewed as coordination that is mediated by
NMDA-induced temporal patterns of activity, it is difficult to as-
sess whether this scheme would fit into the scheme proposed by
P&S; there is a lack of any specific mechanism in the target arti-
cle.
The proposal of P&S emphasizes the critical interplay between
computational modeling and experimental observation. Although
we agree that combining modeling and experimental observation
is essential if one is to begin to understand complex cognitive
processes and their dysfunction, we have argued (Horwitz et al.
1999; Tagamets & Horwitz 1998) that, to understand the neural
substrates mediating cognitive tasks (and brain disorders), it is
necessary to embed the specific assumptions one makes into a
neurobiologically realistic model and to simulate neural data at
multiple levels (e.g., single unit, fMRI) that can be compared with
quantitative experimental data. In the case presented by P&S,
such a model would have defective NMDA-receptors, and one
would attempt to show that the model is deficient in performing
tasks on which schizophrenic patients show deficits, and also, that
the model results in simulated neural activity similar to that seen
in schizophrenic patients (e.g., hypofrontality in an appropriate
fMRI study). It is at this level of analysis that one can start to de-
termine the neural basis of the disruption of normal cognition that
one finds in schizophrenic patients.
The type of hypothesis proposed by P&S should be viewed as
the beginning stage for a neurobiologically realistic physiologic
theory aimed at elucidating the neural basis of the thought disor-
der associated with schizophrenia, not as a theory itself.
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Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein’s ambitious link between receptor abnor-
malities and the symptoms of schizophrenia involves a certain amount of
fuzziness: No detailed mechanism is suggested through which the pro-
posed abnormality would lead to psychological traits. We propose that de-
tailed simulation of brain regions, using model neural networks, can aid in
understanding the relation between biological abnormality and psycho-
logical dysfunction in schizophrenia.
In the last decades, the sciences studying brain and behavior have
started to converge. The paper by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) is
a good example of this tendency. In it, the cognitive and behav-
ioral symptoms of schizophrenia are tied to a putative dysfunction
of the NMDA-receptor. The vast differences in scale that are
bridged in the process are both the strong-point and the weakness
of this paper. On the one hand, such an explicit bridge is neces-
sary to link an identified neuropathology to observed cognitive or
behavioral impairments in a testable way. On the other hand, be-
cause of a shortness of relevant data, the cellular and network
mechanisms that might lead from NMDA-receptor dysfunction to
the symptoms associated with the disorder largely remain ob-
scure.
Nevertheless, P&S’s viewpoint focuses attention on a thus far
poorly understood issue in schizophrenia research, namely, the re-
markable similarities between effects induced by NMDA-recep-
tor blockers such as PCP and schizophrenia symptoms. The mech-
anisms underlying these effects are of considerable importance,
both with respect to disorder pathogenesis and in relation to drug
therapy. P&S present various evidence that suggest a role of
NMDA-receptors in at least some of the symptoms of schizo-
phrenia. This link is most convincing with respect to deficits on
perceptual tasks. The authors discuss in detail what paradigms are
affected in this domain, and how deficits in these tasks are related
to the concepts of cognitive coordination and dynamic grouping. It
is also in this field (in auditory perception) that they present the
sole direct evidence linking NMDA-receptor blockage to a de-
crease in contextual modulation (Javitt et al. 1996).
With respect to the cognitive symptoms discussed in the article,
the distance from the neurochemical level is so great that some
vagueness is necessarily introduced. In these issues both the step
from NMDA to cognitive coordination, and that from cognitive
coordination to symptomatology, are not wholly transparent. For
example, P&S argue that NMDA-receptors typically carry infor-
mation from outside the receptive field of the cell. However, in
higher order areas, the notion of receptive field may be problem-
atic. Still, the authors suggest a distinction can be made between
what neurons “transmit information about,” and information that
is merely modulating. It would seem to us that such distinctions
are clear-cut only in lower order sensory or motor areas, where the
relation between environmental stimuli and neuronal representa-
tions is relatively straightforward. How such distinctions are to be
applied to, for example, hippocampal structures with their multi-
ple recurrent circuits, is unclear.
Another problem is that the exact nature of the putative NMDA
abnormality in schizophrenia remains undefined. NMDA-recep-
tors have been associated primarily with learning (Newcomer &
Krystal 2001). Although the authors show that some symptoms in
schizophrenia cannot be caused by LTP deficits, we wonder why
learning would not be affected, and how LTP deficits would fit in
their story.
At the cognitive level, the concept of “cognitive coordination”
is thus used in a rather loose way. It seems that anything and noth-
ing can be a reflection of cognitive coordination. As a conse-
quence, the predictions of the theory at the cognitive level are un-
clear. This suggests that it would perhaps be more fruitful to
consider a link of NMDA-receptors and contextual modulation
within the limited domain of sensory tasks. Although this would
greatly limit the generality of the theory, it would have the bene-
fit of making it relatively clear-cut what types of transmission are
thought to be affected by NMDA abnormalities, and how that re-
lates to behavioral effects. Loss of generality would thus be made
up by gains in testability.
In more general terms, the closing of the gap between brain and
behavior might benefit from models that are explicit about how an
observed neuropathology, in a particular brain region, might af-
fect network function, and how this, in turn, may result in partic-
ular symptoms. As stressed by P&S, simulation of brain circuits us-
ing computational techniques can be a great aid in this process,
provided that one is explicit about the substrate that is modeled.
There are already several examples of such an approach (An-
drew 2000; Braver et al. 1999; Meeter et al. 2002; Monchi et al.
2002). The study by Andrew (2000) showed how dopamine up-
regulation, simulated as an increase in excitability in frontal 
cortex neurons, produced perseverance errors on a simulated Wis-
consin Card Sort Test, as also found in patients with schizophre-
nia. As another example, in our own work we relate specific wiring
abnormalities in the parahippocampal gyrus with the pattern of
memory deficits observed in schizophrenia (Meeter et al. 2002;
Talamini et al., in preparation). The architecture of our network
incorporates the broad features of medial temporal lobe anatomy,
while the simulated neuropathology is derived from a consider-
able body of evidence that suggests reduced connectivity in the in-
put-output regions of the hippocampus (Harrison & Eastwood
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2001; Hemby et al. 2002). The model’s performance on a number
of episodic memory tasks is compared with scores from patients
with schizophrenia on the same tasks. Thus, the model is con-
strained at various levels of architecture and performance, and
correspondences between both model and brain, and model and
behavior are explicit. This facilitates verification or falsification of
hypotheses, while derivation of new predictions can occur in an
unambiguous way.
This type of analysis may also be appropriate for studying the
role of NMDA currents in schizophrenia, as proposed by P&S. As
the behavioral effects of abnormalities in these currents will prob-
ably depend on the wiring architecture of the region, network
characteristics in the areas underlying the function of interest will
need to be considered. For example, a computational model of au-
ditory cortex may show how NMDA-receptor anomalies could
produce deficits in sensory processing. Computational modeling
thus allows the investigation of concrete deficits produced by con-
crete abnormalities in the brain.
Guarding against over-inclusive notions of
“context”: Psycholinguistic and
electrophysiological studies of specific
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Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein offer an exciting synthesis of ongoing ef-
forts to link the clinical and cognitive manifestations of schizophrenia with
cellular accounts of its pathophysiology. We applaud their efforts but won-
der whether the highly inclusive notion of “context” adequately captures
some important details regarding schizophrenia and NMDA/glutamate
function that are suggested by work on language processing and cognitive
electrophysiology.
Schizophrenia is an enigmatic disorder associated with impair-
ments in the structure and function of many interdependent neu-
rocognitive systems. The neural and cognitive manifestations of
schizophrenia are wildly heterogeneous, nevertheless significant
advances have been made in understanding its biology and psy-
chology. Phillips & Silverstein’s (P&S’s) thesis builds upon recent
advances in linking cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia to the
NMDA/Glutamate system, and we applaud their efforts. How-
ever, similar to other comprehensive views of schizophrenia (e.g.,
Cohen & Servan-Schreiber 1992), we wonder whether their over-
inclusive view of “context” adequately captures some important
subtleties regarding neurocognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia.
In the domain of language, for example, the channel through
which thought disorder in schizophrenia is most apparent, context
may affect processing at any number of functional levels, thus
clouding the notion of what constitutes a “primary” or “receptive
field” input. These levels include the encoding of the auditory
speech signal (or printed word), the activation of lexical entries,
the retrieval of semantic information, how semantic information
gets bound into episodic memory, and so on. Moreover, a given
context may exert independent and separable effects in normal
language processing that are differentially impaired in schizo-
phrenia patients and following ketamine administration in nor-
mals (thus interfering with the NMDA/glutamate system di-
rectly). Such examples, to be reviewed, are problematic for global
notions of “context” because they suggest that context processing
is not unitary but rather a collection of processes, only a subset of
which may be impaired in schizophrenia or arise from NMDA/
glutamate function.
Language contexts exert facilitative and inhibitory effects on
semantic activation that are differentially impaired in schizo-
phrenia. We examined whether schizophrenia patients differ-
entially use context to facilitate priming of contextually relevant
meanings, and to inhibit priming of contextually irrelevant mean-
ings (Titone et al. 2000) using a semantic priming method. Partic-
ipants listened to moderately or strongly biased sentences that
contained ambiguous words (e.g., bug), and saw targets presented
for a lexical decision response (i.e., word/nonword judgment) that
were semantically related to dominant (e.g., insect) or subordinate
(e.g., spy) meanings. Sentence contexts always favored the subor-
dinate, or less frequent meaning; therefore, priming to subordi-
nate targets was always contextually appropriate and priming to
dominant targets was always contextually inappropriate.
Similar to the perceptual closure data cited by P&S, schizo-
phrenia patients differed from controls only for moderately biased
but not strongly biased contexts. For strongly biased subordinate
contexts, both schizophrenia patients and controls used context to
selectively prime subordinate meanings, and thus to appropriately
inhibit dominant meanings. For moderately biased subordinate
contexts, however, only controls selectively primed subordinate
meanings. In contrast, schizophrenia patients significantly primed
both meanings, which indicates that they used the context to ap-
propriately enhance subordinate meaning activation but not to in-
hibit dominant meaning activation (see also Chapman et al. 1976;
Done & Frith 1984 for similar results; see Titone et al. 2002 for
evidence of schizophrenia-related priming impairments for am-
biguous idioms). These data suggest that context may produce
multiple effects simultaneously – the activation of relevant se-
mantic representations and the inhibition of irrelevant semantic
representations. Further, these distinct effects of context may be
selectively disrupted in schizophrenia.
Distinct ERPs associated with context processing are differ-
entially impaired in schizophrenia subtypes and following keta-
mine administration. At least two event-related-potential (ERP)
components may be relevant to context processing and NMDA ac-
counts of schizophrenia. One deflection, the N400, is evoked by
stimuli that are meaningful in everyday life, such as words, sen-
tences, objects, or faces. For most authors, the N400 indexes the
integration of stimulus meaning into an unfolding context (Hal-
gren & Smith 1987; Holcomb 1993; Rugg et al. 1988), or the in-
hibition of inappropriate knowledge (Debruille 1998; Debruille et
al. 1996). A second component, the P600 (a member of the P3b
family; Kutas et al. 1977), is also evoked by stimuli that are mean-
ingful in everyday life. Its amplitude is larger for stimuli that are
subsequently recalled (Kutas 1988; Neville et al. 1986), and as the
amount of information that is consciously extracted from a stimu-
lus configuration increases (Donchin & Coles 1988). Therefore,
the P600 potential may be related to the formation of an episodic
memory event, or stimulus “binding.”
Within P&S’s framework, both the N400 and the P600 qualify
as context-sensitive potentials. The N400 appears to be abnormal
in schizophrenia (Koyama et al. 1991; Niznikiewicz et al. 1999; Sit-
nikova et al. 2002), especially as thought disorder or cognitive dis-
organization increases (Andrews et al. 1993). P600 amplitude is
also smaller in schizophrenia patients than in controls, although
schizophrenia patients who frequently experience reality distor-
tion (i.e., hallucinations and delusions) show significantly larger
(i.e., relatively more intact) P600 amplitudes than schizophrenia
patients who do not experience prominent reality distortion
(Guillem et al. 2001; 2003). Thus, the P600 effect is consistent
with P&S’s interpretation of gamma in schizophrenia, which is also
thought to reflect episodic binding and is less impaired in schizo-
phrenia patients who frequently experience reality distortion.
Although these N400 and P600 results fit with P&S’s frame-
work, the available evidence regarding these potentials and keta-
mine clouds the picture. Ketamine produces significant amplitude
reductions in one of the most important sources of the N400, the
antero-medial temporal lobe (AMTL) generator (Grunwald et al.
1999). Thus, the N400 findings are consistent with P&S’s notion
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of an NMDA-dependent relationship between cognitive disorga-
nization in schizophrenia and contextual coordination. However,
ketamine does not alter the AMTL generator of the P600 (Grun-
wald et al. 1999). Thus, context functions related to the inhibition
of mental representations (i.e., N400) are impaired in schizo-
phrenia, and associated with ketamine-induced MNDA/gluta-
mate system damage. In contrast, context functions related to
episodic memory formation and binding (i.e., P600), although im-
paired in schizophrenia, may not be associated with ketamine in-
duced NMDA/glutamate system damage.
Recommendations. Although the studies reviewed here are
preliminary, we hope they serve as examples of why pathophysio-
logical models of schizophrenia should move beyond overly in-
clusive views of context and context-mediated effects, however
tempting they may be. Only by decomposing the specific neu-
rocognitive processes involved in any one “context” task, as well as
understanding the interrelationships between critical processes
involved across tasks, will the precise relationship(s) emerge be-
tween cellular and higher-level cognitive mechanisms that pro-
duce the intriguing pattern of cellular and cognitive deficits found
in schizophrenia. Given the computational sophistication of P&S’s
contextual coordination approach, we hope they continue to pur-
sue more precise linkages between specific context functions,
NMDA/glutamate system function, and cognitive processing ab-
normalities in schizophrenia.
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Abstract: Phillips & Silverstein’s focus on schizophrenia as a failure of
“cognitive coordination” is welcome. They note that a simple hypothesis
of reduced Gamma synchronisation subserving impaired coordination
does not fully account for recent observations. We suggest that schizo-
phrenia reflects a dynamic compensation to a core deficit of coordination,
expressed either as hyper- or hyposynchronisation, with neurotransmitter
systems and arousal as modulatory mechanisms.
Phillips & Silverstein (P&S) present a welcome focus on large-scale
coordinating mechanisms, as a complement to spatially localised
brain functions. From this perspective, schizophrenia deficits in
cognitive coordination stem primarily from reduced NMDA activ-
ity. The focus on NMDA-hypofunction suggests an associated em-
phasis on reduced coordination. It is noted that high frequency (40-
Hz) Gamma activity is related to NMDA-receptor activity, as well
as to dynamic organisation and coordination. From this context, the
authors present the logical first-pass hypothesis that Gamma activ-
ity will be reduced in schizophrenia. Although they cite core sup-
porting studies, P&S also point to observations of abnormally en-
hanced Gamma activity that suggest a more complex hypothesis.
We have recently reported a series of studies on Gamma activ-
ity in schizophrenia (for a review, see Lee et al. 2003b), examin-
ing both Gamma power and Gamma phase synchrony. While we
observed a consistent reduction in Gamma activity in groups of
both chronic and first-episode subjects, a more specific pattern of
abnormalities has emerged in relation to distinct syndromes. Dis-
organisation is associated with the most disturbed profile of
Gamma activity across task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli. It
is associated with widespread increases in synchrony for task-rel-
evant stimuli (Lee et al. 2003c). By contrast, Disorganisation is
associated with a reduction in Gamma power frontally for task-
irrelevant stimuli (Gordon et al. 2001). An opposing and more spa-
tially localised pattern has been revealed for Psychomotor Poverty
(primarily left hemisphere hypofunction) and Reality Distortion
(primarily right hemisphere hyper-function) in relation to both
Gamma synchrony and Gamma power (Gordon et al. 2001; Lee
et al. 2003c).
We suggest that the widespread enhancement of Gamma syn-
chrony with Disorganisation is synonymous with the authors’ ob-
servation that disturbances in perceptual organisation (reflecting
a failure of cognitive ‘binding’) increase specifically with severity
of Disorganisation. The target article does not present specific
predictions concerning the other syndromes. We speculate that
Psychomotor Poverty and Reality Distortion might represent an
attempt to compensate for a core deficit in synchronisation asso-
ciated with the clinical syndrome of Disorganisation, in terms of
either under or over-binding of stimuli. By contrast, Disorganisa-
tion might reflect a fundamental inability to locate a state of com-
pensation and is therefore expressed as the most disrupted pattern
of binding, to both task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli. From
this view, the “compensatory” syndromes may be conceptualised
in terms of “hyposynchronisation” (distinct reduction in binding
and information processing shut-down associated with Psy-
chomotor Poverty) or “hypersynchronisation” (abnormal increase
in binding and over-processing associated with Reality Distor-
tion). This speculation is consistent with functional disconnection
models of schizophrenia which associate positive schizophrenia
symptoms with “hyperconnectivity” and negative symptoms with
“hypoconnectivity.”
Is such a dynamical compensation view compatible with the
NMDA-hypofunction model? We propose a number of interact-
ing mechanisms, consistent with the authors’ suggestion that the
consequences of both direct and indirect neurotransmitter func-
tion may produce the diversity of schizophrenia symptoms.
NMDA-hypofunction could account for general hypersynchroni-
sation in Disorganisation, via the effects of glutamatergic activity
which has a widespread cerebral distribution (Javoy-Agid et al.
1989). The authors note that NMDA-antagonists such as keta-
mine have been shown to produce Disorganisation in a dose-de-
pendent manner. Ketamine also produces excessive glutamatergic
activity, which in turn leads to enhanced synchronous Gamma ac-
tivity. Enhanced dopamine activity (associated more closely with
Reality Distortion (Oades et al. 1994) has also been related to ex-
cessive Gamma activity. Dopaminergic effects appear to be more
regionally localised than NMDA-glutamatergic effects, and mod-
ulate task-relevant selective attention in particular, consistent with
the regionally localised and task-related hypersynchronisation in
Reality Distortion (Ahveninen et al. 2000). By contrast, we spec-
ulate that hyposynchronisation in Psychomotor Poverty may re-
flect cholinergic activity, given that anticholinergic agents produce
a reduction in Gamma activity, and that clozapine (antipsychotic
medication that is a partial cholinergic agonist) improves cogni-
tive deficits that are most apparent in this syndrome (Allen et al.
1993). Bearing in mind the complexity of receptor subtypes, these
speculations raise the possibility that abnormal regulation of
dopamine or cholinergic activity may represent longer time-scale
neuromodulatory attempts to cope with a Disorganisation-related
deficit in NMDA activity.
In addition, we suggest that arousal may act as a dynamic regu-
lator of the interactions between these neurochemical effects and
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cognitive coordination. It has been demonstrated that the rela-
tionship between synchronous Gamma activity and cognitive co-
ordination is modulated by phasic arousal of specific cortical re-
gions (Sheer 1984). Grossberg (1984) argued that psychosis can
be conceptualised as the expression of an opponent process in
which arousal is gated by slowly accumulating neurotransmitters.
In this case the inverted-U properties of under- and overarousal
may be represented clinically as the compensatory syndromes of
Psychomotor Poverty (hyposynchronisation, decreased choliner-
gic modulation) and reality distortion (hypersynchronisation, in-
creased dopamine modulation) syndromes, respectively. P&S sug-
gest that computational modeling provides an important way
forward in elucidating interactions of NMDA activity with other
neurotransmitter systems. A numerical simulation of whole-brain
neurophysiology developed by our group has demonstrated that
enhanced Gamma activity emerges from an increase of gain-re-
lated parameters of the thalamo-cortical feedback loop and asso-
ciated cortical arousal (Rennie et al. 2000). The reliance of this ap-
proach on physiological parameters offers a quantitative means to
examine neurotransmitter function in relation to synchronous
brain activity.
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Abstract: The additional arguments and evidence supplied by the
commentaries strengthen the hypothesis that underactivity of
NMDA receptors produces impaired cognitive coordination in
schizophrenia. This encourages the hope that though the distance
from molecules to mind is great, it can nevertheless be traversed.
We therefore predict that in this decade or the next molecular psy-
chology will be seen to be as fundamental to our understanding of
mind as molecular biology is to our understanding of life.
R1. Introduction
The commentaries raise many relevant issues, provide new
and important evidence, and offer many valuable insights.
The range of disciplines from which the commentators
come is a testament to the generality of the issues discussed.
Overall, we see them as supporting the general perspective
proposed, but asking for further clarification, detail, and ev-
idence. We strongly agree this is needed, as we see cogni-
tive coordination, its neural bases, and their malfunctions,
not as a small and well-known territory, but as a vast conti-
nent that remains largely unexplored.
Section R2 discusses comments concerning the under-
lying conceptual framework. Sections R3 to R8 discuss cog-
nitive coordination, and its relation to other aspects of schiz-
ophrenia; R9 discusses NMDA hypofunction; R10 discusses
the relevance of high-frequency rhythms; R11 discusses the
role of computational theory and computational models. Fi-
nally, section R12 discusses implications for treatment.
R2. The basic conceptual framework
R2.1. Terminology
“Cognitive coordination” refers to the family of interactions
that modify neuronal signals without changing what they
mean. “Meaning” refers to features detected within per-
ceptual systems, to particular movements within motor sys-
tems, and to the semantic contents of thoughts, plans, and
memories. We assume that interactions that change the
time at which signals occur do not change their meaning.
Dysfunctions of timing as discussed by Condray & Stein-
hauer are therefore prima facie examples of a disorder in
cognitive coordination. Similarly, interactions that affect
salience by modulating response amplitude do not change
the meaning of the signals that they make more salient. This
conception is expressed formally using information theory
as cited in the target article. As Grossberg clearly saw, we
emphasise two distinct but interdependent classes of cog-
nitive coordination, that is, contextual disambiguation and
dynamic grouping. “Context” is activity that affects the pro-
cessing of signals without changing what they mean. Infor-
mation theory has been used in psychophysical paradigms
designed to distinguish modulatory interactions from those
that determine the semantic content of the signals modu-
lated (Phillips 2001; Phillips & Craven 2000). This is one way
of clarifying the core construct of cognitive coordination as
requested by MacDonald. In the psychophysical experi-
ments of Phillips and Craven (2000) evidence for driving in-
teractions was easier to find than evidence for coordinating
interactions. This should alleviate MacDonald’s concern
that coordination may be so ubiquitous that it is difficult to
test. The central point here is that coordination is identified
with interactions between variables, not with tasks as a
whole. The importance of such “process-oriented” ap-
proaches to the study of cognition and its dysfunctions is
discussed in detail by Knight and Silverstein (2001).
We therefore assume that “amplification” and “attenua-
tion” must be distinguished from “excitation” and “inhibi-
tion.” The former are conditional upon the latter because
the latter determine whether there is something to be mod-
ulated. Though obvious to many, this distinction is often
overlooked.
“Grouping” is the specification of a subset of signals on
which to perform some operation. “Prespecified grouping”
is that which is specified without knowing the realized val-
ues of the variables grouped. In perceptual systems it de-
termines the features to which cells are sensitive. “Dynamic
grouping” is that which can be specified only after the real-
ized values are known, that is, after the stimulus has been
received in perceptual systems (Watt & Phillips 2000). “Dy-
namically embedded grouping” specifies groups within
groups, that is, embedded levels of grouping where the em-
bedding cannot be prespecified. Tagamets & Horwitz ar-
gue that “coordination” refers to sequences of actions, and
should not be used to refer to perceptual organization.
They seem to be in a minority on this, as the other com-
mentators use the term in the way we do.
At the synaptic level, we have used the terms RF (recep-
tive field) and CF (contextual field) to distinguish inputs in-
volved in the two classes of interaction. Local processors
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transmit information about RF inputs whether there is CF
input or not. Much less information is transmitted about
CF inputs, and that is conditional upon the RF input.
Bressler, Talamini, Meeter & Murre (henceforth Ta-
lamini et al.), and Titone & Debruille all show that our
use of this terminology can be misleading. The classical RF
was originally defined as the regions in distal visual space
within which small spots of light increased or decreased 
cellular activity. This notion has since undergone several 
revisions, including generalization to meaning whatever
features a cell detects. We further generalized this termi-
nology, using it to refer to whatever it is that cells transmit
information about, contrasting that with contextual inputs.
To some commentators, the origin of the term RF within
the study of perceptual systems carries the connotation of
a concrete reference to present stimulation. As what we in-
tend is more general, some other terminology might be bet-
ter. Roelfsema & Supèr contrast “driving” with contextual
or modulatory connections. As that might be a better ter-
minology, we use it below.
Roelfsema & Supèr suggest that hallucinations may re-
sult from too much contextual modulation, rather than too
little. They may be right, but there is another alternative.
The distinction that we make between driving and modula-
tory connections is an idealized dichotomy. We assume that,
in reality, synaptic connections between cells can be a com-
bination of both, with the balance varying across cells. The
co-localization of NMDA and non-NMDA receptors is
anatomical evidence for this assumption. This balance can
also vary dynamically. If cells have low activity for a long
time, for example, as a consequence of NMDA hypofunc-
tion, then the balance of their inputs can shift such that they
become more driving (Das & Gilbert 1995), thus restoring
some functionality to the cell. So, even if hallucinations do
arise from increased feedback, as Roelfsema & Supèr sug-
gest, then that could be due to the feedback’s becoming in-
creasingly driving, as a consequence of NMDA hypofunc-
tion, rather than through an increase in the activity of
NMDA channels.
These arguments for generality do not imply that all cor-
tical interactions are coordinating as Bressler suggests.
Many interactions are driving and determine the semantic
content of signals. This is particularly obvious in perceptual
systems, where the features detected at each level of the hi-
erarchy depend upon how they are driven by input from
lower levels. Similarly, PFC and basal ganglia (Goldman-
Rakic et al. 2000) are composed of multiple parallel streams
of processing, each dealing with information about differ-
ent things but interacting at each stage of processing. This
suggests that processing from one stage to the next within
streams depends upon driving connections, and interac-
tions between streams on contextual connections.
R2.2. Is cognitive coordination relevant to higher
cognitive functions as well as to perception?
Ginsberg questions the generalization of cognitive coordi-
nation to language perception and production. Talamini et
al. suggest that it may be more fruitful to limit the concept
of contextual modulation to sensory tasks. Titone & De-
bruille note that the notion of a receptive field is unclear
outside of perception, and emphasize the need to avoid
over-inclusive notions of “context.”
Suggestions that we should limit the notion of cognitive co-
ordination to basic perceptual functions are understandable
given the origin of the concept of a receptive field within
studies of perception. Nevertheless, we see cognitive coordi-
nation as even more relevant to higher cognitive functions.
Contextual disambiguation and dynamic grouping are more
relevant to higher functions, not less.1 NMDA receptors are
more dense in higher cortical regions, not less. Higher func-
tions are more impaired in psychoses, not less. Our empha-
sis on perceptual processes therefore makes the case in a
functional domain where, prima facie, it is less likely.
Anatomical, physiological, and psychological evidence
for cognitive coordination as a theme common to cortical
activity as a whole was reviewed in detail by Phillips and
Singer (1997a). In addition, there are general arguments
suggesting that diverse cortical activities should not be in-
dependent, but coordinated. Coordination is necessary to
acquire and use knowledge of predictive relationships, to
select activity relevant to the current context, to combat
noise, to make coherent choices, and to organize activity
into coherent subsets. This applies to cognition in general,
not just to perception.
R2.3. Are there different varieties of cognitive
coordination?
Hemsley shows clearly that forms of context may differ in
various ways: temporal versus spatial; inhibitory versus fa-
cilitatory; tonic versus phasic; and contextual priming ver-
sus top-down executive control. Javitt distinguishes be-
tween NMDAR-dependent and NMDAR-independent
forms of cognitive coordination. Titone & Debruille dis-
tinguish between facilitatory and inhibitory contextual ef-
fects, and between contextual encoding (as reflected by
N400) and episodic binding (as reflected by P600). An ob-
vious way to distinguish contextual effects is by the domain
to which they apply. Chen relates them to integration across
space; Titone & Debruille and Condray & Steinhauer
to language; Raffone, Murre & Wolters (henceforth Raf-
fone et al.) to working memory, and Leiser & Bonshtein
to theory-of-mind. Park, Lee, Folley & Kim (henceforth
Park et al.) distinguish between perceptual context (unat-
tended aspects of the target, and surrounding items in space
and time), cognitive context (long term memory [LTM] and
task-relevant information in working memory [WM]), and
socio-affective context. Grossberg distinguishes between
coordination within the “what” and “where” streams. Last,
but not least, Sass & Uhlhaas argue for forms of context
that are relevant to phenomenology.
All of these distinctions may be important. Emphasis
upon a general theme in no way implies the absence of vari-
ations. Themes and variations are ubiquitous throughout
biology. Indeed it is because we think that there are so many
variations to be discovered that we see cognitive coordina-
tion, not as something simple, but as a continent to explore.
MacDonald views our perspective as denying the im-
portance of the distinction between “top-down” and “bot-
tom-up” coordination. Not so. We do not claim that the
same lesion produces deficits in both, but that both may be
affected by the same kind of dysfunction. NMDA receptors
are involved in both kinds of interaction, but they depend
upon different neural pathways and different synapses. Dys-
functions affecting one sub-set but not the other are possi-
ble, particularly if they use different sub-types of NMDA re-
ceptor.2
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R3. Is cognitive coordination impaired in
schizophrenia?
There was general agreement among commentators that
the data on perceptual organization impairments in schizo-
phrenia are evidence of a failure of coordinating mecha-
nisms. However, Chen finds these results inconclusive, and
the evidence for an impairment inconsistent. Park et al.
note that whether or not a context-processing deficit is
demonstrated in the laboratory may depend on a number
of factors. Hemsley and Park et al. point out that there are
a number of forms of context processing and that there may
not be a unitary form of context processing deficit. Con-
dray & Steinhauer raise the issue of whether a timing
mechanism needs to be added to the processes we de-
scribed in order to account for language processing impair-
ments in schizophrenia. Titone & Debruille question
whether the view of cognitive coordination we propose is
relevant to language processing. Javitt highlights the com-
patibility of data on the mismatch negativity (MMN) com-
ponent of the event-related potential as a form of cognitive
coordination, and stresses the importance of NMDA re-
ceptor hypofunction in accounting for its impairment in
schizophrenia. Raffone et al. highlight the importance of
coordinating mechanisms for visual working memory.
Leiser & Bonshtein suggest that data on Theory of Mind
(ToM) task performance in schizophrenia is consistent with
our view. These comments raise several important issues.
R3.1. Is perceptual organization impaired in
schizophrenia?
Chen offers a misleading picture of perceptual organiza-
tion in schizophrenia. While he is technically correct that
some studies demonstrate abnormalities and some do not,
these differences are easily reconciled within a meaningful
framework. As we have noted (in the target article, and in
Knight & Silverstein 1998 and Silverstein et al. 2000), all
studies in which strong top-down input was required for
perceptual grouping to occur have found that schizophre-
nia patients demonstrated impairments (e.g., Silverstein et
al. 1996a; 1996b; 1998a). In contrast, when the stimuli to be
processed consisted of closed, geometric forms consisting
of visual primitives (e.g., Chey & Holzman 1997; Knight &
Silverstein 1998), or even when these forms consist of non-
contiguous elements but the overall shape was a “good
form” (Silverstein et al. 1998a; 1998b), patients performed
relatively normally. We view these and similar results as in-
dicating that, when processing mainly relies on prespecified
feature hierarchies, patients perform relatively normally,
whereas when dynamic grouping is involved, performance
deteriorates. As a whole then, the data on perceptual group-
ing are highly consistent with our view.
R3.2. Which cognitive impairments can be usefully
conceptualized as being failures of cognitive
coordination?
Hemsley and Park et al. both point out the different
forms of context processing that have been described in the
literature. We believe that despite the outward differences,
there are common mechanisms subserving these different
forms of context processing. We have argued, for example,
that spatial context and temporal context effects are medi-
ated via similar mechanisms3, and it is not unreasonable to
suppose that context defined by information in WM over-
laps with aspects of task or environment context during task
performance. It is clear that further work is needed to de-
termine the nature of the relationships, if any, between
these forms of context processing. We consider it unlikely,
however, that each involves a modulatory mechanism that
is independent of the other; and so we again note the util-
ity of an approach to viewing context that begins by distin-
guishing between driving input and target stimuli, on the
one hand, and modulatory input that modifies the timing,
salience, and/or perceived behavioral significance of stim-
uli, on the other.
Difficulties are necessarily encountered when trying to
formulate a theory that encompasses functions as diverse as
perception and language. Our use of the RF-CF distinction
clearly reveals our predisposition to think in terms of per-
ception, and Condray & Steinhauer and Titone & De-
bruille raise the issue of the appropriateness of our view
for understanding language processing. Rather than begin-
ning by trying to find a definition for context processing that
fits the terminology used to study language (as implied by
Titone & Debruille), we think it is useful to begin with the
converging evidence that impairments in perceptual orga-
nization and other forms of context processing have been
consistently linked to disorganized thinking and speech in
schizophrenia patients (e.g., Barch et al. 1999; Izawa & Ya-
mamoto 2002; Knight & Silverstein 1998; Kuperberg et al.
1998; Silverstein et al. 1998a; 2000). While this suggests the
possibility of a common mechanism, it does not prove one.
However, other evidence also suggests a link might be pos-
sible. Condray & Steinhauer suggest that oscillatory activ-
ity within the gamma range, which we propose reflects the
forms of cognitive coordination we discuss, is also involved
in binding information during semantic memory formation
and lexical access. This suggests that similar neurophysio-
logical mechanisms may underlie both spatial and tempo-
ral integration.
Condray & Steinhauer mention the importance of a
timing mechanism in language processing. We note in the
target article that subcortical structures such as the thala-
mus and basal ganglia may provide such a timing function,
and that they may be important in coordinating cognitive
activity. Evidence in support of this comes from findings of
abnormalities in NMDA receptor subunit expression in the
thalamus and hippocampus among schizophrenia patients
(Gao et al. 2000; Ibrahim et al. 2000; Smith et al. 2001).
Finally, the recently proposed Oscillator-based Associa-
tive Recall model of Brown et al. (2000) provides a nice ex-
ample of how oscillatory and timing activities can be inte-
grated, and how dynamic context-based models (involving
internal context-states and precise timing functions) can be
applied to a wide range of phenomena, including percep-
tion, short-term memory, and speech production.4
Just as our effort to include language processing abnor-
malities in schizophrenia under the heading of cognitive co-
ordination failures met with some questions, our efforts to
apply the concept of cognitive coordination beyond visual
perception into memory, working memory-based context
processing, and sensory gating phenomena also met with
calls for accommodation. A separate discussion of MMN,
PPI (prepulse inhibition), P50, and inhibition can be found
in section R4. Here, we consider the question of whether
context defined by task information held in working mem-
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ory should be included within our view of cognitive coordi-
nation.
We agree with MacDonald’s call for evidence regarding
the covariance of performance on tasks involving context as
defined by Cohen and colleagues (Cohen & Servan-
Schreiber 1992; MacDonald et al. 2003: Servan-Schreiber
et al. 1996), and context as we define it. We are currently
collecting such data. Other evidence already suggests that
common mechanisms are operative. For example, as Javitt
notes in his commentary, ketamine produces impairments
on both the (pre-attentive) MMN and (post-attentive, WM
based) AX-CPT paradigms. Also, Desimone and colleagues
have demonstrated that attentional (top-down) and stimu-
lus driven (bottom-up) effects in V4 operate via similar
mechanisms (e.g., Reynolds & Desimone 2003; see also
sect. 2.1 in target article).
While we await further evidence on this issue, we raise
the question: Does available evidence justify limiting the
conception of context to one involving information held in
working memory, or does it suggest that a broader defini-
tion of context is more appropriate? We do not see any a pri-
ori reason to limit the definition of context to information
held in working memory. Common sense dictates that con-
text can be defined using multiple criteria, while still hav-
ing the same modulatory effects, and this was noted by
Hemsley and Park et al. Furthermore, our theory pre-
dicts the findings from WM-based tasks, whereas the WM
memory model of Cohen and Servan-Schreiber cannot ac-
count for the perceptual grouping effects we describe.
Moreover, we demonstrated in the target article how our
theory of reduced cognitive coordination in schizophrenia
can account for a range of phenomena, including percep-
tual organization deficits and disorganized symptoms. In
contrast, the Cohen and Servan-Schreiber model initially
predicted (based on the assumption of reduced PFC
dopamine) a relationship between their context processing
deficits and negative symptoms, but data from subsequent
studies indicated a relationship instead with disorganized
symptoms, as we would have predicted. We see the consis-
tent findings of relationships between disorganized symp-
toms and performance on diverse tasks, which we view as
exemplifying cognitive coordination (e.g., perceptual orga-
nization, lexical disambiguation, working memory-based
sustained attention, etc.), as strong evidence for the view we
propose. If the definition of context processing is to be lim-
ited only to one involving working memory (i.e., temporal
context), then any model based on this theory would have
to account for the relationships between disorganized
symptoms and the other types of task performance which
we consider to involve context processing. Such a model
would also have to address the views of Park et al., and
Hemsley, as well as others in field of cognitive neuroscience
(e.g., Gilbert et al. 2000; Raizada & Grossberg 2001), who
clearly see context as involving more than working memory.
Finally, recent evidence demonstrates a bridge between
views of context defined by temporal or spatial information.
Izawa and Yamamoto (2002) demonstrated a perceptual or-
ganization deficit in schizophrenia patients using a task that
involved sequential perception of stimulus fragments. In
this task, which required integration over both space and
time, performance was, as in past studies of perceptual or-
ganization, related primarily to the level of disorganized
symptoms. In the Silverstein et al. (1998a) study, perfor-
mance involved an evolving recognition of which rapidly
presented dot patterns were repeating and which were new.
In that study, schizophrenic performance differed from
controls both in terms of their ability to benefit from stim-
ulus repetition (presumably reflecting the strength of the
memory representation) and their ability to rapidly recog-
nize repeating stimuli with weak configural properties (sug-
gesting a need for greater exposure to such stimuli before a
WM representation that can guide task performance is de-
veloped). Also in that study, degree of memory representa-
tion formation for nonconfigural stimuli over time was re-
lated primarily to disorganized symptoms. These data
suggest, at least, that when perceptual organization is eval-
uated using both temporal and spatial manipulations, the
results are similar to those found in studies using only spa-
tial context. These results are consistent with the commen-
tary of Raffone et al., who point to the importance of
NMDA receptor mediated coordination in short term
memory, and with findings that perceptual organization
deficits and short-term visual memory deficits are found
among the same subtype of schizophrenia patient (Knight
1984; Knight & Silverstein 1998). On balance then, we
would say that the evidence favors a more inclusive view of
context processing.
R3.3. Is the hypothesis of impaired cognitive
coordination relevant for understanding theory of
mind deficits in schizophrenia?
We agree with Leiser & Bonshtein that ToM may be rel-
evant to our theory of cognitive coordination failure in
schizophrenia, in that ToM requires the ability to coordi-
nate several pieces of information at once. Other evidence
in support of this position comes from experimental work
in autism, where weak central coherence has been associ-
ated with poor ToM performance (Jarrold et al. 2000). Jar-
rold et al. postulate that ToM is a high level manifestation
of central coherence, the latter being a concept that has sig-
nificant overlap with cognitive coordination, but without
specification at the computational or neurobiological levels.
Jarrold et al.’s view is similar to that of Sarfati et al. (1997),
who conceptualized ToM impairment in schizophrenia as
being due to a failure to process context, and linked ToM
deficits to disorganized symptoms, as our theory would pre-
dict (Sarfati et al. 1997). Data we have collected also sup-
port a link between ToM deficits and cognitive coordination
failures. For example, Schenkel et al. (2001) observed a
2.59 correlation between ToM performance (i.e., scores on
Corcoran et al.’s [1995] Hinting Task) and the Cognitive/
Disorganization factor of the Positive and Negative Syn-
drome Scale (PANSS).
More recently, we observed correlations between Hint-
ing Task scores and Spaulding et al.’s (1999) Brief Psychi-
atric Rating Scale (BPRS) Psychotic Disorganization factor
among long-hospital-stay schizophrenia spectrum patients
(N 5 40, r 5 2.31, p 5 .05) and among a mixed group of
inpatient and outpatients with schizophrenia (N 5 36, r 5
2.73, p , .001). Also, scores on the Hinting Task correlated
.36 (p , .05) with contour integration test (Silverstein et al.
2000) scores among the long-stay group (Schenkel et al.
2001), and .31 (p 5 .08) among the mixed group. Among
the mixed group of patients, BPRS Psychotic Disorganiza-
tion scores correlated significantly with poor premorbid so-
cial functioning, linguistic context processing, and contour
integration performance (Schenkel & Spaulding 2002). Fi-
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nally, Uhlhaas (2003) found that schizophrenia or schizo-
affective disorder patients with disorganized symptoms
performed more poorly on ToM tasks, and better on a vi-
sual context processing task where intact context process-
ing hinders about target stimuli, compared to patients with-
out disorganized features. We view all of these data as
consistent with Leiser & Bonshtein’s suggestion that ToM
is a form of cognitive coordination.
R3.4. Cognitive coordination impairments and the
symptoms of schizophrenia
No discussion of the question of whether cognitive coordi-
nation is impaired in schizophrenia would be complete
without a discussion of symptomatology. In general, there
was little discussion of our view, and data, indicating that
disorganized symptoms represent a “molar” manifestation
of reduced cognitive coordination, exemplified in more
“molecular” form in laboratory demonstrations of dysfunc-
tions of auditory and visual perceptual organization and
other forms of context processing. Williams, Lee, Haig &
Gordon (Williams et al.) provide EEG evidence consis-
tent with our view, by demonstrating relationships between
gamma frequency abnormalities and disorganization in
schizophrenia. They also go beyond our focus on disorgani-
zation and provide evidence that positive and negative symp-
toms may represent compensatory reactions to impaired
coordinating processes. The whole brain modeling ap-
proach of the Williams group, including simultaneous
recording of EEG, fMRI, cognitive, and arousal indices,
represents a powerful technological advance that can be ap-
plied to testing the issue of the covariance of multiple forms
of disorganization (e.g., cognitive, neurophysiological), in-
cluding symptoms.
R4. Is our perspective relevant to an
understanding of sensory gating,
sensorimotor gating, and inhibition deficits?
Kisley & Davalos question our inclusion of sensorimotor
gating (PPI) and sensory gating (P50) phenomena within
the concept of cognitive coordination, noting that there is
no convincing evidence that either NMDA receptor activ-
ity or gamma frequency oscillations are involved in either.
Gooding & Braun assert that “the cognitive coordination
deficit described by P&S does not adequately capture the
cognitive signature of schizophrenia.” These comments
raise the question of whether we were too inclusive in the
range of phenomena we tried to account for by our theory
of cognitive coordination reduction in schizophrenia.
R4.1. Sensory and sensorimotor gating
A number of studies have indicated that NMDA antago-
nists disrupt sensorimotor gating (PPI) in rats (see Geyer et
al. 2001 for a review). However, van Berckel et al. (1998),
Duncan et al. (2001), and Oranje et al. (2002), using vari-
ous stimulus parameters and different doses of ketamine,
did not find any effects on PPI in humans. The data on sen-
sory gating (P50 suppression) are also mixed. As noted by
Kisley & Davalos, while early evidence suggested a link
between reduced gamma activity and P50 deficits in schiz-
ophrenia, more recent work has suggested a greater role for
lower frequency cortical rhythms in the generation of the nor-
mal P50 suppression effect. In addition, gamma activity in re-
sponse to the conditioning stimulus appears to expire prior to
onset of the test stimulus, making it difficult to see how it
could be involved in coordinating the within-pair activity.
Our theory is not wedded to gamma oscillations, how-
ever. As we noted in section 5 of the target article, lower fre-
quency rhythms may also be relevant. Van Berckel et al.
(1998) and Oranje et al. (2002) indicate that ketamine does
affect P50 suppression in humans, but that it does so by re-
ducing responsivity to the conditioning stimulus, without
having a significant effect on the test stimulus. These data
suggest that sensory and sensorimotor gating phenomena
may not involve the type of NMDA receptor mediated co-
ordinating mechanisms we discuss. A critical question,
then, is whether these phenomena involve coordinating
mechanisms that are different from those we discuss, or
whether they should more correctly be viewed as not in-
volving coordinating mechanisms. Recent evidence calls
into question whether P50 suppression involves coordina-
tion. For example, Blumenfeld and Clementz (2001) and
Clementz and Blumenfeld (2001) found that the smaller
P50 conditioning-test stimuli ratios in schizophrenia were
due to smaller than normal responses to the conditioning
(first) stimulus. They suggested that these data were incon-
sistent with the concept of “poor suppression.” Perhaps
then, what has been called a P50 suppression abnormality
involves not coordination between two paired stimuli, but
alterations in a more basic aspect of processing sensory
driving input (that is affected similarly by ketamine and
schizophrenia). Interestingly, recent evidence also indi-
cates that in healthy adults, responses to the test (second)
stimulus can be altered by expectancy and attentional (top-
down effects) (Clementz et al. 2002). This further calls into
question the idea that P50 suppression reflects a preatten-
tive sensory gating mechanism. In short, newer studies sug-
gest that P50 suppression may not be an example of cogni-
tive coordination, and therefore, in future work this
phenomenon may be best conceptualized from within a dif-
ferent perspective. The situation regarding PPI is less clear.
It must be kept in mind, however, that all of the PPI stud-
ies cited examined acute effects of ketamine. The long-
term effects of NMDA receptor hypofunction on PPI still
need to be explored.
The evidence for NMDA effects on MMN is much
stronger, and is cited in the target article. A recent study
supports our view that MMN is a strong example of cogni-
tive coordination. Umbricht et al. (2003) demonstrated
that, whereas the serotonin agonist psilocybin disrupted
AX-CPT performance in healthy adults, it did not alter
MMN activity. Taken in combination with their earlier
demonstration that ketamine disrupts performance on both
tasks (and that schizophrenia patients perform abnormally
on both), Umbricht et al. concluded that whereas impaired
AX-CPT performance may result from secondary pharma-
cological effects shared by both psilocybin and ketamine,5
deficient MMN generation in schizophrenia may be a rela-
tively distinct manifestation of NMDA receptor hypofunc-
tion (see also commentary by Javitt for further supporting
evidence).
Perhaps the simplest conclusion that can be reached re-
garding these data is that not all forms of cognitive coordi-
nation involve the cognitive and/or neurophysiological
mechanisms we discuss. This is consistent with Javitt’s con-
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clusion that, while some forms of coordination rely primar-
ily on NMDA receptor activity, others do not. This conclu-
sion raises the following important questions: (1) Is there
more than one form of cognitive coordination, and if so,
how they are they similar, how do they differ, and to what
extent are they independent of each other? and (2) how will
the answers to these questions inform our understanding of
schizophrenia?
R4.2. Inhibition
Regarding the general issue of inhibition, which Gooding
& Braun state our theory cannot accommodate, available
evidence indicates that the neurophysiological mechanisms
we discuss can account for both coordinating and inhibitory
effects. One reason for this is that NMDA receptors are in-
volved in projections onto inhibitory neurons, and have
strong effects there. For example, NMDA receptors in-
volved in projections onto GABAergic (inhibitory) in-
terneurons are 10-times more sensitive to blockade by
NMDA antagonists than are NMDA receptors involved in
projections to excitatory neurons (McCarley et al. 1996). A
result of reduced NMDA receptor activity is thus reduced
inhibition. A consequence of reduced NMDA activity on
inhibitory interneurons is a reduction in synchronized
gamma activity (Kwon et al. 1999), which we hypothesize
to be involved in cognitive coordination. Gamma range ac-
tivity has been implicated in a number of tasks of percep-
tual organization (Keil et al. 1999; Lutz 2002) and in other
forms of stimulus integration that we believe operate via the
cognitive coordination mechanisms we outlined. Further-
more, in post-mortem studies of schizophrenia patients, 
elevated levels of N-acetyl-aspartyl-glutamate have been
observed, and this compound has been observed to prefer-
entially block NMDA receptors mediating excitatory input
on inhibitory interneurons (Tsai et al. 1995). Thus, a num-
ber of sources of evidence converge to suggest that failures
in the neurophysiology underlying coordinating activity
(e.g., NMDA receptor activity) can produce reductions in
gamma synchrony and inhibition.
We also wish to note that a predicted result of reduced
synchronization is the relative weakening of the salience of
what should normally be considered “figure” and the sub-
sequent relative increase in “ground” elements (or ele-
ments from what Sass & Uhlhaas, following Gurwitsch,
call the margin) in consciousness. Thus, reduced inhibition
may be a secondary effect of the lack of a clearly defined fo-
cus on conscious awareness. As noted by Hemsley, abnor-
malities in inhibition and facilitation have been found in
schizophrenia, suggesting that both impairments may re-
flect abnormal modulatory activity.
Contrary to the claim by Gooding & Braun then, our
theory can accommodate evidence of inhibitory failures in
schizophrenia. That said, an important area for future ef-
forts will be to extend our theory to account more specifi-
cally for the types of inhibitory failures seen among schizo-
phrenia patients in laboratory tasks and during everyday
behavior. Just as paradigms that would seem to involve sim-
ilar mechanisms may not do so (e.g., MMN and P50), there
may be forms of inhibitory failure in schizophrenia that do
not involve the coordinating mechanisms we discuss, and
clarification of this will help improve our theory as well as
other theories of schizophrenia.
Finally, an important consideration for theory develop-
ment is the relative specificity of the above phenomena to
schizophrenia. For example, sensory gating deficits have
been observed in mania (Franks et al. 1983), whereas per-
ceptual organization impairments have not been observed
in other psychiatric disorders (and sometimes only infre-
quently among good premorbid schizophrenia patients).
These data add the further consideration to theory devel-
opment that in the search for what is unique about schizo-
phrenia, or about a subtype of this illness, it will be impor-
tant to identify mechanisms that may be associated
generally with psychotic disorders (or mood disorder sub-
types with the potential for psychosis), versus those that are
associated only with schizophrenia, and then to determine
the effects of these multiple abnormalities on the clinical
presentation of schizophrenia.
R5. Can reduced cognitive coordination account
for the emergence of hallucinations and
delusions?
Hallucinations and delusions are two of the most striking
characteristics of schizophrenia, and we are not surprised
that so many commentators raised the issue of how the co-
ordinating mechanisms we discuss might be relevant to
these symptoms. In response to Alpert & Angrist, we note
again that chronic ketamine effects provide a better model
of schizophrenia than acute effects, and auditory hallucina-
tions are common, and more prevalent than visual halluci-
nations, in cases of chronic ketamine administration. These
and similar data have led to widespread agreement on the
utility of the PCP-psychosis model of schizophrenia. Bress-
ler’s suggestion that reduced coordination could lead to
both degradative and illusory phenomena provides a po-
tentially important insight regarding hallucinations that
needs to be followed up in future studies. Anecdotal reports
from patients suggest that Bressler’s hypothesis may also be
relevant for delusion formation, as exemplified in the fol-
lowing statement, cited by Mattusek (1952/1987): “Out of
these perceptions came the absolute awareness that my
ability to see connections had been multiplied many times
over” (p. 96). Such anecdotal reports are consistent with
Hemsley’s position that delusions result from stimuli being
evaluated within inappropriate, often idiosyncratic, internal
contexts.
Hoffman & McGlashan take a different approach on
this issue, noting how reduced connectivity can lead to
“parasitic foci” (Hoffman & McGlashan 1993) or spurious
attractor states wherein hallucinations and delusions form
and become relatively fixed phenomena. Bressler’s and
Hoffman & McGlashan’s varying perspectives highlight the
fact that we are still far from agreement about the cause of
hallucinations. We are encouraged that both views are con-
sistent with the idea of reduced cognitive coordination, and
further tests may clarify processes leading from reduced co-
ordination to the experience of hallucinations. Both of their
views are consistent with recent work of Lutz (2002), who
studied healthy subjects completing an object perception
task, as they moved from states of unreadiness to readiness
(and as their EEG records demonstrated increasing gamma
band synchronization). Lutz hypothesized that, in the rapid
reorganization of mental contents that takes place during
the transition from unreadiness to readiness, elements of
neural networks involved in the contents of the earlier state
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of consciousness could still be resonating and could be re-
enslaved into the newly formed assembly. This is a possible
mechanism for how, among many schizophrenia patients,
where consciousness is not characterized by strong theme-
thematic field links, irrelevant information may become
integrated into ongoing thought and action, in some cases
even in the form of hallucinations.
Grossberg, and Roelfsema & Supèr suggest that hal-
lucinations may result from a deficient coordination of bot-
tom-up and top-down feedback. Their views also highlight
the importance of viewing coordination within the context
of other factors, such as affect, arousal, and significance
evaluation. The EEG findings cited by Titone & De-
Bruille also highlight the need to clarify whether halluci-
nations result from excessive sensory input, or from the
presence of input which is just not normally allowed access
to consciousness, but gains access when conscious aware-
ness is not coherently organized around a specific theme.
Relevant to this issue are comments by Sullivan (1956) that,
while schizophrenia is characterized by an entry into con-
sciousness of material that would normally be excluded, it
is the inclusion of affect laden, “primitive” material that is es-
pecially associated with schizophrenia. This view suggests
that some material is more likely to impinge on conscious-
ness than others, and that it is the nature of the impinging
material that may heighten the state of arousal. This is mere
speculation at present; however, two types of data are con-
sistent with it. First, there are excessively high rates of child
abuse reported in the histories of psychiatric inpatients with
hallucinations (regardless of whether the diagnosis is schizo-
phrenia), and among patients with schizophrenia (Read et al.
2001), suggesting the presence of strong, often dissociated
affect states. Second, there is evidence from the rat literature
that when early development takes place in a deprived envi-
ronment, NMDA receptor expression and, presumably, the
potential for appropriate coordinating activity is reduced
(Liu et al. 2000). One result of developmentally reduced
NMDA receptor expression is reduced sensory input, which,
in humans, is a potential cause of alterations in the balance
of bottom-up and top-down activity. It is thus possible that
under conditions of stress, excessive input from highly affect-
laden memory traces may lead to the emergence of halluci-
nations in a system that is already imbalanced.
Ginsberg stresses the need to account for the co-occur-
rence of disorganization with other syndromes. This is im-
portant because, while factor analytic studies consistently
identify a unique disorganization syndrome, overlap with
other syndromes is not zero, and in some cases, symptoms
load on more than one factor (e.g., hallucinations loading
on both the positive and cognitive/disorganized factors in
Lindenmayer et al. 1994). The discussion above points to
the possibility that certain positive symptoms can be ac-
counted for within the perspective we propose. It is also
possible, however, that symptoms such as hallucinations
and delusions are not primarily examples of reduced coor-
dination, but represent compensatory strategies. Williams
et al.’s data provides support for this position, which is also
consistent with the early work of Bleuler, who viewed hal-
lucinations and delusions as secondary phenomena result-
ing from a core disturbance in loosening of associations (cf.
Bleuler 1911/1961). Related to this question are the unex-
plored issues of whether cognitive coordination ability ex-
ists on a continuum within the general population, and may
therefore be a modifying influence for the development of
schizophrenia (in that, if one has poor coordination and de-
velops schizophrenia, disorganization is prominent), or
whether it is a core aspect of the illness itself.
R6. Is our perspective consistent with
developmental views of schizophrenia?
Gooding & Braun claim that our theory does not pay suf-
ficient attention to factors that lead to the development of
schizophrenia, and write that our perspective “is distinctly
lacking in a behavioral genetics perspective.” Hoffman &
McGlashan note that our focus on context processing im-
pairments is consistent with their data and with computa-
tional models on a neurodevelopmental abnormality involv-
ing excessive synaptic pruning. They also note that the sort
of local-local connectivity loss we describe is most likely to
occur in adolescence, whereas distant connections between
brain regions are less likely to be affected by excessive prun-
ing during adolescence. Condray & Steinhauer agree with
our understanding of schizophrenia as a neurodevelopmen-
tal disorder, and one that may share features with other such
disorders. They suggest that problems during crucial devel-
opmental periods, such as in the migration of cortical neu-
rons during prenatal development, and/or in synaptic prun-
ing during adolescence, may interfere with the development
of synchronization (resonance) during stimulus processing,
and therefore lead to fragmentation in multiple domains.
Below, we address two issues related to the developmental
course of schizophrenia: Onset and course of illness.
R6.1. Onset of illness
We see the hypothesis of a cognitive coordination dysfunc-
tion as entirely consistent with a neurodevelopmental view
of this illness. Several points made in the target article high-
light this view, and are consistent with the observations of
Hoffman & McGlashan and Condray & Steinhauer, in-
cluding: (1) consistent evidence of links between poor cog-
nitive coordination and the poor premorbid subtype of
schizophrenia, suggesting that impaired coordination may
premorbidly manifest itself only in more complex situations
such as social interactions, and then, with further clinical
deterioration, be evident in more basic functions such as
perception, thought, and language; (2) the overlap of our
view with the theory and data of Hoffman & McGlashan,
suggesting the potential involvement of pruning-related
connectivity loss as a potential cause of cognitive coordina-
tion reduction; and (3) the presence of cognitive coordina-
tion failures, including disorganized symptoms, in other
neurodevelopmental disorders, such as autism and some
nonverbal learning disabilities.
A critical question for future research involves whether
changes on laboratory measures of cognitive coordination
precede clinical signs and symptoms, occur simultaneously
with them, or occur later. Data on this issue would allow for
more refined theorizing about how cognitive coordination
failures give rise to psychotic episodes in schizophrenia, and
how and why the severity of these failures waxes and wanes
over time.
Gooding & Braun question the relevance of our hy-
potheses for behavior genetic studies. We find this com-
ment curious, especially in light of the evidence which they
believe meet criteria for a behavior genetics approach (see
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below, next paragraph). Our concept of impaired cognitive
coordination is useful in this regard for several reasons. (1)
It links biology and behavior. (2) It is rooted in much evi-
dence on the neurobiology and cognitive impairments in
schizophrenia. (3) Its most global behavioral manifestation
(i.e., disorganized symptoms) has been found to be highly
heritable in twin studies of schizophrenia (Cardno et al.
2001). (4) Disorganization among high-risk individuals was
found to be one of the few significant predictors of the de-
velopment of diagnosable schizophrenia within a 12-month
period (Yung et al. 2003). (5) Context processing deficits
have been found among unaffected siblings of schizophre-
nia patients (MacDonald et al. 2003). (6) Reduced EEG co-
herence, which was interpreted as reflecting reduced syn-
chronization, has been found among unaffected siblings of
schizophrenia patients (Winterer et al. 2001). (7) Impair-
ments consistent with our view have been linked to a dis-
tinct subtype of schizophrenia (patients with poor premor-
bid social functioning) that is thought to be particularly high
in genetic loading for schizophrenia. (8) Mice that have
been genetically altered to express only 5% of the obliga-
tory NMDAR1 subunit of the NMDA receptor demon-
strate social deficits (Mohn et al. 1999).
Gooding & Braun cite a number of their own studies as
examples of research useful in clarifying the nature of the
development of schizophrenia. These studies are examples
of the psychometric high-risk approach, in which self-
report questionnaires that assess Meehl’s (1962) behavioral
manifestations of schizotypy (thought to reflect the under-
lying neural integrative defect that he called schizotaxia) are
given to young adults (typically college students). High
scorers on these scales are thought to be at high-risk for
schizophrenia, and are studied further by giving them var-
ious tasks to perform to see whether they perform like pa-
tients. There are several problems with this approach. For
example, by defining the state (schizotypy) solely in terms
of behavioral indicators, and neglecting other levels of
analysis in the choice of independent variables, the likeli-
hood of generating enough data to develop a comprehen-
sive theory of schizophrenia is reduced. Stated differently,
although the psychometric high-risk approach grew out of
Meehl’s seminal work, its proponents have done little to
clarify the nature of the neural integrative deficit, instead
focusing on behavioral manifestations of schizotypy and its
correlates. Perhaps this is why, after many years of research,
the evidence indicates that high scorers on the schizotypy
scales rarely progress to develop schizophrenia (Chapman
et al. 1994), that many of the deficits found among high
scorers are not specific to schizophrenia (e.g., in verbal
memory deficits, thought disorder, WCST [Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test] performance, etc.) (Clark et al. 2001), and that
characteristics found among schizophrenia patients are
sometimes not found among high scorers (Silverstein et al.
1992). We believe that any approach that focuses solely on
behavior or symptoms is bound to produce little progress,
in contrast to approaches that can model and integrate phe-
nomena at multiple levels of analysis.
The theory we propose is consistent with the work of
Williams as well as the modeling work of Wright, Edelman,
Grossberg and others, in indicating that the nature of the
hypothesized integrative deficit is amenable to exploration,
and, as noted, above, can be reconciled with developmen-
tal models of schizophrenia. We agree with Gooding &
Braun that it would be useful for researchers working
within the psychometric high-risk approach to examine
NMDA receptor functioning, and related phenomena,
among high scorers on the schizotypy scales. Indeed, re-
duced cognitive coordination, or, as described earlier by
Conrad (1958), a neurophysiological abnormality in “differ-
ential and integral Gestalt functions” (p. 161) is a candidate
mechanism for Meehl’s integrative neural defect (schizo-
taxia). Incorporating these “schizotaxia-close” indicators
into subject selection procedures in schizotypy research
may prove useful. This sort of focused, theory-driven ap-
proach could help increase the yield from schizotypy re-
search by beginning to test some of the core assumptions of
Meehl’s theory of schizotaxia.
It is important to add here that even within a neurode-
velopmental view of schizophrenia, non-genetic factors can
be important. A number of studies indicate that altered de-
velopmental environments can affect expression of NMDA
receptors and increase risk for schizophrenia. Liu et al.
(2000) demonstrated that positive maternal care in rats is
related to increased expression of genes encoding NMDA
receptor subunits, which enhances hippocampal sensitivity
to glutamate as well as hippocampal development. This
suggests that lower than normal maternal or environmental
care may lead to reduced NMDA receptor expression, and
possibly, in humans, to an increased risk for schizophrenia.
In humans, physical and sexual abuse in childhood has been
linked to an increased risk of schizophrenia (Read et al.
2001). While there is not enough evidence at this point to
determine whether adverse environmental experiences
during development are associated with the development
of impaired NMDA receptor expression and cognitive co-
ordination in humans, we suggest that this may be as fruit-
ful an area to explore as that of the behavior genetics of cog-
nitive coordination in schizophrenia.
R6.2. Course of illness after first psychotic episode
Consistent with findings that cognitive coordination is more
related to chronic than acute PCP/ketamine exposure, two
studies indicate that forms of cognitive coordination in
schizophrenia are impaired in chronic, but not first-episode
patients. Salisbury et al. (2002) found this to be true for
MMN, while Parnas et al. (2001) found this to be true for
three visual binding tasks. In contrast, other studies have
found coordination deficits in unaffected relatives (e.g.,
MacDonald et al. 2003), and clinical disorganization can be
detected in high-risk individuals who develop schizophre-
nia within a year (Yung et al. 2003). Other studies have
found coordination deficits to covary with disorganization
among chronic patients (Knight & Silverstein 1998; Silver-
stein et al. 1998a; 2000), and to covary with inpatient ver-
sus outpatient status (Silverstein et al. 1996a). Clarifying
the issue of the relationships between onset of specific co-
ordination deficits, onset and course of clinical features,
and course of the illness thus remains a major unsolved task.
R7. Is our perspective relevant to understanding
the characteristic self-disturbances of
schizophrenia?
Hemsley notes that disturbances in the operation of con-
text have been invoked to explain disruptions in the “sense
of self,” which has been viewed as a core disturbance in
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schizophrenia. However, Sass & Uhlhaas claim that our
view “neglects important aspects of consciousness” and of-
fer insights from phenomenological philosophers that they
believe “may help clarify the subjective dimension” of
schizophrenia, and the role of context in consciousness.
Hemsley’s discussion of Epstein and James echoes Sass
& Uhlhaas’s discussion of Gurwitsch’s (1964) concept of
“the margin.” Each view posits that in schizophrenia, there
is an intrusion into conscious awareness of material that
normally would not be included, leading to a reduced abil-
ity to organize behavior and cognition in terms of a unified
motivational state. These ideas are similar to Sullivan’s (1956)
observation that in schizophrenia there can be an “escape
of attention from its ordinary field,” and a subsequent loss
of control of the contents of consciousness, leading to the
emergence into consciousness of material that is normally
excluded. Sullivan saw this as a factor in the failure of the
self-system in schizophrenia, because such intrusions have
the effect of interfering with a sense of a consistent and co-
herent self from moment to moment. This is similar to
Hemsley’s claim that a failure to integrate sensory input
with memories of similar experiences leads to a disturbed
sense of self.
We are encouraged that a convergence of clinical and
theoretical work suggests that the concept of reduced 
cognitive coordination may be useful in explaining self dis-
turbances in schizophrenia. We also agree with Sass &
Uhlhaas’s implication, however, that a comprehensive the-
ory of schizophrenia needs to be informed by first-person
data, and be able to describe phenomena at the level of sub-
jective experience. In this way, we see a difference between
a disturbed sense of self, as accounted for by a lack of inte-
gration of sensory input with memory, and a disturbed
sense of self as described by a patient actually having the ex-
perience. Ultimately, a strong theory of schizophrenia
should be able to describe the latter type of experience at
the phenomenological level, and account for its underlying
mechanisms.
If our theory is to be relevant for explaining disturbances
of consciousness and self-experience in schizophrenia, it
will have to be refined and extended to demonstrate that
the coordinating mechanisms we discuss are relevant for
these phenomena. The suggestion that it is relevant is con-
sistent with the work of the Gestalt psychologist Köhler
(1947) who noted that the Gestalt laws apply not only to
perception, but to phenomena such as thinking and feeling
as well. Similarly, Conrad (1958) believed that a distur-
bance in integrative gestalt functions, especially involving a
loss of figure-ground distinctions between internally gen-
erated mental events and external input, causes some of the
characteristic experiences of schizophrenia, such as hallu-
cinations, thought disorder and thought broadcasting. More
recently, Lehar (2002; in press) proposed a quantitative
model in which consciousness itself is viewed as a form of
mental representation that involves gestalt properties.
Moreover, the hypothesis that binding processes involving
synchronization are involved in the generation and mainte-
nance of conscious states of awareness has been proposed
(Crick 1994; Varela 1995), and has received experimental
support (Lutz 2002). The importance of this recent work is
that it can account not only for basic perceptual or other
cognitive functions, but for the integrated state of con-
sciousness that is the foundation of conscious and self-
experience. Lehar (in press) notes that the biggest problem
with most contemporary neurophysiological theories of vi-
sion is that they do not go beyond basic feature recognition
to explain the subjective sense of visual consciousness. He
also notes that this is a factor in the relative inattention that
has been given to gestalt phenomena, which requires theo-
ries to go beyond neurophysiological activity in order to ac-
count for the subjective experiences described in the gestalt
“laws.” The recent modeling work of Lehar, Grossberg,
Edelman, and others suggests that it is possible to bridge
the gap between underlying mechanisms and subjective ex-
perience. Therefore, extensions of our theory of cognitive
coordination into the realm of consciousness and its distur-
bances should be possible, and this is exciting territory to
explore.
The relevance of disturbed coordinating processes for
disturbances at the level of the self is supported by evidence
indicating reduced autonoetic awareness in schizophrenia.
In two recent studies of nonverbal (Danion et al. 1999) and
verbal (Tendolkar et al. 2002) memory, it was demonstrated
that schizophrenia patients’ disturbances in memories for
events could be explained as a function of a reduced ability
to integrate recall of events with a subjective sense of hav-
ing experienced those events. Among patients, and in con-
trast to controls, recall was based more on a sense of know-
ing that something occurred, rather than on being able to
generate a recollection that included a sense of self-aware-
ness of having experienced the event.6 In commenting on
the Danion et al. paper, Tien (1999) noted that “events are
located in perceptual space and time, and perhaps a basic
space-time mental framework is needed to index and orga-
nize perceptions as occurring within this framework”
(p. 637). Tien also suggested that an internal time code may
be needed to form associations. This comment suggests
that the sort of timing mechanism that Condray & Stein-
hauer noted is involved in language processing may also be
relevant for binding together elements of consciousness as
a whole.
Sass & Uhlhaas cite the work of Gurwitsch (1964) as an
example of how insights from phenomenology can be ap-
plied to schizophrenia. His concepts of the theme, thematic
field, and margin are indeed useful, as they extend notions
about context and coordination into the realm of everyday
behavior, social cognition, and scene perception. These are
areas where the concept of cognitive coordination has not
yet been explored.
Sass & Uhlhaas note that, in schizophrenia, there is sel-
dom a breakdown of spatial form (the theme), which they
interpret as indicating that it is coordination of the theme
with the thematic field that is impaired in schizophrenia.
According to Sass & Uhlhaas, this “loosening of the per-
ceptual context” from the theme (or main focus of aware-
ness) impairs the appreciation of the relevance of material
in focal awareness. Stated differently, objects and events in
the environment may come to be experienced as if not con-
nected to the intentions, goals, motivations, and affects of
the person doing the experiencing. Data suggesting im-
pairments in the processing of basic gestalt information do
exist, however (e.g., Cox & Leventhal 1978; Place & Gilmore
1980; Silverstein et al. 1996a; 1996b; 1998a; 2000).7 There-
fore, we suggest, using Gurwitsch’s terminology, that disor-
ders of cognitive coordination occur within the theme, as
well as between the theme and thematic field. However, we
also note, in agreement with Sass & Uhlhaas, that Gur-
witsch’s concept of relevancy relationships (characteristic of
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the thematic field), is useful for understanding schizophre-
nia. Phenomenological reports from patients (e.g., Sass
1992) certainly do suggest that the normal contextual rela-
tionships between objects in the environment, and between
a person’s ongoing concerns and the environment, are re-
duced in many people with schizophrenia. To date, while
much attention has been paid to integrative functions in
perception, the topic of connections between aspects of
consciousness has been addressed primarily by phenome-
nological philosophers. If concepts such as relevancy rela-
tionships are to be addressed from a neuroscientific per-
spective, then scientists will have to begin to address issues
such as meaning, intentions, and so on, in their theories of
cognition and consciousness. We view this as an important
direction, and see Sass & Uhlhaas’s focus on disorders of co-
ordination between the theme and thematic field as de-
serving of further study. It points the way to a psychology of
schizophrenia that views cognitive impairments in this ill-
ness as more than merely an isolated dysfunctional circuit
or module. Indeed, their commentary highlights the im-
portance of viewing patients’ cognitive distortions within
the broader context of their experience of the world.
An important issue arising from Sass & Uhlhaas’s com-
mentary involves the methodological approach that would
be used to determine whether disorders of consciousness
fit within our view of cognitive coordination. While it would
certainly be simple enough to determine whether self-frag-
mentation experiences and/or self-environment dissocia-
tion experiences are correlated with biological or laboratory
cognitive evidence of impaired coordination, Lutz (2002)
has noted that such demonstrations cannot satisfactorily ad-
dress the real issue, because this approach has as an implicit
premise the separation of phenomenal description and sci-
entific explanation. Only third person data are collected,
and this approach does not address the phenomenological
claim that experience can be manifested to, or affected by,
itself.
Stated differently, Lutz sees such designs as unable to ac-
count for the emergence of particular phenomenal states
and neurobiological signatures in response to external
events. To do this successfully, he argues that the study de-
sign must be mutually constrained by both phenomenolog-
ical and biological data. As an example of the latter ap-
proach, which he calls generative passages, subjects trained
in reporting phenomenal experiences, using the bracketing
method of Husserl, described their state of consciousness
(e.g., awareness, readiness) prior to each trial in a task in
which random dot stereograms were fused, leading to the
emergence of a 3-D image of a Necker cube (subject de-
scriptions were given after the trial finished). Subject de-
scriptions naturally grouped into three categories, which
were called steady readiness, fragmented readiness, and
unreadiness. ERP data from each trial were analyzed as a
function of these first-person description categories. In this
way, the dynamical neural signature was studied as a func-
tion of the phenomenological reports generated by sub-
jects. The results supported the idea that conscious states
of readiness, or feelings of continuity with the pre-trial 
moment, were associated with early, pre-target-onset syn-
chronization within the gamma band. States of unreadiness
were characterized by no pre-target gamma synchrony, and
a late onset of synchronization, which was interpreted as 
reflecting an initial breakdown of the task-irrelevant state
(accompanied by feelings of discontinuity with the former
moment) and then a late onset re-attunement to the task at
hand. The implication of Lutz’s epistemological argument
and data for our theory is that, in order to approach the type
of phenomenologically-informed theorizing about schizo-
phrenia suggested by Sass & Uhlhaas, it will be necessary
to generate experimental designs that incorporate the con-
scious experience of the subject into the study’s indepen-
dent variables. This is an exciting challenge, but one which
any strong theory of schizophrenia needs to be able to meet.
R8. Cognitive coordination and creativity
Both Hoffman & McGlashan and Park et al. note that
factors affecting cognitive coordination and creativity may
be related. Hoffman & McGlashan note that creativity may
occur at high levels of synaptic pruning, just before the psy-
chotogenic threshold is crossed. Park et al. note that a dis-
order of cognitive coordination would allow for mental con-
tents to be experienced outside of their normal context,
allowing for novel groupings and relationships. If it is true
that reduced connectivity and/or widespread reductions in
cognitive coordination are specific to schizophrenia, and if
the above hypotheses on creativity are valid, then creativity
should be associated with schizophrenia, and this should be
a specific form of creativity that is distinct from what is
found to be associated with other conditions such as de-
pression and bipolar disorder. This is because existing evi-
dence suggests that among psychiatric disorders, reduced
cognitive coordination is relatively specific to schizophre-
nia. Two sources of evidence suggest that this may be the
case. First, past studies have identified differences in
thought disorder among schizophrenic and bipolar disorder
patients, with the former group demonstrating more bizarre,
disorganized speech and the latter demonstrating more
playful, combinatory oddities (Solovay et al. 1987). This
suggests that when thinking is disordered in these different
conditions, it may result from different mechanisms. Sec-
ond, Sass (1992) has cogently argued that the forms of self-
fragmentation characteristic of schizophrenia give rise to a
particular aesthetic. He cites a wealth of first-person exam-
ples of well-known writers, poets, painters, and schizophre-
nia patients (some of whom are also artists/writers/poets)
demonstrating similarities between the phenomenological
experiences of schizoid and schizophrenic individuals and
aspects of modernist art. We believe that the connection
between reduced cognitive coordination and creativity is
worth exploring. As noted by Park et al., despite years of 
hypothesizing about creativity and psychopathology, the re-
search evidence on this issue is mixed, and the positive ev-
idence paints a complex picture involving contributions of
psychopathology, childhood experience, and many other
factors. While it is unlikely that factors related to schizo-
phrenia are major determinants of the creativity of most
artists, it is nevertheless possible, as hypothesized by Sass
& Uhlhaas, that impaired context processing may be com-
mon both to schizophrenia spectrum disorders and certain
forms of creativity.
R9. Is NMDA activity impaired in disorganized
patients?
No commentary explicitly argued that NMDA dysfunction
is not involved, and many explicitly agreed that it is. Several
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asked for further evidence, however, The most important
new evidence reported in the commentaries is Javitt’s find-
ing that glycine, an NMDA agonist, reduces patient’s char-
acteristic errors in the AX-CPT task. This task assesses co-
ordinating interactions, such as those involved in executive
control and WM. This complements findings showing that
ketamine, an NMDA antagonist, increases healthy volun-
teer’s errors in this task (Umbricht et al 2000).
Oades, Röpcke & Oknina (hereafter Oades et al.) cite
findings of Kapur and Seeman (2002) that are interpreted
as evidence that PCP and ketamine have an affinity for D2
and 5HT-2 receptors that is similar to that for NMDA re-
ceptors. We have three responses to this. (1) The most im-
portant is that Kapur and Seeman’s estimate of affinity for
NMDA receptors is inadequate, for instance, it was made
in the absence of both NMDA and glycine (Javitt, personal
communication).8 Thus, if their measures of affinity for D2
and 5HT-2 are correct, the findings of Kapur and Seeman
do not weaken the NMDA hypothesis, but rather strengthen
it, because these findings indicate binding to D2 and 5HT2
receptors similar to Kapur and Seeman’s measure of bind-
ing to NMDA receptors, which was an underestimate. (2)
Dopaminergic and seretonergic systems cannot themselves
directly coordinate cognitive activities. Our primary grounds
for supposing that NMDA receptors have a coordinating
function is that information specifying what we are per-
ceiving, thinking, and doing must be conveyed by the glu-
tamatergic system. What needs to be done is to coordinate
these activities with each other. No other system has any-
where near the connectional specificity required to convey
the necessary information. On these grounds we expected
the glutamatergic system to have both driving and coordi-
nating components. The physiological properties of AMPA
and NMDA receptors provide strong support for this pre-
diction. (3) Glycine directly affects NMDA receptors, but
not D2 or 5HT-2 receptors. Its therapeutic effects (Javitt)
can therefore be more directly explained via the former
than the latter.
Oades et al. also ask whether NMDA hypofunction pro-
duces too much or too little glutamatergic activity. This is a
complex issue requiring further study, but the NMDA hy-
pofunction hypothesis is not a hypoglutamatergic hypothe-
sis as some have claimed (e.g., Kapur & Seeman 2002). It is
compatible with an increase, a decrease, or even with no
overall change at all in glutamatergic activity. This is because
the hypothesis focuses on the balance between modulation
via NMDA receptors and driving activity via non-NMDA re-
ceptors, not on the sum total of glutamatergic activity.
Alpert & Angrist suggest that NMDA dysfunction may
be a risk factor that is observable prior to acute onset. We
agree, and have data from several studies showing that con-
figural face perception and context sensitivity in size per-
ception are both impaired in that subset of the general 
population who rate themselves as disorganized on the
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (e.g., Uhlhaas et al.,
submitted). This is strong evidence because reduced con-
text-sensitivity in the size perception task (based on the
Ebbinghaus illusion) produces better performance in con-
ditions where context is misleading.9
Talamini et al. note that NMDA receptors have long
been associated primarily with learning, and ask how that
fits with our story. As noted in section 3 of the target arti-
cle, it fits well. We assume that learning is facilitated by co-
herence and synchronization. Patterns of activity that are
internally coherent are learned better than those that are
not. The memory deficits outlined in section 4.3. of the tar-
get article support the prediction that NMDA hypofunction
will impair learning. Hoffman & McGlashan emphasize
this aspect of NMDA function when citing evidence that
NMDA receptors may play an important role in maintain-
ing and/or eliminating synaptic connections. We agree that
this is well worth further study, but emphasize again that
from our perspective effects on learning are a consequence
of effects on processing, not independent of them.
Interactions between glutamatergic, dopaminergic, and
serotonergic systems are complex. Furthermore, we as-
sume that, in addition to the short-term interactive conse-
quences of a primary malfunction in any one of them, there
will be various long-term interactive adaptations. We agree
with several commentaries suggesting that there is much
undiscovered territory here.
The most unexpected commentary was that by Sanders,
Platek & Gallup (Sanders et al.) suggesting that com-
pensatory adaptation of NMDA functions, for example, in
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), may help explain why
blind schizophrenia patients are so rare. This is an intrigu-
ing and important idea. We strongly agree with their sug-
gestion that dynamic adaptation of NMDA receptor chan-
nels and their sub-unit composition may be of central
importance to an understanding of cognitive coordination
and its dysfunctions in general.
R10. EEG and high-frequency rhythms
Several commentaries discuss the relevance of EEG and
high-frequency rhythms. Tagamets & Horwitz see the
synchrony of fast rhythms as our main hypothesis. It is not,
and no other commentary said that it is. Section 5, where
this is discussed, was added to the target article only after
feedback from referees. As Phillips and Singer (1997a)
note, it is obviously the case that synchrony does not require
periodicity. When the signals synchronized are periodic,
however, as they will often be, then synchronized oscilla-
tions result.
Titone & Debruille outline evidence for the relevance
of cognitive coordination to language processing and asso-
ciated ERPs. They note that two potentials thought to re-
flect contextual interactions, N400 and P600, are impaired
in schizophrenia, and particularly in disorganized and non-
hallucinating patients. This fits well with our perspective.
However, they also note that, although ketamine reduces
N400, it has not yet been shown to reduce P600. We agree
that this is well worth further study, but do not see it as
greatly weakening our theory. First, a failure to find an ef-
fect is not strong evidence. Second, the relation between
P600 and context processing is not yet clearly known. Third,
acute effects of ketamine are less schizomimetic than
chronic ketamine psychosis. Condray & Steinhauer also
cite evidence that processes such as lexical access and se-
mantic memory function are associated with high-fre-
quency rhythms, and argue that timing relations in the pro-
cessing of rapid sequential stimuli may also be important.
Both commentaries suggest that relations between context-
sensitive language processing, EEG data, and psychosis are
worthy of much further study. We agree.
Crucial issues concerning the relevant analyses to use
when interpreting EEG data are raised by Pflieger and by
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Strelets. Pflieger reports that visual patterns presented si-
multaneously to left and right hemispheres, and differing
only in the perceptibility of groupings within those pat-
terns, produce ERPs that differ in some frequency bands,
and particularly in the gamma band. These differences
were located over the visual cortex, and occurred rapidly,
particularly when the pattern with perceptible structure
was in the right visual field. Evoked and induced responses
were analyzed separately, and were shown to be differently
affected by grouping. Though a predicted association be-
tween grouping and induced activity was not found, these
results show that there are many ways to analyze such data,
and that we do not yet know which are the most appropri-
ate. This is also shown clearly by the results outlined by
Strelets. She found that spectral power within the gamma
band did not distinguish schizophrenic patients, but that
coherence of gamma across different hemispheres and dif-
ferent cortical regions did. This fits well with Bressler’s
perspective, and again highlights the necessity of using ap-
propriate analyses when interpreting EEG data.
As Williams et al. rightly note, the hypothesis of re-
duced gamma is only a simple first-pass prediction from our
perspective. Emphasis upon phase synchrony within and
across regions must also be added, as must the relevance of
lower-frequency rhythms, for example, as discussed by
Kopell (2000). Furthermore, the distinction between in-
duced and evoked rhythms may also be important. Williams
et al. outline evidence that distinctions between schizo-
phrenic syndromes should be taken into account when
analysing EEG data. We agree that there is much unex-
plored territory here. Their finding of disturbed gamma ac-
tivity, particularly in disorganized patients, greatly encour-
ages such further exploration.
R11. Computational theories and computational
models
Seven commentaries call for our perspective to be devel-
oped and tested through modelling (Barch & Braver,
Grossberg, Hoffman & McGlashan, Raffone et al.,
Tagamets & Horwitz, Talamini et al., Williams et al.).
This was the most frequent suggestion made, so we must
take it seriously. We do. The commentaries vary in the
amount claimed for modelling. Talamini et al. argue that
cognitive neuroscience “might benefit from models.”
Grossberg argues that they are “needed.” Most is claimed
by Tagamets & Horwitz, who say that models are “neces-
sary.” In response, we reiterate our distinction between the-
ories and models, which was clearly understood by Barch &
Braver. What we have offered is primarily a theory, not a
model (Kay et al. 1998; Phillips & Singer 1997a; 1997b;
Phillips et al. 1995). We did cite both large-scale (e.g.,
Sporns et al. 1989) and small-scale models (e.g., Lisman et
al. 1998) in support of our theory, however. More are now
cited by Raffone et al. and by Williams et al.
R11.1. Computational theory
Science progresses by discovering abstract simplifications
that reveal some underlying order in the endless details of
existence. In relation to the study of information process-
ing systems, we find Marr’s (1982) concept of “computa-
tional theory” useful.10 This refers to an understanding of
the goals of any computation, and of the strategy or strate-
gies by which they can be met. This is clearly distinguished
from the representations and algorithms used to specify
procedures by which the strategy might be instantiated, and
of the hardware in which they may be implemented.
Phillips and Singer (1997a, sect. R7.2) try to make this clear
using the example of flight. The goal is to stay up in the air.
A strategy by which this may be achieved is to use the aero-
dynamic lift provided by wings with certain cross-sectional
profiles, as formalized in the appropriate equations. They
say nothing about the materials from which the wings are
made, nor about a host of other details concerning any real
wing. The theory can be tested using wings with various
cross-sections in wind tunnels. They can be used as models
of birds’ wings, but they are valid tests of the theory of aero-
dynamic lift whether any organism flies using this strategy
or not. Understanding the strategy transforms our under-
standing of biological flight, however. It tells us what to
measure to see whether any biological wing is capable of
generating lift in this way. This shows that birds’ wings can
and insects’ wings cannot. The aerodynamic theory can
therefore help us understand biological flight without re-
quiring us to build models of either bird or insect wings.
The role of computational theory in the study of brain
function is much the same, except for the very important
difference that there the goals are far from obvious. (We
assume that the computational goals of local cortical cir-
cuits are very different from the goals of the organism as
a whole.) The concept of “cognitive coordination” begins
with the hypothesis that coordinating diverse activities is
a general and fundamental goal. This is formalized using
information theory. A strategy by which this may be
achieved is by the combined use of driving and modula-
tory connections, together with a learning algorithm for
adapting the strengths of these connections based on pre-
dictive relationships between stimuli and events. This
strategy has been tested by studying the capabilities and
limitations of algorithms that instantiate the theory (e.g.,
Kay et al. 1998; Phillips et al. 1995). Given some under-
standing of these goals and strategies we can ask whether
the theory is of relevance to cortical function. NMDA-re-
ceptors and disorganization in psychosis supply evidence
that it is.
Barendregt suggests that the Pi (p) calculus, developed
for the specification and analysis of concurrent communi-
cating processors within computing science may be of use
in formalizing the basic concepts of our approach. This is
because “communication” in that theory is closely analo-
gous to “coordination” in ours. We very much agree, and are
surprised to find that so relevant a formalism has not yet
been used by those working on either brain function or ar-
tificial neural nets.
R11.2. Models
There is much disagreement about use of the term “model”
(see Webb 2001). One reason for this may be that it is much
over-used. There seems to be general agreement that it in-
volves two things, however: the model and whatever is
modelled. To build or select a good model, the modeller
must know enough about the thing modelled to build or
choose something similar. It seems to us that this does not
apply to the scientific enterprise in general. When search-
ing for some underlying order we are trying to discover
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something that we do not have, not model something that
we do have. Furthermore, the theoretical understanding
that we seek is very different from the data to which it re-
lates. Theories try to be simple, general, and final. The data
are complex, particular, and endless.11
Models can help move us towards a theoretical under-
standing, however (Webb 2001). Building things, whether
physically or as computer simulations of physical things, re-
quires the specification of things that theories can ignore.
This tests the relevance of the theory to physically real
things. More fundamentally, both Webb and Barch &
Braver argue that it can force us to refine, elaborate, or add
to the concepts and hypotheses on which the theory is
based. We agree with them. Models that may be relevant to
the current concerns are discussed in the following two sub-
sections.
R11.2.1. Models that include analogies to NMDA-recep-
tors. In support of our case, we cited a large-scale model
that includes NMDA-receptors (Sporns et al. 1989). This
group has since reported several even larger simulations, all
supporting the hypotheses we advocate. Williams et al.
now cite a large-scale simulation that is being used to study
the effects of NMDA-receptors on the emergence of high-
frequency cortical EEG rhythms, amongst other things.
Smaller and more functionally focussed simulations were
also cited in the target article (e.g., Lisman et al. 1998). Raf-
fone et al. now cite others. We agree that their work
strengthens the approach we advocate.
R11.2.2. Models that do not yet include analogies to
NMDA-receptors. Though modulatory receptors are com-
mon throughout the cortex, they are rare in connectionist
models of cognition, which usually rely on excitation and in-
hibition alone. Furthermore, in keeping with our perspec-
tive, these models are also rarely concerned with the coor-
dination of diverse activities. The simulations cited by
Grossberg, Hoffman & McGlashan, and by Talamini et
al. do not yet include connections analogous to NMDA-
receptors. All note that their models could be used to study
the effects of such connections, however. We hope that
they are. In response to Grossberg, we must note that the
evidence shows that NMDA-receptors play a role in pro-
cessing, not just learning. In response to Hoffman & McGla-
shan we must note that although we agree that NMDA-
hypofunction is likely to affect pruning, we do not see how
this could explain the immediate schizomimetic effects of
NMDA-antagonists.
If any simulations not including analogs of modulatory
connections are shown to be capable of producing ade-
quately coherent percepts, thoughts, and actions, then that
will weaken our perspective. It would not disprove the the-
ory, however, nor explain the ubiquity of NMDA-receptors
and the effects of NMDA-antagonists. If extending existing
models to include analogies to NMDA-receptors can be
shown to aid coherence, then that would strengthen the
theory, but would of course not prove it.
R11.2.3. Are large-scale biologically realistic models
necessary? We have argued that models can help us de-
velop theories. But are they more than that? Are they nec-
essary? Tagamets & Horwitz claim that large-scale bio-
logically realistic models are necessary to an understanding
of the neural substrates of cognition. We agree that large-
scale models can often show properties that are unlikely to
be discovered in any other way. This does not imply that
theories can only be related to the evidence via modelling,
however. A comprehensive discussion of the role of models
is provided by Webb (2001) and commentators. Overall,
they make a strong case for using models. None of them
claimed that models are necessary, however, and several ex-
plicitly argued that they are not. Biorobotic models have
been useful to biology (Webb 2001), but so far not much
(Niebur 2001), and engineering has gained more from bi-
ology than biology from engineering (Selverston 2001). The
discovery of the structure of DNA and its relevance to ge-
netics is an oft-cited example of the usefulness of models to
biology. By itself the structure built by Watson from tin and
cardboard was far from adequate, however. It certainly did
not provide something “from which a compelling deduction
of cause and effect can be derived” as requested by Gross-
berg. Watson’s model was of use, nevertheless, and this ex-
ample shows that useful models need not be large-scale and
detailed. On the contrary, his was small and crude. Simple
models may be especially useful in the early stages of try-
ing to understand some complex system. Overly detailed
models can be as incomprehensible as the system itself
(Churchland et al. 1990; Giere 2001; Reeke 2001). In any
case, a detailed working model of the cognitive functions
impaired in schizophrenia would have to be capable of gen-
erating coherent percepts, thoughts, and actions, and of dis-
tinguishing fantasy from reality. No such system is likely to
be built in the near future.
Thus, though we think that models can be useful, we do
not agree that they are necessary. Furthermore, as large-
scale models can confuse, rather than enlighten, it is im-
portant to ask whether they help make the complex com-
prehensible. If the models advocated by Tagamets &
Horwitz do so then they will make a valuable contribution.
If they throw light on cognitive coordination, NMDA-re-
ceptors, or cognitive disorganization in psychoses, then
they will be of relevance to the issues being discussed here.
R12. Treatment implications of our perspective
R12.1. Implications for pharmacological interventions
New data cited by Javitt, indicating that glycine reverses
impairments on the MMN and AX-CPT paradigms sug-
gests that agents that enhance NMDA receptor activity can
improve cognitive coordination. It remains to be seen
whether pharmacologic interventions at glutamate recep-
tors can improve multiple manifestations of reduced cogni-
tive coordination, and whether these improvements covary.
The finding that glycine also improves scores on the cogni-
tive factor of the PANSS (which includes conceptual disor-
ganization) suggests that they may (Heresco-Levy et al.
1999). Because glycine also improves negative symptoms,
however, this raises the issue of why levels of disorga-
nized and negative symptoms should covary, and whether
our theory can account for this, as noted by Ginsberg.
Williams et al. suggest reasons why this might be so, and
significant zero-order or time-lagged correlations between
reductions in disorganized symptoms (or other manifesta-
tions of reduced coordination) and reductions in negative
symptoms would provide a strong test of their theory.
Goff and Coyle (2001) discussed several pharmacologic
intervention strategies to improve NMDA receptor func-
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tioning, including the use of co-agonists such as glycine,
partial agonists such as the antitubercular drug D-cycloser-
ine, and ampakines such as CX516 that potentiate AMPA
receptor-induced polarization, thereby enhancing NMDA
receptor functioning. To date, only glycine has been stud-
ied in terms of improving cognitive coordination, and this
is an important area for future study.
R12.2. Implications for psychological interventions
The use of psychological techniques to improve cognitive
coordination in schizophrenia provides much opportunity
for exploration. Park et al. demonstrated in several stud-
ies that altering stimulus and/or task contexts can modify
performance on cognitive tasks where performance defi-
cits are considered characteristic of schizophrenia. Our
group has demonstrated similar effects (Silverstein et al.
1996a). Such data support the idea that cognitive task per-
formance (or real-world behavior) should not be thought
of only in modular fashion. A fuller understanding of the
performance strengths and weaknesses in schizophrenia is
likely to include an understanding of social, affective, self-
representation, and cognitive factors during ongoing be-
havior.
In general, improved performance among schizophrenia
patients on tests thought to tap “hard-wired” deficits has
been observed following two types of interventions: (1) the
use of monetary incentives; and (2) the use of specific in-
structions or task manipulations designed to highlight rele-
vant material or reduce complexity (Silverstein et al. 2001;
1996a). Translated into the language of Gurwitsch (1964),
discussed by Sass & Uhlhaas, this suggests that theme-the-
matic field connections can be strengthened by increasing
motivation to perform the task, or by eliminating the pres-
ence of information that is likely to interfere with focus on
the theme.
Park et al.’s modification of spatial working memory
performance in schizophrenia through the use of social ma-
nipulations raises questions about what mechanism is in-
volved. Specifically, is improvement due to increased levels
of motivation secondary to the social interaction; to im-
provements in self-esteem secondary to the interaction that
subsequently enhance motivation; to a reduction in self-
fragmentation or self-disturbance provided by the positive
interaction, leading to an enhanced readiness state during
subsequent cognitive task performance, and/or to other
factors? All of these suggestions involve the question of
whether addressing the concerns or projects (borrowing
from Sass & Uhlhaas) of the person leads to improved cog-
nitive functioning. Preliminary evidence suggests that this
is the case in general, including in cases of cognitive coor-
dination. However, many questions remain about how this
works.
These principles may be operative in the use of token
economies with so-called “treatment-refractory” schizo-
phrenia patients. The simplification of the environment, the
increased feedback about positive and negative conse-
quences of behavior, and the linkage of appropriate behav-
iors to positive social interactions and secondary reinforcers
has led to dramatic improvements in the functioning of pa-
tients who did not respond to any other form of treatment
(Paul & Lentz 1977; Silverstein et al. 2002). One way of con-
ceptualizing this is to say that a token economy, through its
use of positive (motivating) reinforcers and enhanced stim-
ulus salience, improves context processing in schizophrenia
patients, allowing for behavior to become more adaptive.
The implications of this idea for cognitive rehabilitation
of schizophrenia is that, assuming the presence of relevant
treatment content, only treatments that address motivation
are likely to succeed. Cognitive rehabilitation approaches
that directly aim to promote task engagement through the
use of intrinsic (Medalia et al. 1998) or extrinsic (Silverstein
et al. 2001) reinforcers appear to be the only forms of cog-
nitive rehabilitation for schizophrenia that demonstrate clin-
ically meaningful real-world improvements in neuropsy-
chological functioning.12 “Disembodied” approaches, that
conceptualize the work as an attempt to modify an aspect of
a computational system, often fail to show any benefit
(Benedict et al. 1994). We suggest that in developing new
cognitive and psychosocial rehabilitative treatments for
schizophrenia, clinicians build in motivational and other co-
ordination-enhancing features. We are currently testing
several methods for enhancing awareness of response readi-
ness (as defined by Lutz 2002), to see if these methods im-
prove performance on laboratory (perceptual) measures of
cognitive coordination. Recent research indicating that
schizophrenia patients can self-regulate their own EEG ac-
tivity (Gruzelier 2000) also suggests that neurophysiological
phenomena such as gamma band synchrony may also be
amenable to psychological influence. In developing inter-
ventions to enhance cognitive coordination, it will be im-
portant to determine which patients benefit from them, and
what can be done for patients who do not benefit (e.g., de-
velopment of assistive devices to improve binding; Tien
1999). Ultimately, it will be important to determine if any
techniques that can be used to improve functioning in the
laboratory also assist patients in their ability to organize their
own experience and behavior in the real world.
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NOTES
1. Ambiguity and its resolution through context is central to
language (e.g., Altmann 1998), as is the perception and produc-
tion of syntactic structure, which involves dynamic grouping. Our
concept of dynamic grouping is much the same as Fodor and
Pylyshyn’s (1988) notion of “compositionality,” which applies pri-
marily to higher functions such as language and working memory.
Recent evidence also shows that higher perceptual functions, such
as the perception of causality, are highly context sensitive. Execu-
tive functions may be so commonly impaired in schizophrenia, as
emphasised by Cohen and Servan-Schreiber (1992), because they
are highly dependent on context-sensitivity and dynamic organi-
sation.
2. Notions of “top-down” and “bottom-up” need to be im-
proved, however. Contextual modulation of activity in primary vi-
sual cortex by texture segregating processes within higher visual
cortex is both “top-down” and stimulus driven (Zipser et al 1996).
As this is contradictory, given normal usage, the terminology
should either be improved or abandoned. In the meantime, when
we mean “task-based effects” we will say just that.
3. This view is consistent with the “force-field” theory of Ak-
sentijeviç et al. (2001). They proposed a view of perceptual space
based in analytical geometry, and on Köhler’s (1929) “minimum
principle” (or law of prägnanz), in which visual grouping (across
space) and auditory grouping (across time and involving memory
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processes) are seen as reflecting a common mechanism. Aksenti-
jeviç et al. (2001) argue that the spatio-temporal equivalence of vi-
sual and auditory grouping, as an example of “supramodal invari-
ants of organization” can provide clues to the neural correlates of
perception, and to the dependence of perceptual events on their
contexts.
4. A recent model in support of the widespread importance of
oscillatory mechanisms is the OSCAR (OSCillator-based Associa-
tive Recall) model of Brown et al. (2000). The OSCAR model,
which is based on both computational modeling and real-world
data, demonstrates that the internal representation of sequential
information involves the formation of links between internal cog-
nitive states and events in the external world. In this model, in-
ternal cortical representations become bound to each other by
synchronized oscillations at various time scales. Internal and ex-
ternal events are bound by the association of external events with
an endogenous, dynamic learning context signal/vector, which
represents the changing state of an array of several endogenous
oscillators (operating over a range of fast, medium, and slow fre-
quencies), with each modeled as a signal that varies sinusoidally
over time. The changing output of the oscillators causes the in-
ternal learning context to change over time, but the predictable
relationships between the oscillators (like the relationships be-
tween the second, minute, and hour hands of a clock) allow for se-
quential order to be encoded and for facilitation of order infor-
mation during recall. In this way, successive states of the system
can be reproduced from knowledge of an initial state. In the OS-
CAR model, encoding involves the formation of associations be-
tween successive list items and successive internal dynamic states
(modeled as the product of the outputs of the oscillators at any
given time point). Recall involves reinstatement of the dynamic
learning context, which, of course, assumes the ability to gener-
ate/recreate oscillatory activity.
Brown et al.’s model is consistent with our thesis, in that they
note that oscillatory activity underlies performance in a variety of
areas, including visual perception, spelling, variable binding in
reasoning, motor control, short term memory, and time estima-
tion. Brown et al. suggest that oscillators can be viewed as adap-
tively rational mechanisms that allow for representation of the dy-
namic statistical properties of the external environment in such a
way that optimal behavior can result. The OSCAR model provides
a nice example of how a timing mechanism can be reconciled
within the view we propose (although, whereas we focus on syn-
chronization within the gamma band, they focus on synchroniza-
tion of oscillations across varying time scales). It is likely, however,
that oscillations in other bands are involved in some of the effects
we discuss. Spontaneous transitions between gamma and beta os-
cillations have been recently reported (Olufsen et al. 2003), inter-
actions between oscillations in several frequency bands have been
observed during top-down and bottom-up processing interac-
tions, and the frequency bands in which oscillations occur may de-
pend in part on prior experience with the stimuli (Von Stein et al.
2000). Our theory would have predicted the sort of grouping ef-
fects in memory that are addressed by the OSCAR model, but the
generation of their model specifically from data on sequential pro-
cessing highlights the importance of a timing mechanism, as sug-
gested by Condray & Steinhauer. We agree that if in fact vari-
ous forms of context processing (simultaneous and temporal/
sequential) are mediated by the same mechanisms, then a unified
theory and model will have to account for both forms. We are en-
couraged that this issue has been noted by several commentators,
and that available data (e.g., those of Condray & Steinhauer) and
recent modeling work can be reconciled with the theory we pro-
pose.
5. The serotonergic and glutamatergic systems interact con-
siderably. Many effects of NMDA antagonists involve 5-HT2A re-
ceptors, and involve excess activity at non-NMDA glutamatergic
receptors (Aghajanian & Marek 2000). Also, 5-HT2A antagonists
can block certain behavioral effects of NMDA antagonists (Carls-
son 1995; Yamaguchi et al. 1987). In the PFC, 5-HT2A receptor
stimulation increases the release of glutamate and the rate of ac-
tivity at non-NMDA glutamatergic receptors. NMDA antagonists
can also lead to increased glutamate release and activity at non-
NMDA receptors (Mathe et al. 1998). The effects of this would
be to increase feedforward processing of sensory information
while reducing modulatory activity at NMDA receptors.
The first pharmacological models of schizophrenia were based
on effects of hallucinogenic drugs. It was thought that these drugs
produced their effects through antagonism of 5-HT receptors
(Gaddum & Hammeed 1954; Wooley & Shaw 1954). More re-
cently, electrophysiological studies have demonstrated that acti-
vation of 5-HT2A receptors produces large increases in gluta-
matergic excitatory postsynaptic potentials in the apical dendritic
region of layer V pyramidal cells through a presynaptic mechanism
(Aghajanian & Marek 1999). The effects of NMDA antagonists
such as MK-801 are strongly potentiated by LSD, which acts on
5-HT2A receptors (Carlsson 1995). This is thought to cause a de-
ficiency in thalamic filtering, an increase in sensory information
being sent to the cortex, and a breakdown of integrative cortical
functions (Aghajanian & Marek 2000). All of this has led to the
suggestion that it would be useful to achieve an integration of the
psychedelic hallucinogen and glutamatergic theories of schizo-
phrenia (Aghajanian & Marek 2000).
An important distinction in this discussion is that between local
and global or systemic effects. This is important because while the
local circuitry that we propose to be abnormal in schizophrenia
may rely primarily on one mechanism, which we propose to be
NMDA receptor activity, the systemic effects of NMDA receptor
antagonists go beyond the local modulatory circuit and involve in-
teractions with other neurotransmitter systems, including dopa-
mine, serotonin, GABA, and acetylcholine (Javitt & Zukin 1991;
Jentsch & Roth 1999). Thus, it is not the case that all effects of
NMDA receptor antagonists will be analogous to those produced
at the local circuit level. For example, MK-801, an NMDA recep-
tor antagonist, has effects on dopaminergic and serotonergic ac-
tivity, which are also involved in cognition. NMDA receptor an-
tagonists thus can be expected to produce both widespread
dysfunctions in modulatory activity (because the local circuitry on
which we focus is widely distributed throughout the brain), as well
as widespread effects on other neurotransmitter systems that are
affected by NMDA receptor activity.
6. In the Danion et al. (1999) study of nonverbal memory, re-
call was impaired at two levels. At one level, associations between
pairings of objects was impaired. This was interpreted as a deficit
in relational binding, in the sense that patients were not able to
combine all aspects of events into a cohesive, memorable, and dis-
tinctive whole. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis on
the role of cognitive coordination in memory, on the role of
NMDA functioning in memory organization (such as that involved
in transitive inference), and on the role of oscillatory activity in
grouping and order effects in memory (Brown et al. 2000). At 
another level, schizophrenic patients’ recall disturbances in the
Danion et al. study were viewed as a failure to bind event-related
information with self-representation information, or, stated differ-
ently, a failure to bind self-awareness with information about the
external world during ongoing experience.
Studies such as those of Danion et al. and Tendolkar et al.
(2002) provide a link between concepts of binding that address
neural circuitry at the stimulus feature level, and phenomenolog-
ical concerns about self cohesiveness and fragmentation, which
some consider to be core phenomena in schizophrenia (see Sass
& Uhlhaas commentary).
Such studies also extend past discussions of the directionality of
cognitive coordination failures. For example, while basic coordi-
nation failures may be responsible for disturbances ranging from
gestalt perception to subjective feelings of experiencing the envi-
ronment as a sequence of single objects without an integrated con-
text, it is unknown at this point how failures in binding self-aware-
ness with ongoing experience may alter the motivational and
affective stance toward the environment so as to produce further
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alterations in basic perceptual processes. All of this stresses the
need to explore whether our cognitive coordination theory can be
extended to account for autonoetic awareness, and the level of
binding necessary to achieve a cohesive self-representation and
integration of this representation with external events during on-
going experience.
7. In many cases, however, these impairments are only evident
under conditions of rapid stimulus exposure. While under normal
circumstances patients may not see objects as fragmented, slow-
ness in the processing of gestalts, the formation of noisy repre-
sentations, or unusually high amounts of competition between
perceived objects and other objects and features in the environ-
ment for attention, are likely to have serious consequences for the
schizophrenia patient (Silverstein et al. 1998a; 2000). These in-
clude slowness or interference in accessing lexical information
linked to objects, stimulus overload, the capture of attention by ir-
relevant information, and so on. Moreover, while there are reports
of patients seeing objects as fragmented (Arieti 1979; Chapman
1966; McGhie & Chapman 1961), it appears to be the case that
under normal circumstances, these patients can use compensatory
strategies to normalize the perception of the object. This is
demonstrated in the following examples: (1) “I have to put things
together in my head. If I look at my watch I see the watch, watch-
strap, face, hands, and so on, then I have got to put them together
to get it into one piece” (Chapman 1966); and (2) “Everything is
in bits. You put the picture up bit by bit into your head. It’s like a
photograph that’s torn in bits and put together again” (McGhie &
Chapman 1961).
8. Javitt (personal communication) provides more detail on
this as follows: “Kapur and Seeman (2002) reported affinities of 2,
5, and 37 mM for PCP binding to the NMDA, 5-HT2 and D2 sites,
respectively. Although the 5-HT2 and D2 affinities may be cor-
rect, the NMDA affinities are substantially higher than the affini-
ties reported by others, which are generally in the range of 35–
250 nM (0.035–0.25 mM) (e.g., Nadler et al. 1990; Zukin & Zukin
1979; Zukin et al. 1983). Further, the apparent affinity of PCP and
other noncompetitive antagonists is known to depend upon the
ability of these compounds to gain access to the open channel.
When assays are conducted in the absence of glutamate and
glycine (as in Kapur & Seeman 2002) long incubation times are
required to permit accurate affinity determination. In the Kapur
study, the 2 hr incubation time is substantially below the minimum
time for the reaction to achieve equilibrium (Javitt & Zukin 1989).
Conducting binding studies under non-equilibrium conditions is
well known to lead to a substantial overestimate in affinity, as ap-
parently occurred. Kapur also reported an EC50 of 4 mM for in-
teraction of PCP with D2 receptors on CHO neurons. This con-
centration is 4 time higher than serum and CSF levels associated
with lethality during PCP overdose (Javitt & Zukin 1991), and un-
likely to be of relevance physiologically.”
9. A pre-existing cognitive style that is biased toward local pro-
cessing rather than toward global coordination in no way prevents
exacerbation of that bias during acute episodes, however, and may
well make it more likely.
10. In relation to the analysis developed by Webb (2001), com-
putational theory may be seen as a source of ideas that can be used
to develop a model of some target system.
11. Some say that theories are models. If so, we have a model.
We think that this terminology is confusing, however, so do not
claim to have a model. Computational instantiations of the Co-
herent Infomax theory show that the concepts are well specified,
but we have not shown that it applies to simulated neural nets that
are constrained by relevant measures made on real brains. Indeed,
our computational studies suggest that various approximations
would be needed if applied to large networks and complex envi-
ronments. After extensive discussion, Webb (2001) concludes that
something is a model only if used as such. According to this view,
our theory it is not a model, as we do not use it as one.
12. The discussion here focuses on cognitive rehabilitation of
neuropsychological processes, as opposed to cognitive behavioral
treatment of symptoms. These two forms of treatment have, to
date, had distinct aims. The recent demonstrations of success of
cognitive behavioral treatment for symptoms such as hallucina-
tions and delusions is impressive (Dickerson 2000; Pilling et al.
2002). Thus far, however, there have been no studies which have
looked at the neuropsychological effects of cognitive behavior
therapy for schizophrenia.
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